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ABSTRACTS

The Individual, the State, and Ethnic Communities in Political Theory

By V. VAN DYKE

Liberal political theory and contemporary expositions of human rights focus largely on the individual. Some liberal theorists even deny that ethnic communities and other groups, as collective entities, can have moral rights at all. The outlook is narrow and unfortunate. It reflects a preoccupation with domestic politics and a model of domestic politics that neglects the common fact of heterogeneity. It ignores widespread practices and urgent problems, for in many countries groups identified by race, language, or religion make moral claims, and their claims are sometimes conceded. It ignores the common view that nations or "peoples" have a (moral) right of self-determination, and it even leaves the state itself without justification. If theory is to give adequate guidance, its focus must be broadened. The question of group rights needs to be explored, and interrelationships between the rights of individuals, of groups, and of the state need to be clarified.

Problems in the Management and Resolution of International Conflicts

By C. LOCKHART

Discussion of the independent nature of four problems in the management and resolution of international conflicts fills a gap, since these distinct problems are often considered to be a single undifferentiated subject area. The first problem is the existence of multiple conflict structures (patterns of capabilities and interests): different structures follow differing patterns of development. The second problem concerns difficulties in statesmen's abilities to discern accurately the structure and thus the dynamics of the conflict episodes they confront. The third problem involves the strategy requirements of different conflict structures, and the fourth the discrepancies between statesmen's strategy preferences and the requirements of different conflict structures. Increased intellectual recognition of these distinct issues might help to reduce the severity of international conflicts by reducing misperception and inappropriate actions based on misperception. But statesmen would still face problems in gaining domestic political support for their intellectual understanding of international conflicts.

Deterrence in 1939

By A. ALEXANDROFF and R. ROSECRANCE

Rather than a case where deterrence was not tried, 1939 is a case where deterrence failed. As such, it has important implications for deterrence theory. Mutual deterrence must operate on roughly the same time perceptions. Britain felt impelled to deter Germany after Prague, but could offer only a long-term deterrent. Germany's short term appeared so favorable that the long-term uncertainties posed by Britain and France failed to restrain her. The experience of 1939 also underlines the importance of political factors, particularly realignment in mutual deterrence. The Russo-German Pact tipped the balance toward war. In the contemporary setting, calculations of time perspectives between the Soviet Union and the United States are important for mutual deterrence, especially in Europe. Changes in the Sino-Soviet split hold further implications for contemporary deterrence.

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The Promise of the World Order Modelling Movement

By H. D. LASSWELL

Although the World Order Models Project (WOMP) has issued valuable publications, perhaps the most important feature is the process by which the project was organized and carried out. It can be viewed as a first step in a movement dedicated to the reorientation of global values and institutions. A preferred public order in an interdependent world requires voluntary attention control among the participants in globe-encircling networks. The prospects of a preferred world are improved by stepping into the future with subjectivities in harmony with the value goals of human dignity. Subjectivities must be exposed to the continuing discipline of a modelling process that is at once contextual and problem-oriented, and occasions a cooperative experience of thinking, feeling, and acting.

Rawls' Theory of Justice: Domestic and International Perspectives

By R. AMDUR

In *A Theory of Justice,* John Rawls seeks to derive principles of justice from the agreement of rational, hypothetical individuals, each concerned to further his own interests. From a carefully defined initial situation of choice, Rawls derives two basic principles: one demanding equal liberties for all, the other permitting inequalities in wealth and authority only when they serve to maximize the expectations of those who are left worst off. This article explores the political and social implications of Rawls' theory. It is argued (1) that the theory requires a constitutional democracy, offering very strong protection to political and intellectual liberties; and (2) that it also requires a highly egalitarian distribution of wealth and income. Although Rawls does not discuss international distributive justice, there are good reasons for concluding that his distributive principles ought to apply globally.

The Study of European Political Development

By P. H. MERKL

The evolution of theories of political development has gone full circle with its current "return to Europe" and to history. Scholars are once more examining the early state-building process and especially the extractive and repressive activities of its military, bureaucratic, and taxation systems. A geographical and historical model of the timing of state formation in Europe since 1500 reveals situations and necessities that explain much of the history of various European states. The changing dynamics of collective action and violence since 1830, moreover, reflect the underlying transformation of society and organizational life. But it is still too early to attempt an exhaustive synthesis of the different theories of crisis and political change.

Trends on Terror: The Analysis of Political Violence

By J. B. BELL

Both the public and the academic response to terrorism has been ahistorical, exaggerated, and closely associated with congenial political postures; moreover, the academic perspective is conditioned by the nature of individual philosophy. The books under review examine the subject from several points of view, in which the conventional means of social scientists have been wielded to mixed advantage. Since there are no agreed definitions, no accepted limits to the subject, and no very effective academic approach, the situation seems unlikely to improve dramatically in the near future.

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NOTICE TO OUR READERS

Thirtieth Anniversary Issue

October 1978 will mark the 30th anniversary of the initial appearance of WORLD POLITICS. Through the years, the study of international relations and national development has evolved in a series of changing emphases on conceptual approaches, subject matter, and analytical techniques. The editors believe that the 30th anniversary of the journal provides an appropriate opportunity to encourage an evaluation of the themes and methods developed over the past generation, and in particular a discussion of those that seem most promising for the years ahead. They therefore would like to mark this occasion by devoting all or part of an issue to papers concerned with a critique of and the outlook for research trends in international relations and national development.

The editors have chosen to open the proposed anniversary issue to all prospective contributors rather than to commission papers for this purpose. They invite the submission of manuscripts that focus on broad retrospective and prospective views of the study of world politics. Papers received in response to this invitation will be given priority, but must conform to our regular rules and will be handled under normal editorial procedures. Manuscripts submitted for the anniversary issue should be so marked; they should be received before October 1, 1977, and should preferably be no longer than 10,000 words, including footnotes.

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THE INDIVIDUAL, THE STATE, AND ETHNIC COMMUNITIES IN POLITICAL THEORY

By VERNON VAN DYKE*

SINCE the time of Hobbes and Locke, liberal political theorists have made it their primary purpose to explore relationships between the individual and the state.[1] Problems in these relationships pervade the writing of academic theorists, and pronouncements about them are central features of historic documents. The truths that Thomas Jefferson held to be self-evident are truths concerning the individual and the state: all men have inalienable rights, and governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. Similarly, the French revolutionaries, though also concerned with the nation, proclaimed the rights of man and of the citizen. The tradition is carried on in contemporary international declarations and covenants on human rights, for—with certain exceptions—the rights enumerated are the rights of individuals in relation to the state.

The argument here will be that the liberal conception—an individualist conception—is unduly limited. It is not enough to think in terms of two-level relationships, with the individual at one level and the state at another; nor is it enough if the nation is added. Considering the heterogeneity of mankind and of the population of virtually every existing state, it is also necessary to think of ethnic communities and certain other kinds of groups, and to include them among the kinds of right-and-duty-bearing units whose interrelationships are to be explored. The question is whether ethnic communities that meet certain criteria should be considered units (corporate bodies) with moral rights, and whether legal status and rights should be accorded to them.

* This article was stimulated by discussions in a seminar that I conducted in 1975–76 in connection with the residential fellowship program of the National Endowment for the Humanities. I wish to thank the Fellows who participated, and particularly Malcolm Byrnes (Southern University), Craig R. Goodrum (University of Texas Law School), Rockne M. McCarthy (Trinity Christian College), and Roger N. Pajari (Georgia Southern College). I have benefited also from suggestions offered by colleagues, notably Lane Davis and John Nelson.

[1] Though not presuming to classify Dante Germino ideologically, I might cite his statement that "the primary purpose of a political philosopher is to explore the individual's relationship to society. . . ." See his contribution, "The Contemporary Relevance of the Classics of Political Philosophy," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Political Science: Scope and Theory*, Vol. 1, *Handbook of Political Science* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley 1975), 259.

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The first step in the argument, after the definition of crucial terms, is to show that the liberal emphasis on the individual even precludes a proper theory of the state, which suggests in principle that liberalism cannot be trusted to deal adequately with the question of status and rights for ethnic communities, most of which are minorities within the state. The second step is to cite practices relating to ethnic communities and other groups—practices that at the very least raise questions about the adequacy of the liberal individualistic prescription. They suggest that liberalism needs supplementing. The third step elaborates on the second, citing the right of nations or peoples to self-determination as the right of groups rather than of individuals, and therefore as a right for which liberalism does not offer a clear basis. In some cases the rights that groups exercise are perhaps reducible to individual rights and can thus be brought within the framework of liberal theory, but in other cases the rights belong to groups as corporate units. The fourth step is to note an implication of the third: that the usual assumption that the consent of the governed is the consent of individuals is open to question, and that the consent that counts may come from groups. The final step is to ask what difference it makes if ethnic communities and other groups, in addition to individuals, are acknowledged as right-and-duty-bearing units.

The Meaning of Crucial Terms

By ethnic community I mean a group of persons, predominantly of common descent, who think of themselves as collectively possessing a separate identity based on race or on shared cultural characteristics, usually language or religion; they may or may not think of themselves as a nation, a concept with stronger implications for political autonomy or independence.

In asking whether ethnic communities should be considered to have rights, I am asking about moral rights—that is, about morally justified claims.[2] Whether a claim is morally justified is, I assume, a question for individual judgment, though of course many persons need to concur in the judgment before meaningful social recognition of the claim is likely to occur. In fact, one of the common issues in politics is whether a justified moral claim (a moral right) exists that ought to be reinforced by law—that is, by being made a legal right as well.

[2] Cf. Morris Ginsberg, *On Justice in Society* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1965), 74-75; S. I. Benn and R. S. Peters, *The Principles of Political Thought* (New York: Free Press 1965), 107-16.

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The above implies that rights may be moral or legal, or both. To classify them in additional ways is to raise questions, some of which will be argued below. Rights may belong either to individuals or to groups as units. I do not have an exhaustive list of the kinds of groups that ought to be considered in this connection. I would surely include the following as potential or actual right-and-duty-bearing units: ethnic communities, nations, and the populations of political dependencies and sovereign states. I would also include trade unions, though they do not figure in my present argument. I would exclude chance aggregations and even social and economic classes, considered as such; they may have group interests, but not group rights. What to say about other sorts of groups is a question that I leave unexplored.

Rights that belong to individuals may go to them either as human beings or as members of a group. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights enumerates rights of the first sort; they go to "everyone . . . without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status." No comparable enumeration exists of rights of the second sort, going to individuals as members of a group; they are illustrated by the right to vote, which as a rule goes only to citizens.

Rights that belong to a group may be either derivative or intrinsic. A group right is derivative if it is delegated by one or more original holders of the right—for example, the members of the group, or perhaps the state; it is intrinsic if it is aboriginal to the group. To hold that a group right is derivative, and most particularly to hold that it is derived from individuals, is compatible with liberal individualistic theory, for the group right is then reducible to an individual right. To hold that a group right is intrinsic, however, requires a modification of individualism in some degree.

The statement that groups have moral and legal rights (are right-and-duty-bearing units) inevitably threatens to revive the old question whether there is such a thing as a real "Group-Person" with human qualities such as a mind or a spirit.[3] I reject the thought, but will not

[3] Cf. Otto Gierke, *Natural Law and the Theory of Society 1500 to 1800*, trans. with an introduction by Ernest Barker (Cambridge [England]: At the University Press 1934), I, lxiv, lxxxvii, 174, 175; Frederic William Maitland, *Collected Papers* (Cambridge [England]: At the University Press 1911), III, 304-20; Morris R. Cohen, *Reason and Nature: An Essay on the Meaning of Scientific Method* (2nd ed., Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press 1953), 388-97; Harold J. Laski, "Morris Cohen's Approach to Legal Philosophy," *University of Chicago Law Review*, XV (Spring 1948), 577-82; Leicester C. Webb, "Corporate Personality and Political Pluralism," in Webb, ed., *Legal Personality and Political Pluralism* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press 1958), 45-65; Dirk Jellema, "Abraham Kuyper's Attack on Liberalism," *Review of Politics*, XIX (October 1957),

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argue the question in this brief statement of crucial definitions. What I have in mind is suggested by the idea of a corporation, which has rights and liabilities distinct from those of the persons composing it. It is suggested, for that matter, by the state itself, for *it* is a kind of corporation. At the same time, ethnic communities are unlike corporations in that they are not the creatures of law or the state. They come into existence—as nations sometimes do—independently of the state, raising the question whether they may have moral rights and a capacity to advance moral claims regardless of their legal status.

Liberal Theory on the Individual and the State

Among liberal political theorists, the focus on the individual and the state is so prominent and obvious that it seems almost superfluous to cite supporting evidence. But the focus is important, and so is the related fact that the emphasis on individualism leaves liberals without a proper theory of the state.

Both the focus and the related fact are apparent in works stressing the idea of the social contract. Hobbes and Locke, for example, make it clear that individuals (men, in fact) are parties to the contract—men who act for themselves and presumably for associated women and children. They do not act as representatives of ethnic or other groups. According to Hobbes, "A commonwealth is said to be instituted when a multitude of men do agree. . . ."[4] Hobbes provided no place for associations or groups at the intermediate level between the individual and the commonwealth. As Sabine puts it, "There is [for Hobbes] no middle ground between humanity as a sand-heap of separate organisms and the state as an outside power. . . ."[5] Similarly, Locke spoke of an "original compact [through which] any number of men . . . make one community or government wherein the majority have a right to act and conclude the rest."[6] Later, Rousseau too spoke of a number of men establishing the state through a social compact; and he was explicit about eliminating associations intermediate between the individual and the state, holding that "if . . . the general will is to be truly expressed, it is essential that there be no subsidiary groups within the State. . . ."

482-85; Bernard Zylstra, *From Pluralism to Collectivism: The Development of Harold Laski's Political Thought* (Assen, The Netherlands: Van Gorcum 1968), 25, 38-39, 50-53.

[4] *Hobbes's Leviathan* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1909), chap. XVIII, 133.

[5] George H. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory* (New York: Holt 1950), 475.

[6] Ernest Barker, ed., *Social Contract: Essays by Locke, Hume, and Rousseau* (New York: Oxford University Press 1962), 56-57.

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Each citizen was to "voice his own opinion and nothing but his own opinion."[7]

The most recent major exponent of a contractarian point of view, John Rawls, likewise assumes that the parties in the original position, who work out the principles of justice, are individuals who speak for themselves. Moreover, the justice that they seek is only for individuals. Rawls shows concern for social classes (that is, for "the least advantaged"), but he does not raise the question whether ethnic communities should be considered as entities with claims to justice.[8]

Emphasis on the individual is not confined to those who assume a social contract. In speaking of the greatest good of the greatest number, utilitarians obviously have individuals in mind. Those who focus on the common good or on the nature of political obligation are thinking of individuals. Those who speak of the consent of the governed usually take it as an obvious assumption that the consent is to come from individuals. Those who deal with the concepts of one man–one vote, one vote–one value, and of majority rule, clearly have individuals in mind. And references to equality can be assumed to be references to the equality of individuals unless it is specified otherwise, as in references to the sovereign equality of states.

Stressing individualism, liberals have no proper theory of the state. As indicated above, Hobbes spoke of a "multitude of men," and Locke of "any number of men," making a covenant. Neither attempted to characterize the men—not saying, for example, whether the men shared a common language or religion. They evidently thought of the question how some men acquired a moral right to make a covenant that would bind dissenters, for they both specified that the covenant was to have unanimous consent—not asking how probable it was that unanimous consent could be obtained. They did not bother, however, to say how women and children came to be bound. Rousseau's solution to the problem was in a way more forthright. He stated that those who did not consent became foreigners and could leave; if they remained, consent was implied.[9] At the same time, Rousseau's solution assumes that those making the contract somehow had a right to impose change on others.

More recent liberal authors handle the problem in different ways. Ernest Barker, considering Locke's position, says that two steps are

[7] *Ibid.*, 194.
[8] Van Dyke, "Justice as Fairness: For Groups?" *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 69 (June 1975), 607-14.
[9] Barker (fn. 6), 272-73.

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necessary to a social contract: preceding the contract that establishes a government is an earlier contract that establishes a society. "There must already be something in the nature of an organized community" before there can be a contract.[10] This is an ingenious, if not a disingenuous, solution to the problem; it suggests infinite regress. Rawls' solution to the problem is simpler: he just takes the state for granted, as a kind of happening, and goes on from there.

Some associate the state with the nation. That is the case with John Stuart Mill and with Ernest Barker (when speaking for himself and not commenting on Locke). Both are concerned, as Barker puts it, with the maximum development of the capacities of the greatest number of individuals, and both therefore favor a democratic state. Thus, they are concerned about the conditions prerequisite to democracy, and this leads them to insist that the boundaries of the nation should determine the boundaries of the state. Mill's statement, descriptive in form but prescriptive in intent, is as follows:

> Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the working of representative government, cannot exist. . . . [I]t is in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities.[11]

Barker also is both descriptive and prescriptive. "[M]ost States," he says, "are what we call 'national States.'" The assertion was highly questionable when he made it (his book was published in 1951), and it surely is untrue today. Speaking of the United Kingdom, he equated it with England. He spoke of the "general structure of English life," and said that "we start from the primary fact of the existence of national society."[12]

> The reason why the nation is generally the basis of a State is simple. There must be a general social cohesion which serves as it were, as a matrix, before the seal of legal association can be effectively imposed on a population. If the seal of the State is stamped on a population which is not held together in the matrix of a common tradition and sentiment, there is likely to be a cracking and splitting, as there was in Austria-Hungary.[13]

[10] *Ibid.*, xii.
[11] John Stuart Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill 1958), 230, 233.
[12] Ernest Barker, *Principles of Social & Political Theory* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1951), 3, 42.
[13] *Ibid.*, 55.

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Barker acknowledges that "the modern State is not always a unitary national society. It may contain national minorities. . . ."[14] But, rather than adjusting his theory to this fact, he treats it as an "addition," tacked on and left as an anomaly.

Though Barker thinks that the state should be based on a national society, he does not grant the nation a moral right to statehood any more than he accepted Locke's apparent assumption that "any number of men" in a state of nature had a moral right to make a contract of government without having made a prior contract of society. In fact, Barker refuses to attribute moral rights (or what he calls "quasi-rights")[15] to groups of any sort. Aggregations of individuals may form groups, such as trade unions, and carry on activities; and the aggregations may be regarded as bodies or "wholes." But they are not to be regarded as persons, and not to be accepted as possessing moral claims or "quasi-rights." Moral rights belong only to individuals. If the state were regarded as a moral person, *étatisme* would be fostered and might issue in "a philosophy of the total and engulfing State whose will is the peace—and the tomb of its members."[16] If groups other than the state were regarded as moral persons, the authority of the state would be threatened. According to Barker, the state, and nonstate groups, are to be legal persons only. How "any number of men," or a nation, acquires a moral right to establish a state is a question left without a satisfactory answer. And the point has an implication: those who do not see a moral basis for the establishment of the state are not likely to see a moral basis for the claims of ethnic communities.

One wonders what Barker's answer would have been had he thought of the question whether, in international politics, one state might in principle have a moral claim against another, or whether the people of a colony might collectively have a moral claim against their imperial overlord. For that matter, one wonders what his answer would have been if he had thought of the question whether the citizens of a state, who in his eyes constitute a corporate unit with collective legal rights and responsibilities while it exists, also constitute a corporate unit with a collective moral right to re-establish the state if it were somehow dissolved. To be consistent, he would have had to say no to all these questions—unless in the third case he chose to suggest a prior contract of society. He concedes moral rights to individuals, but offers no basis for saying that some individuals have a moral right to impose change on others or to restrict their liberty.

[14] *Ibid.*, 56. [15] *Ibid.*, 139. [16] *Ibid.*, 71.

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Historic Precedents and Contemporary Practices

Historic precedents exist and contemporary practices are followed that go against the liberal individualistic position. They reflect the grant of both legal and moral rights to groups. In some cases, it seems clear that the group rights are not reducible to individual rights. In other cases the question can be answered, in a Kuhnian sense, in terms of the paradigm one adopts. Those who insist on an individualistic paradigm can find a basis for arguing that what is ostensibly a group right is reducible; and those who reject an individualistic paradigm as inadequate can contend (as I do) that it is preferable to adopt a more complex paradigm permitting individual and group rights, both legal and moral, to exist side by side.

The great historic precedent, of course, is the establishment of the state itself. As suggested above, the notion that all individuals somehow consent to the jurisdiction of the state is an obvious fiction. A more tenable position (though none is entirely satisfactory) is that human needs exist at various levels (for example, at the level of the individual and at the level of the community), and that the existence of needs implies a right to meet them. Essentially the same principle can be expressed in terms of the good: that the good can be sought for units at various levels, and that there is a right to promote the good.[17] This principle justifies individual rights, and it also justifies the rights of communities, including the communities (or the communities of communities) that constitute states. At no level are the rights absolute. At each level and between levels, rights and their exercise are limited by other rights. Within limits reached after considering the relevant rights, the meeting of the needs of the community—or the promotion of the good of the community—justifies restrictions on the behavior of individuals, whether they consent or not.

Precedents in specific circumstances were set in connection with the American and the French Revolutions. In the same Declaration in which Jefferson and his associates proclaimed the inalienable rights of all men, they also proclaimed the right of "one People to dissolve the Political Bands which have connected them with another, and to assume . . . the separate and equal Station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them. . . ." The wording permits a choice between paradigms. Jefferson spoke of "one People" and of "them." Those

[17] Cf. the definition of a *right* offered by Plamenatz: "A right is a power which a creature ought to possess, either because its exercise by him is itself good or else because it is a means to what is good, and in the exercise of which all rational beings ought to protect him." J. P. Plamenatz, *Consent, Freedom, and Political Obligation* (London: Oxford University Press 1938), 82.

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impressed by the term "them" can say that the Laws of Nature and Nature's God conferred the right on individuals severally, who then acted through representatives in exercising it. Those impressed by the term "one People" can say that the right was conferred aboriginally on the community as a kind of corporate unit, and that the right of individuals was simply to participate in the decision of the corporation.

The French revolutionaries were clearer. They proclaimed the rights of man, but they also proclaimed that "all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation." The statement presumably means that the nation has a collective right to act as a unit, and the word "essentially" suggests that the right is intrinsic, not delegated by individuals and not reducible.

Elsewhere, I have described contemporary practices with regard to the legal rights of groups.[18] Ethnic communities are sometimes treated as political units within countries, both through territorial delimitations and through the use of separate electoral rolls. Thus, communities as units are accorded representation in the various branches of government. Different communities sometimes live under different sets of laws—for instance, in the field of family law. It is not at all uncommon for ethnic communities to operate their own school systems, with tax support. Ethnic communities in many countries are differentially treated with respect to rights of property and residence; it is not only a question of territorial reservations for the indigenous but also a question of special measures designed to make it possible for the communities to preserve their distinctive identity. And in the case of less advanced groups, or of groups that have suffered discrimination, it is now not uncommon to give them a right to expect special measures (affirmative action) designed to promote their equality, e.g., in the economic and educational realms.

Of the various questions that attend these practices, two will be considered here. The first concerns reducibility: whether the communities have the rights as units, and whether the rights of the communities are reducible to the rights of individuals as members. The second is whether the legal rights should be thought of as reflecting moral claims. I will argue that the communities have the rights as units, that in some cases the rights are irreducible, and that in principle they may well reflect moral claims.

With respect to the first question, some of the clearest illustrations come from British colonial practices. In setting up legislative councils

[18] Van Dyke, "Human Rights and the Rights of Groups," *American Journal of Political Science*, XVIII (November 1974), 725-41.

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in colonies, the British regularly faced the problem of disparate ethnic communities—a relatively small but economically and politically powerful European (mainly British) community, one or more "native" communities, and perhaps a non-European immigrant community (for instance, in East Africa, an Asian community). Cultural differences were often acute. In such circumstances, the British thought explicitly in terms of communities, and perhaps in terms of "interests." In Tanganyika, for example, they thought in terms of three communities: European, Asian, and African—in 1948 numbering 11,000, 57,000, and 7 million, respectively. A British commission charged with recommending a system of representation at the end of World War II apparently did not even think of assuming that what should be represented were individual inhabitants. Instead, it thought in terms of the "claims of the communities" and the relative importance of those claims. Further, professing an inability to assess their relative importance, it saw "no logical alternative to equal representation."[19] There would be what other British spokesmen have called "parity"; that is, each community would count as one. There would be a "partnership" of communities in a "multiracial" society.[20] The words implied that the communities would retain their separate identities, being treated as distinct units. Individuals would have the right to help elect the representatives of the community to which they belonged. The British did this kind of thing not only in Tanganyika, but in other dependencies as well.[21]

That the British conferred legal rights on the communities as units is plain. And it is difficult to see how the community rights can be reduced to individual rights. The best reductionist argument would presumably be that each voter, or each adult inhabitant, was given a right to expect that his or her racial group would be represented as indicated. Individualists would be uncomfortable in making the argument, however, if their individualism included even an elementary variety of egalitarianism, for the arrangement made each European equivalent to about 5 Asians or about 636 Africans. It is much more comfortable and sensible to hold that the British looked at the problem of repre-

[19] Great Britain. Parliamentary Papers. *Inter-territorial Organisation in East Africa.* Colonial No. 191 (December 1945), 8.

[20] Cf. Tanganyika. *Report of the Committee on Constitutional Development 1951* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer 1951), 2, 18-19; Cranford Pratt, "Multi-Racialism and Local Government in Tanganyika," *Race,* II (November 1960), 35-36; Yash Tandon, "A Political Survey," in Dharam P. Ghai, ed., *Portrait of a Minority: Asians in East Africa* (Nairobi: Oxford University Press 1965), 79.

[21] Cf. Van Dyke, "One Man One Vote and Majority Rule as Human Rights," *Revue des Droits de l'Homme,* VI, Nos. 3-4 (1973), 456-58.

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sentation much as they and others look at it in international politics. Between states, regardless of their size, the problem of representation is solved by the parity rule: one state–one vote. The British simply treated the communities of Tanganyika like states.

Practices analogous to those followed in British colonies are followed today in a number of countries. Fiji provides an example—not surprisingly, perhaps, for it was a British dependency not long ago. Its population is racially divided. Approximately 50 percent are Indian, 42 percent Fijian, and 8 percent European and other. Voters register on racial electoral rolls, and each racial group has a quota of seats in the two houses of the central legislature. The House of Representatives consists of 52 members, with Indians, Fijis, and Europeans and others entitled to 22, 22, and 8 seats, respectively. No provision exists for changing the quotas as the distribution of the population changes. Again, a reductionist could argue that the arrangement gives each voter or adult a right to expect that his or her group will be represented as indicated, and the departure from the requirements of egalitarianism is not so egregious as in Tanganyika. Moreover, the third racial roll (European and other) is not strictly a community roll, though the British are the dominant element. At the same time, a modification of the international analogy applies in a credible way: the Fijian constitution (conferred by Britain) assumes the existence of three communities and assures them representation as such. The right of the individual is to participate in selecting those who represent not individuals, but the community.

In Fiji, five-sixths of the land is owned by over 6,600 Fijian land-owning units and is administered by a Native Land Trust Board. The constitution includes special protection for this arrangement, providing that any bill affecting it must be approved by at least 6 of the 8 Senators appointed in accordance with the advice of the Great [Fijian] Council of Chiefs.[22] The arrangement is obviously communal, giving land rights to the community as such on a collective, corporate basis. To seek to reduce these communal rights to individual rights is to strain to preserve a paradigm that does not fit.

In Belgium, the linguistic communities have rights. The constitution itself says that "Belgium comprises three cultural communities. . . . Each community enjoys the powers invested in it by the Constitution or by such legislation as shall be enacted by virtue thereof." Clearly, each community is here treated as a unit—potentially as a right-and-

[22] Great Britain. *Fiji Independence Order 1970*, "The Constitution of Fiji," Articles 45 and 68.

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duty-bearing unit. The cultural communities are identified by language. Each has its own region, and a fourth region (Brussels-Capital) is bilingual. Within each region language regulations prevail. The language of instruction in the schools, for example, must be the language of the region if tax support is to be forthcoming and if diplomas granted are to be recognized. The Belgians speak specifically, in official publications, of assuring "the territorial integrity of the cultural communities."[23] According to the constitution,

> The boundaries of the four regions may only be altered or amended by an act of Parliament passed on a majority vote in each linguistic group of each of the Houses, on condition that the majority of the members of each group are present and that the total votes in favour within the two linguistic groups attain two-thirds of the votes cast.

French and Dutch Cultural Councils are established, made up respectively of the French- and Dutch-speaking members of Parliament, and limited legislative powers are devolved upon them. The constitution specifies that "with the possible exception of the Prime Minister, the Cabinet comprises an equal number of French-speaking and Dutch-speaking Ministers." Clearly, these provisions confer rights on the communities as units. Determined individualists can of course argue that the community rights are reducible to individual rights, and that the moral claim is that of individuals rather than of the group. The argument would be that individuals have a right to expect that the territorial integrity of their linguistic community will be maintained, that within their region their language will be used, and that members of their linguistic community will share in governmental offices. In contrast, those who accept a paradigm including group rights can say that when the Belgians themselves officially speak of the rights of communities, it is gratuitous to allege that this cannot be what they mean, and that the rights really go to individuals. Moreover, the requirements that the language of the community be used and that the linguistic communities be represented in the Cabinet are not suggestive of individualism.

Community rights are recognized even in the United States. Individualism is dominant, of course, but there are exceptions to it and inconsistencies in it; and references to groups and their rights are increasing. The clearest case is that of the Indian tribes—"subordinate and dependent nations," enjoying those powers of sovereignty that Congress

[23] Robert Senelle, "The Revision of the Constitution, 1967–1971," *Memo From Belgium*, Nos. 144-145-146, January-February-March, 1972 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, External Trade and Cooperation in Development), 130.

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has not taken away.[24] Legislation concerning the Indians reflects different and contradictory principles, but some of it assumes that the tribes are like sovereign states in being irreducible right-and-duty-bearing units.

In the United States, courts refer increasingly to groups. In 1938 the Supreme Court spoke of the possibility that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities" might call for especially searching judicial inquiry.[25] Subsequently, the Court noted that "the economic rights of an individual may depend for the effectiveness of their enforcement on rights in the group, even though not formally corporate, to which he belongs."[26] In one of the landmark cases on school integration, a federal district court quoted a statement asserting that "[S]egregation is a group phenomenon. Although the effects of discrimination are felt by each member of the group, any discriminatory practice is directed against the group as a unit and against individuals only as their connection with the group involves the anti-group sanction."[27] In the 1960's, the terms "identifiable minority" and "cognizable group" began appearing in cases involving desegregation,[28] housing legislation,[29] jury selection,[30] and racial gerrymandering. With respect to the latter, one court pointed out that "the gerrymander . . . does not directly or necessarily affect the individual right to vote. It is aimed at groups of citizens and is intended to diminish the likelihood that their candidate will be elected." "There is no principle," the court held, "which requires a minority racial or ethnic group to have any particular voting strength reflected in the council [of the City of Chicago]. The principle is that such strength must not be purposefully minimized on account of their race or ethnic origin."[31] Earlier, the Supreme Court had declared that "the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . .

[24] *Native American Church* v. *Navajo Tribal Council*, 272 F. 2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959). U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of the Solicitor, *Handbook of Federal Indian Law*, by Felix S. Cohen (Washington 1942), 122-23, 278.

[25] *United States* v. *Carolene Products Co.*, 304 U.S. 144 (1938), at 153, fn. 4.

[26] *Beauharnais* v. *Illinois*, 343 U.S. 250 (1951), at 262.

[27] *United States* v. *Jefferson County Board of Education*, 372 F. 2d 836 (1966), at 866, quoting Note, *University of Chicago Law Review*, xx (1953), 577.

[28] *Cisneros* v. *Corpus Christi Independent School Dist.*, 324 F. Supp. 599 (1970), at 606, 627; *United States* v. *State of Texas*, 342 F. Supp. 24 (1971), at 24.

[29] *Hunter* v. *Erickson*, 393 U.S. 385 (1969), at 393.

[30] *Hernandez* v. *Texas*, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) at 478. *United States* v. *Hunt*, 265 F. Supp. 178 (1967), at 188.

[31] *Cousins* v. *City Council of City of Chicago*, 466 F. 2d 830 (1972), at 843, 851. Cf. *Sims* v. *Baggett*, 247 F. Supp. 103 (1965); *Howard* v. *Adams County Board of Supervisors*, 453 F. 2d 455 (1972), at 457; *Graves* v. *Barnes*, 343 F. Supp. 704 (1972), at 728, 730; *Klahr* v. *Williams*, 339 F. Supp. 922 (1972), at 927; *White* v. *Regester*, 412 U.S. 755 (1972), at 765; *Beer* v. *United States*, 374 F. Supp. 363 (1974), at 393.

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protects voting rights and political groups . . . , as well as economic units, *racial communities*, and *other entities*."[32] In the numerous ratio-hiring cases, the regular practice is to require that minority groups (perhaps including women) be represented in specified kinds of municipal or state employment in rough proportion to their numbers.[33]

These various judicial references to group rights are of course inconclusive. A Procrustean insistence that the evidence fits liberal individualist theory is possible. But the incongruities of that theory with respect to the equal protection of the law are receiving increased attention. Thus, Owen M. Fiss urges that, with respect to the interpretation of the equal protection clause, the "antidiscrimination principle" (which focuses on the individual) ought to be abandoned, and that in its place a "group-disadvantaging principle" ought to be adopted. "The concern," he says, "should be with those laws or practices that particularly hurt a disadvantaged group."[34] An individualist interpretation of equal protection provides a questionable basis for affirmative action—for example, when benefits go to persons who have not suffered discrimination themselves.

Rights for groups or communities are recognized not only at the domestic, but also at the international level. International action relating to Cyprus provides the clearest illustration of the assertion of irreducible community rights. The 1960 constitution of Cyprus, reflecting agreement among Britain, Greece, and Turkey, starts right out defining "the Greek community" and "the Turkish community"; numerous provisions treat these communities as corporate entities. Moreover, a resolution of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe relating to Cyprus calls explicitly for the protection of two kinds of rights on the island: "the human rights of all inhabitants," and "other rights belonging to the communities."[35] Other actions at the international level, though clearly providing for group rights, are not so clear on the question of reducibility. A resolution of the U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, for example, speaks of minorities that "wish for a measure of differential treatment in order to preserve basic characteristics which they possess and which distinguish them from the majority of the

[32] *Williams* v. *Rhodes*, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), at 39; emphasis added.

[33] See, for example, *Officers for Justice* v. *Civil S. Com'n, C. & C. San Francisco*, 371 F. Supp. 1328 (1973), at 1332.

[34] Fiss, "Groups and the Equal Protection Clause," *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, v (Winter 1976), 157.

[35] Council of Europe, Consultative Assembly, Sixteenth Ordinary Session, Resolution 290 (1965).

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population"; it says that "differential treatment of such groups or of individuals belonging to such groups is justified. . . ."[36] And the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination stipulates that parties "shall, when the circumstances so warrant, take . . . special . . . measures to ensure the adequate development and protection of certain racial groups or individuals belonging to them for the purpose of guaranteeing them the full and equal enjoyment of human rights. . . ."

The second question is whether the legal rights that are accorded should be thought of as reflecting moral claims. Barker's negative answer, noted above, is surely inconclusive. His assumption that the authority of the state should be safeguarded against the claims of non-state groups is an assumption that those concerned with minorities may or may not share. And even he did not allege that *étatisme* necessarily follows an acceptance of the state as a moral person. Evils may flow, of course, from almost any kind of political arrangement, including the recognition of group rights. The parity arrangement in Tanganyika, for example, is not suggestive of moral sensitivity. But no reason is evident for rejecting out of hand the view that groups, considered as units, may have moral rights. On the contrary, the grant of legal status and rights to groups, as in Belgium, Cyprus, Fiji, and the United States, may well be in response to a moral claim. Why should the possibility be ruled out that the authority of the state should be limited not only by the moral rights of individuals ("inalienable" or human rights), but also by the moral rights of groups?

Self-Determination as the Moral Right of Dependent Peoples

As noted above, Mill and Barker speak of the desirability of making the state coextensive with the nation. The view is relevant to the idea of self-determination, which has been advanced since the time of the French Revolution, though more in the political than in the intellectual realm; and self-determination has often been described as a *right*. "Every people," Woodrow Wilson said, "has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live."[37] The Charter of the United Nations speaks of the *principle* of self-determination, and the two

[36] E/CN.4/Sub.2/40/Rev.1 (June 1949), 2. Cf. E/CN.4/641 (25 October 1951).

[37] Michla Pomerance, "The United States and Self-Determination: Perspectives on the Wilsonian Conception," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 70 (January 1976), 2.

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human rights Covenants speak of the *right*. Speaking of it as a right, Wilson sometimes attributed it to *peoples* and sometimes to *nations*. The common reference in the interwar years was to *national* self-determination, but the U.N. Charter and the two human rights Covenants revert to the term *people*. "All peoples," the Covenants say, "have the right of self-determination." Who constitute a *people* is left vague.

Like the legal rights of communities, the right of nations or peoples to self-determination raises a question about the adequacy of the liberal focus on the individual and the state. Of course, it might be argued that the right of a nation or people is reducible to an individual right—that what is really recognized is the right of individuals to choose the sovereignty under which they will live, or the right to be governed (if they choose) along with others of their own kind. Such arguments, however, are not persuasive. Wilson's statement was not that every *person* but that every *people* has a right to choose the sovereignty under which to live. At most, the individual has a right to participate in the decision—and to leave the group if he does not like the outcome. Approximately the same rejoinder applies to the thought that individuals have a right to be governed together with their own kind. In contrast, a strong argument can be advanced that self-determination is the right of a group, of a corporate unit. The argument rests on words chosen when the right is asserted; on logic; and on an examination of practice.

The words chosen are sometimes ambiguous, as when Jefferson spoke of the right of "one People"—especially since the pronoun that he associated with "one People" was "them." At other times, the words chosen leave no doubt. Thus, in 1975 the General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for measures "to enable the Palestinian people to exercise *its* inalienable national rights. . . ."[38] A just collective claim is here assumed.

Logic supports the point more strongly. Where an individual right is at stake, such as the right of free speech, violation is a possibility, and preventive or protective measures can be taken; and if a violation occurs, redress can be sought. If self-determination were an individual right, comparable statements could be made. But in fact, comparable statements cannot be made. There is never a thought that, when a people exercises its right of self-determination, the outcome might violate an individual right. No violation occurs even in the case of those who oppose the outcome. They retain the right to leave the group, but they have no right of protection against the group's decision,

[38] A/Res/3375, XXX (13 November 1975); emphasis added.

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and no right of redress. The only individual right that might be violated is the right to participate in the decision. The foregoing suggests that it is the corporate unit that enjoys the right; the most that an individual can claim is a right to participate in the corporate choice.

That self-determination is the right of a corporate unit is also suggested by the way in which the right has been implemented. After World War I, it was simply assumed that certain components of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires were nations entitled to independent statehood. Individual voters in Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and so forth were not asked to choose. The victorious powers simply dealt with leaders of these entities whom they recognized, and arranged for independence. Even if there had been plebiscites giving individuals an opportunity to participate in the decision, they would have been within national units, and a majority vote would presumably have determined the fate of the entire unit, regardless of the wishes of the minority. In the few border areas where plebiscites in fact occurred, individuals voted not so much in their own right as to help in the settlement of conflicting claims between the adjacent nation-states. After World War II, the implementation of the right of self-determination has continued to be on a group basis. The dominant view in the United Nations is that a "people" is to be defined as the population of a political dependency as a whole. In most cases, the imperial power endorsing self-determination and granting independence has dealt with whatever central authority it recognized in the dependency, though in some cases special votes or referenda have been held. Whatever the procedure, the "self" that is "determined" is always a group as a unit.

When we speak of a group's right of self-determination, what kind of a right is at issue? The question is important, especially in the light of Barker's view that moral rights should not be attributed to groups. In the light of that view, it is perhaps not surprising that Barker did not analyze the notion of a right of self-determination. Although self-determination might be a legal right (it is nominally a constitutional right in the U.S.S.R.), assertions of the right rarely give it this quality. When Jefferson asserted the right of "one People," he described it as a right "to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them." The right that he had in mind should thus be classified as natural or divine or moral. Similarly, when the General Assembly adopts a resolution speaking of "the Palestinian people" and "*its* inalienable national rights," it is not speaking of legal rights; rather, it is asserting that "the Palestinian people" have a moral claim. Even when a state ratifies one

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of the Covenants, saying that "all peoples have the right of self-determination," it is not conferring a legal right on them. Rather, it is committing itself to the position that peoples have the moral right in question.

Assuming that self-determination is essentially the moral right of a group—of a collective entity, a unit, a corporate body—what is its basis? Several answers are possible. Those who believe that the individual's rights are natural or God-given can extend that belief to the rights of groups; they can say that the right comes into existence along with the group itself. Those who believe that the moral claims of individuals rest simply on a critical judgment about what ought to be can well say the same of the rights of groups. Both of these answers are compatible with a third possible answer, given earlier: that the existence of needs implies a right to act (within limits) to meet them, or that a conception of the good has a corresponding implication.

The Consent of the Governed: Can It Come from Groups?

The view that government derives its just power from the consent of the governed is noted above, along with the related tacit assumption that "the governed" are individuals. The question now is whether that tacit assumption is justifiable.

The assumption is understandable if the population of the state is homogeneous, sharing a common culture. But if the population is divided into different communities, each cherishing and wanting to preserve its distinctive identity, why should it be assumed that the consent that counts comes from individuals? Cannot entire communities give or withhold consent as collective units?

The question calls for additional comment on the right of nations or peoples to self-determination. Although the usual outcome of an exercise of the right is independence (sovereign statehood), that is not the only possibility. Puerto Rico has chosen Commonwealth status, giving it a considerable measure of autonomy while remaining under the flag of the United States. The same kind of status is contemplated for the people of the Northern Marianas Islands. The people of the Cook Islands have obtained a similar status in relation to New Zealand; and the people of the island of Mayotte have voted to remain a part of France rather than join the other Comoros Islands in an independent state. Every minority that has any kind of special status might in principle have obtained it through an exercise of self-determination.

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Moreover, nothing prevents an exercise of self-determination from leading to a decision to drop all claim to distinctive status and to accept assimilation into, or fusion with, another society. Whatever the outcome, as already indicated, the decision is that of a collectivity. Even if the entity exercising self-determination is somehow split, with different parts choosing different futures for themselves, the decision is collective; it is the consent of the respective parts that is obtained. And if the group or part of it chooses to remain within an existing state, why should it not be said that the consent of the governed is the consent of a collectivity? Individuals may consent too, if only by submitting, but this does not gainsay the separate consent of the group. And if, in connection with self-determination, the consent of the group as a unit can be obtained by deliberate design, why cannot the consent of other groups be given in less formal ways? Individuals may, of course, protest the consent that the group gives, and may leave the group, but the group's decision stands.

The Question of Exceptions

In the light of the statement made at the outset—that modern liberal political theorists focus on relations between the individual and the state as if no groups count that are intermediate—let it be acknowledged that social classes and interest groups are commonly recognized. That fact, however, is beside the point, for the consideration given to social classes and interest groups has little to do with the consideration that ought to be given to ethnic communities. To be sure, social classes in Europe (as "estates") were once differentially treated for political purposes, and in some countries a social class is at the same time an ethnic community. Moreover, an ethnic community may be an interest group. But liberal political theorists, apparently regarding selected aspects of the North Atlantic world as typical of the whole world, tend to ignore the possibilities suggested by these facts. Assuming that social and political arrangements within the state are arrangements for individuals, they treat social classes and interest groups as aggregations of individuals struggling with other such aggregations. They take it for granted that the various aggregations are integral parts of the society and polity, destined to remain so. They do not seem to think of the exceptional cases of aggregations that are culture groups with a corporate claim to differential political status and rights. Thus the consideration that they give to social classes and interest groups is not on a continuum with the consideration they give to states as corporate

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units, or to nations or "peoples." If one starts with the fact that states exist as corporate units, and goes on to a consideration of the claims of nations or "peoples," logical continuity is broken if the next step is to social classes and interest groups as they are usually considered. Logical continuity requires that the next step be a consideration of ethnic communities.

Are the theorists known as "pluralists" exceptions to the generalization that an unjustifiable leap occurs from a consideration of the state, nation, or "people" to a consideration of the individual?

In terms of the English pluralists (for example, Figgis, Laski, Cole, and Maitland) and of the German pluralist, Gierke, who influenced them, the answer might go either way. Of course, all of them intimate a framework, however vaguely, into which special status and rights for ethnic communities could perhaps be fitted. This is particularly true of Figgis, who concerned himself especially with the church and who spoke of the state as a *communitas communitatum*. Laski, too, made comments of an incidental sort suggesting some degree of autonomy for the countries of which the United Kingdom is composed, and for the Flemish and Walloons in Belgium. But it is abundantly clear that Laski and the other English pluralists, except Figgis, were thinking primarily if not exclusively of classes and interest groups that pursue individualistic values; they were not thinking of ethnic groups or culture groups that seek some kind of collective autonomy within a larger society or that seek to participate in the larger society as entities with status and rights. Their pluralism was the pluralism of economic associations and interests.

The principal steps beyond a recognition of the state and nation toward the recognition of status and rights for other comparable groups have been taken by scholars outside the mainstream of political theory—scholars whose orientation is predominantly empirical. Furnivall is credited with coining the term "plural society," and others influenced by him (notably M. G. Smith, Leo Kuper, and Leo A. Depres) are obviously concerned about the status and role (if not the status and rights) of ethnic groups. In the field of comparative politics, Arend Lijphart ("consociational democracy"), Val R. Lorwin ("segmented pluralism"), Hans Daalder, and others have similar concerns. Kenneth D. McRae, whose background is in political theory, belongs on the same list. A literature is growing that does not proceed on the assumption that once the state and nation have been recognized, the remaining questions concern relationships between the individual and the state.

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What Difference Does It Make?

What difference does it make? Why is it important that, alongside the principle that individuals are right-and-duty-bearing units, a comparable principle should be accepted for the benefit of ethnic communities? The answer has a number of parts.

1. Whether communities as well as individuals are considered as potential right-and-duty-bearing units should make a difference in intellectual inquiry. The traditional and present stress on the individual leads to a failure even to think about groups in some contexts where the omission is obviously deplorable, or to a gross neglect of groups. According to prevailing norms, it is all right to think of differential treatment for the population of states and for nations, but not for other communities or groups with a distinctive identity. Put somewhat differently, a stress on the individual and on the principle of equal treatment tends to promote the view that it is improper even to think about differences of race, sex, language, and religion unless it be to combat discrimination based on these characteristics. It tends to promote blindness to group differences and a kind of unspoken assumption either that societies are homogeneous or that right-thinking persons will treat them as if they were.

Illustrations of these tendencies are not hard to find. They are present, for example, in John Rawls' *A Theory of Justice*. As noted earlier, Rawls is wholly preoccupied with the question of justice for individuals. He does not deal with the problem of ethnic communities. He takes no note at all of differences of language. He mentions race only to rule it out as a basis for discrimination, and he mentions religion out of concern for the individual believer rather than out of concern for religious communities. He mentions self-determination, not as the right of a group to choose whether or not to be a sovereign state, but as the right of a state to be free of external intervention. The society to which his theory of justice applies is a society of individuals; he assumes that all societies are alike in that they consist of individuals and not of groups.

Similar statements apply to Hanna Pitkin's *The Concept of Representation*. Pitkin seems to take into account only British and American experience—and only those aspects of that experience that other political philosophers and theorists have noted. The representation of which she speaks is the representation of individuals, of constituencies, of interests, and of the "nation" as a whole. Of course, the "persons" of whom she speaks might be artificial or corporate, but she does not

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seem to think of this possibility. She does not acknowledge that representation might go to racial communities (as it does in Fiji and New Zealand), or to religious communities (as it has in Lebanon), or to linguistic communities (as it does in the Belgian Cabinet), or to ethnic communities of any sort.

Carole Pateman's *Participation in Democratic Theory* also illustrates the point. Pateman assumes that the only participants are individuals. One can read her book without finding any reason why seats in the House of Commons are allocated on a quota basis to the English, the Scots, the Welsh, and the Irish, respectively, or even an acknowledgement that this happens.

J. P. Plamenatz's *Consent, Freedom, and Political Obligation* reinforces the point. Plamenatz does not even mention the possibility that consent might come from a group as a collective unit, that freedom (i.e., "national liberation") might be desired by a group, or that political obligation might rest on a group.

In each of these cases, individualistic assumptions, combined with the dichotomy between the state and the individual, lead to inattention to practices that go counter to those assumptions. It is not that the practices are rejected; they are simply not considered. Vision is narrowed, and those studying the subjects treated are not reminded of and instructed on possibilities that they ought to take into account.

2. If, in principle, communities as well as individuals were accepted as right-and-duty-bearing units, the chance would be increased that a coherent and intellectually defensible doctrine or set of doctrines could be developed, which would respond to practical problems. Individuals want freedom and equality, to be sure, but there is also a "quest for community."[39] To focus only on the rights of individuals is to focus only on forces making for atomization and estrangement and to ignore primordial collective sentiment and group loyalties. Because of the failure to consider the appropriate role of communalism in the scheme of things, theory and doctrine go along one line and practice often goes along another; and individualism is assumed while anomie is bewailed. The thinking that occurs is compartmentalized—or cynical or naive.

3. If ethnic communities as well as individuals were explicitly accepted as right-and-duty-bearing units, it would probably make a difference in their representation in various activities. To be sure, in-

[39] Robert A. Nisbet, *The Quest for Community* (New York: Oxford University Press 1953).

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dividualism and even the principle of treatment according to merit are often modified in practice in favor of group claims, as in affirmative action programs. Nevertheless, individualism gives an advantage to members of the dominant group. Their cultural characteristics permit them to establish rapport most easily with those who already have influence and power. They command the dominant language. These qualities are likely to make them seem most suitable for appointive and elective offices and for leadership positions in all walks of life. Thus they tend to obtain disproportionate representation in the various elites. Persons from the minorities who become members of an elite may or may not be representative of their own culture group; they are likely to be co-opted, perhaps because they have more or less abandoned the culture from which they sprang.

4. If ethnic communities as well as individuals were accepted as right-and-duty-bearing units, it should make a difference to the fate of communities that are nondominant and to the psychological health of their members. Individualism, combined with the usual stress on personal merit, is destructive of cultures other than the majority or dominant culture. The schools—at every level—are likely to promote the dominant culture and to undermine all others. The standards and the procedures for recruiting elites are likely, as indicated above, to favor persons who belong to the dominant culture or are willing to assimilate into it. The minority person who adheres to a minority culture is likely to be looked upon as second class and second rate, his culture disparaged as unworthy. The whole attitude is an attack on the existence of the group and the self-respect of its members. It means oppression, and perhaps exploitation as well.

5. It would facilitate affirmative action if ethnic communities were accepted as right-and-duty-bearing units. After all, the discrimination for which affirmative action is compensatory was directed against individuals because of their membership in certain communities, and through them against the community as such. The discrimination was in a sense impersonal; it was not that a given person was to be denied certain opportunities and thus be excluded or kept down; it was rather that the whole community was to be kept in its place. The reciprocal of this is to take compensatory action for the whole community and to let individual members benefit even if they have not personally suffered discrimination. Such action is hard to justify, however, if the focus is simply on the individual and the state. It is hard to justify especially if affirmative action includes the preferential treatment of some, and

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therefore the prejudicial treatment of others. The point is brought out in the DeFunis case—the case of a white who claimed that he was denied equal protection when the Law School of the University of Washington denied him admission while granting admission to apparently less qualified blacks. The case went into the courts, but the issue was never resolved because it had become moot by the time the Supreme Court was ready to act. The issue would be much easier to handle—in fact, it would probably not arise as an issue—if it were accepted that communities as well as individuals are entitled to certain kinds of status and rights.

6. As already indicated, to accept communities as right-and-duty-bearing units would provide a more satisfactory doctrinal basis for some actual practices; it would also open up the question of engaging in comparable additional practices. For example, as noted above, American courts are treating certain groups as "cognizable"; in the name of the principle that the state shall not discriminate against individuals, the courts are ordering measures benefiting members of such groups, whether or not they have suffered discrimination. Moreover, corrective equity for a cognizable group may impair the interests, if not the rights, of a group that is noncognizable. For instance, a community of Hasidic Jews in the Williamsburgh district of New York could be divided against its will between two electoral districts so as to undo the effects of discrimination against blacks.[40] An exclusive emphasis on individualism thus leads to paradoxes that need to be resolved.

Soul City offers another paradox. It is being developed in North Carolina under black leadership, the idea being that it is to be mainly for blacks. But undiscriminating individualism makes it impossible to state this explicitly or officially. The merits of the project can scarcely even be debated in terms of the principle relevant to it—that communities as such (in this case the black community) deserve consideration and may have rights.

Still another paradox appears in the case of the Old Order Amish in Wisconsin.[41] The issue was whether the religious community had a right of survival that modified the right of the child to an education. The Amish were willing to send their children to public schools through the eighth grade, but feared that their community might be destroyed if the law requiring attendance to the sixteenth year were enforced against them. In this case, interestingly enough, the Supreme

[40] *United Jewish Org. of Williamsburgh, Inc.* v. *Wilson*, 377 F. Supp. 1164 (1974); 500 F. 2d 434 (1974).

[41] *Wisconsin* v. *Yoder*, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).

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Court gave precedence to the right of the religious community. But the court acted on the basis of the first amendment guarantee of freedom of religion, leaving the presumption untouched that nonreligious ethnic communities do not have a comparable right.

7. A doctrine accepting both individuals and communities as right-and-duty-bearing units is susceptible to universal application, whereas a doctrine focusing on individuals is not. Even if the melting pot could produce homogeneity in the United States, it could not possibly do so in most countries of the world. Actually, it is out of the question in the United States too. All countries of the world are in some degree heterogeneous. The tendency to think of states as if they were nation-states is highly misleading, for scarcely a state qualifies for the label.[42] Virtually all states are polyglot in the sense that they are multilingual, multiracial, multireligious, or multinational. If every culture group in the world were assumed to be a "nation" entitled to be a state, it would mean the division of virtually every existing state and the creation of mini-states numbering in the thousands. To have a doctrine that responds to the heterogeneity of the world it is necessary to provide a place for (that is, to permit the grant of status and rights to) groups that are intermediate between the individual and the state. Choices can then be deliberately made concerning the relative emphasis on the two principles. Sometimes the emphasis will properly be on individual rights and therefore on equal treatment regardless of ethnic differences. Sometimes the emphasis will properly be on the rights of ethnic communities and therefore on the differential treatment of members and nonmembers. The implication is that the state should not be conceived as a monolithic unity but as an agency for recognizing groups, determining what legal status and rights they shall have, supervising and coordinating their interrelationships, and itself conducting certain kinds of functions in which all have a common interest.

8. If communities as well as individuals were accepted as right-and-duty-bearing units, there would be consequences for both justice and peace.

In principle, the granting of status and rights to ethnic communities on an intermediate basis should extend justice by giving minorities their due and reducing the discrimination and oppression to which they are commonly subjected. At the same time, this consequence can-

[42] Walker Connor, "Ethnic Nationalism as a Political Force," *World Affairs*, Vol. 133 (September 1970), 91-98; Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?" *World Politics*, XXIV (April 1972), 320; Connor, "The Politics of Ethnonationalism," *Journal of International Affairs*, XXVII, No. 1 (1973), 1-2.

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not simply be assumed. After all, the concept of status and rights for communities does not mean simply status and rights for *minority* communities. Dominant or majority communities would necessarily also have status and rights and would have an opportunity to influence the decisions that are made. It is too much to expect that, as a rule, they would be magnanimous and benign. The problem would be to induce them to be fair. In a sense, dominant communities now commonly arrogate special privilege to themselves under the cover of individualism and the principle of treatment according to merit, and the temptation to do this might or might not be reduced if community rights as such were explicitly considered. The record of the whites of South Africa, who endorse the idea of rights for different ethnic communities, is appalling. It is at least arguable that even if justice calls for community rights in principle, it would be better strategy in practice for minority communities to forego their claims and to concentrate instead on the principle of nondiscrimination. But this would have to be a short-run strategy, for certain countries only; as already indicated, it would not provide a suitable universal basis for organizing mankind.

In principle, too, the grant of status and rights to communities on an intermediate basis should make for peace—on the assumption that justice is one of the conditions of peace. But it is unrealistic to expect the prompt achievement of justice even if just rules are accepted. Struggle is likely to be necessary. Hope for justice might actually increase violence, as surer and more rapid change is demanded by some and resisted by others. In the long run, however, it seems probable that the interests of peace as well as the interests of justice would be served.

Two Caveats

Two caveats are in order. No criticism is intended of the idea of individual human rights. They are precious. And defense of them might need to be even more vigilant where groups enjoy status and rights, for groups as well as the state might violate them. The point here is not that the problem of equal treatment for individuals should be ignored, but that the rule of equal treatment must be interpreted in the light of a counterpart: that ethnic communities—as well as states, nations, and "peoples"—may also have just claims. Reasonable classification is accepted as compatible with equal treatment, and for certain purposes it should be regarded as reasonable to classify people into groups by language, race, or religion. In appropriate circumstances, the relevant claims should be interpreted and applied in the light of each

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other. Thus, as in the Old Order Amish case, the right of a child to an education and the right of the state to require school attendance until the sixteenth year would be considered in terms of the right of a community to preserve itself. And the right of an individual to freedom of expression might be interpreted in terms of the right of a linguistic community to preserve its language.

The second caveat is that the case made here is general in its terms and leaves many questions unresolved. The criteria for deciding whether a community should be recognized and what status and rights it should have are left virtually unexplored. It is obviously not the argument that just any combination of persons is entitled to call itself a group and to have whatever status and rights it wants. Present practices over the world are suggestive of what might be desirable, but much examining and appraising need to occur before generally applicable standards of judgment can be worked out.

Conclusion

The requirements of logic and the long-term requirements of universal justice commend the idea of accepting communities as right-and-duty-bearing units. It is quite illogical to take the view that only states, nations, and "peoples" are entitled to be treated as entities and that lesser groups are not. It is illogical to jump from the state, nation, or "people" on the one side, to the individual on the other, and to say that the ethnic communities that exist in-between do not deserve consideration. Not only is it illogical, it is also unjust. It is unjust to accept or assume status and rights for states, nations, and "peoples," but to reject them for ethnic communities that are also historically constituted. And it is even unjust to individuals to say that those who belong to dominant groups can enjoy the attendant advantages and satisfactions, whereas those who belong to nondominant and minority groups must either abandon their culture or accept second-class status. It is not enough for political theorists to contemplate simply the individual and society, or relationships between man and the state. It is time for them to contemplate mankind in its great variety.

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PROBLEMS IN THE MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS

By CHARLES LOCKHART*

THIS essay will focus on aspects of four closely related but independent problem areas which have long hampered statesmen and scholars in the search for peace. The first of these arises from differences among specific instances of conflict. To know one conflict or one type of conflict is not equivalent to knowing all conflicts. In terms of the capabilities and interests of the conflicting parties, conflict structures vary greatly. And conflicts with different structures follow distinctive dynamics as they develop. In some cases, a great power coerces a weaker, diplomatically isolated nation and achieves a steady realization of its interests. Other instances may exhibit a rough parity in terms of the capabilities of the contestants, but be asymmetrical in terms of the interests at stake. If in such cases one party can convincingly demonstrate that its interests—and therefore the actions it is willing to undertake in protecting its interests—are more compelling than those of its adversary, that party is apt to achieve a favorable compromise. Another possibility may involve rough parity of capabilities and crucial interests. In such cases, the parties may become deadlocked in an escalatory spiral of coercive tactics which leads to costs far in excess of the interests initially endangered.

These three situations might be exemplified respectively by the crises of Fashoda in 1898, Algeciras in 1905–06, and Sarajevo in 1914, although some of the parties engaged in the conflicts did not perceive them in this manner at the time.[1] Differences in perceptions across

* I want to thank Susan Butler for commenting on and improving earlier drafts of this essay. In addition, I wish to acknowledge an intellectual debt not adequately reflected in the footnotes to Glenn H. Snyder, Paul Diesing, and other members of the Crisis Bargaining Project, SUNY/Buffalo Center for International Conflict Studies.

[1] Illustrations will be drawn from these as well as from other conflicts throughout the essay. Since these three conflicts occurred many years ago, brief summaries may be useful.

The Fashoda conflict began with the British discovery of a small French expeditionary force in the British-claimed Sudan. The British demanded the removal of the French force. Some French leaders wished to press for a French foothold in the Sudan. Through negotiations, the British eventually won removal of the French force (which was extremely vulnerable, given British military superiority on the seas and in Northeast Africa). However, the British cooperated in reducing French humiliation through a variety of procedural concessions.

The Algeciras crisis was the first of several Franco-German conflicts arising from

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conflict participants provide the second problem area. Disagreement over the nature of a particular conflict appears not only across the conflicting national units that are parties to a dispute, but also within national units. In the Fashoda affair, for instance, the French Ministry of Colonies was pressing for what it perceived as the crucial matter of British recognition of French interests in northeast Africa. The British, aware of their superior military position, regarded the French as foolishly staging a challenge to a recognized sphere of British influence. The unfortunate French Foreign Minister, Delcassé, was caught between these two forces. Although he recognized British military strength in the area under dispute, he was reluctant to capitulate and leave Britain and other interested powers with the impression that France was weak and indecisive. And, although intrigued by the possibility of expanding French imperial influence, Delcassé was also aware of the potential importance that friendly relations with Britain could have to France's European position.[2] As the Fashoda example indicates, analysts both across and within nations tend to focus their attention selectively on particular aspects of a conflict and generally interpret these aspects selectively in terms of their peculiar individual experiences.

The parochial images that arise in statesmen's minds through selective attention and interpretation exacerbate a third issue. Various conflict dynamics need to be met with specifically tailored strategies if they are to be managed—that is, if particularly harmful forms of conflict activity are to be avoided—and resolved. The images that statesmen develop may give them distorted perceptions of the conflicts they face and may lead them to apply inappropriate strategies. For instance, some

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questions surrounding the status of Morocco. This particular episode was precipitated by a public speech the Kaiser made in Tangier, in which he refused to recognize any special position for the French in Morocco. The French Government, led by Rouvier, was initially conciliatory. The French Cabinet even dismissed the Germanophobe Foreign Minister, Delcassé, in response to German pressure. But the Germans continued to insist on an international conference to decide the status of Morocco. They were probably more concerned with using the Moroccan question to drive a wedge between France and Britain than with a German foothold in Morocco. If the British did not support France at an international conference on Morocco, the Entente Cordiale would be broken. The French finally relented, and an international conference was held in Algeciras. The French received support from the British as well as from other nations while the Germans stood alone. And the French drove a hard bargain which recognized a special position for the French in Morocco.

The assassination of the Austrian Archduke Francis Ferdinand by Serbian nationalists at Sarajevo led to Austria's ultimatum and subsequent declaration of war on Serbia. These actions triggered a complex series of interlocking events which culminated in the First World War.

[2] Roger G. Brown, *Fashoda Reconsidered* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1970).

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French leaders perceived all three of the crises mentioned above as situations in which the French could emerge victorious if they would only persevere in wringing concessions from the adversary. In fact, obstinance worked for the French at Algeciras, but was hopeless in the Fashoda case; it led to disaster in the conflict growing out of Sarajevo. Formal guidance as to how to deal with international conflicts must be sensitive enough to distinguish differences among conflicts, as well as complex enough to provide advice for a variety of circumstances.

Even if statesmen perceive a particular conflict accurately, there is no certainty that they will agree on how to deal with it. Discrepancies between statesmen's strategic preferences and the requirements of specific conflict structures constitute the fourth problem discussed in this essay. In part, differing preferences in strategy may arise from parochial organizational perspectives and indicate conflicting vested interests within a society. Under circumstances in which several different organizations or interests have a voice in policy formulation, a strategy may reflect a compromise among domestic interests and be virtually irrelevant to the situation posed by the foreign adversary. Recent United States foreign policy in Southeast Asia has been interpreted by some as an example of this condition. But differences in approach to conflict situations stem from theoretical arguments as well. Statesmen differ in personal attributes—such as their attitudinal orientation toward conflicts of interest, the degree to which they trust others, and their notions about the efficacy of coercion. These differences contribute to variations in the tacit presuppositions or partial theories on which statesmen rely in conflict situations; they create differences in the ways in which individual statesmen address particular conflicts.

I. Disparate Conflict Structures

1. Deterrence Conflicts

During the cold war, a *deterrence model* of international conflict was widely accepted in the West. Those who focus on the problems of deterrence address significant issues attending international conflict. But deterrence theorists make several important and sometimes implicit assumptions that place limits on the relevance of their efforts. A bias that courses through much of deterrence theory is embodied in the terms "aggressor" and "defender." These obviously affect-laden words even creep into mathematical formulations of deterrence situations; for the most part, deterrence theorists deal with situations that can be encapsulated by the game of Chicken (see Figure 1).[3] Thomas Schelling

[3] The Chicken game in Figure 1 is adapted from Daniel Ellsberg, "The Theory and

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FIGURE 1. CHICKEN



Numbers are ordinal. The most preferred outcome is 4; the least preferred outcome is 1. An ordinal scale, which admits only a rank ordering of preferences, is used in this and other figures in this essay instead of an interval scale which would allow more sophisticated comparisons. The simple ordinal scale holds the advantage of focusing attention on the differences among various conflict structures which arise from changes in rank ordering. The ordinal scale's concomitant drawback is that it cannot illustrate more refined differences among various conflicts with the same basic structure (same rank ordering). For the purposes of this essay, the advantage of the ordinal scale outweighs its drawback.

argues that the trick to handling this model is to pre-empt the adversary in signaling a credible commitment—executed by foreclosure of all but a single option—to an uncooperative course of action, such as "resist" or "challenge" in Figure 1.[4] The mathematically symmetrical game in Figure 1 favors neither player in the construction of such a commitment, but the terminology attached to the game creates important asymmetries. The defender is the party wedded to the status quo, and his game is generally one of forestalling or deterring chal-

Practice of Blackmail" (Santa Monica: RAND 1968). Chicken is a game in which each of the players prefers having his own cooperation exploited (the upper, right-hand payoff for "Defender"; the lower, left-hand payoff for "Aggressor") to the costs of mutual noncooperation (the lower, right-hand payoff for both players). The crux of Chicken is that each player will give in if he perceives the other will stand fast.

[4] Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press 1960), and *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1966).

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lenges to existing circumstances. The aggressor desires to modify existing conditions, and his task is often one of compellence, causing the defender to relinquish his current position. The inequity in this situation stems, according to Schelling and others,[5] from the greater difficulty in gaining credibility for compellent, as opposed to deterrent, actions. For Western theorists at least, the status quo holds an element of inviolability not shared by revisionist efforts.

With important modifications—arising from differences between abstract games and actual conflicts—Schelling's strategy is applied effectively in instances of international conflict approximating the Chicken model.[6] United States policy in the Berlin crisis of 1948–49 offers a rough example of a successful execution of this strategy. Through the airlift, the United States demonstrated a commitment to the independence of West Berlin; in the face of this commitment, the Soviets preferred to relax their own position rather than to respond with military violence which carried considerable risk of war. Soviet preferences here are consistent with both the symmetrical mathematical and the asymmetrical semantic arguments made by Schelling. Confronted with the United States commitment, the Soviet Union chose acquiescence over challenge, and decided not to engage in coercion that would have been complicated by the need to initiate violence in order to disrupt the United States airlift.

Robert Jervis comments that deterrence theorists, even when discussing the cold war, tend to lean on examples drawn from the period between the First and Second World Wars.[7] He concludes that this period of history exemplifies the characteristics for which deterrence theory is suited. In terms of an underlying Chicken structure, this assessment appears accurate. In many instances, the Western powers preferred yielding. German tactics might have been different if Hitler had been impressed by Western strength and resolve, for until shortly before the outbreak of World War II the Germans were in no position to fight the victors of World War I. Certainly there were peculiar circumstances surrounding the interwar years which contributed to the Chicken character of the confrontations. Among Western statesmen, there was some feeling that the Versailles agreement had treated Germany unfairly and that some of Hitler's demands were

[5] Oran R. Young, *The Politics of Force* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1968); Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William E. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* (Boston: Little, Brown 1971).

[6] See section III, below, for differences between abstract games and actual conflicts which lead to modifications of strategy.

[7] Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1976), 90.

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just. For his part, Hitler used ploys stressing the fairness and the limited nature of his demands, which played on Western sentiments.

In essence, prescriptions of deterrence theory are valid in conflicts in which the adversary holds Chicken preferences. Perhaps for this reason, deterrence theorists tend to perceive conflicts as instances of Chicken for which their theories are suited. Sometimes, however, these perceptions are erroneous: The adversary values the stakes too highly to back off in the face of a commitment.

Under the usual assumptions of abstract game theory and in many instances of international conflict, the Chicken structure offers no single stable solution;[8] over time, this instability contributes to transformations in the actual or perceived parameters of the game. These transformations create actual or spurious versions of the asymmetrical game of Prisoner's Dilemma–Chicken (see Figure 2). The Prisoner's Di-

FIGURE 2. PRISONER'S DILEMMA–CHICKEN



Numbers are ordinal. The most preferred outcome is 4; the least preferred outcome is 1.

[8] Anatol Rapoport and Albert M. Chammah, in "The Game of Chicken" (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Mental Health Research Institute 1966), offer examples of this instability. Some conditions of play—allowing communication between players oriented toward maximizing their joint payoff—create a stable, mutually cooperative solution.

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lemma player, Row in this case, has a dominant strategy of uncooperativeness, and this game can be expected to stabilize in the lower left-hand corner. There are numerous possibilities for an actual asymmetrical transformation of this nature. During the interwar years, for instance, it became increasingly difficult for Western statesmen to accept Hitler's challenges as limited acts of redressing just grievances. As these statesmen began comparing their developing perceptions of virtually unlimited German goals with the costs of imminent war, their preferences gradually shifted. Another transformation that occurred during the interwar period affected the German side; in terms of Figure 2, the parties will have to be reversed for a moment. German territorial acquisitions and armament policies gradually transformed the capabilities of the relevant national actors so that Hitler, at least, preferred war to the failure of particular challenges.

2. CONFLICT SPIRALS

Another conception of conflict focuses on conditions outside the boundaries of the deterrence format. A common name for the perspective roughly opposed to the deterrence model is the *spiral model*. Spiral theorists also were active during the cold war, although they certainly had less impact than deterrence theorists on the foreign policies of the major powers.[9] They usually depict the actions of various parties to conflicts in a more evenhanded fashion than does the aggressor-defender format of deterrence theory. Misperception, which normally concerns deterrence theorists only in the sense of whether commitments are communicated credibly, is often an integral concern in spiral theories. In other words, spiral theories focus on different aspects of conflict than deterrence theories.

Spiral conceptualizations also have an underlying game model; in contrast to Chicken, it has remained implicit. The formal model that generally fits the spiral conception is Prisoner's Dilemma (see Figure 3).[10] In essence, this model demonstrates that a party challenged even inadvertently on core interests is apt to escalate. It is possible to expand the two-by-two version in Figure 3 and explicate various steps in an escalation sequence. But for the purposes of this

[9] See Charles E. Osgood, *An Alternative to War or Surrender* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press 1962).

[10] In Prisoner's Dilemma, each player prefers suffering the costs of mutual noncooperation to having his own cooperation exploited by the other. This preference is the reverse of the preference on the same options in Chicken. While each party will escalate (the lower right-hand corner) rather than capitulate (receive a 1), both prefer a compromise to mutual noncooperation. So mutual concessions (the upper left-hand corner) will avoid the costs of escalation.

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FIGURE 3. PRISONER'S DILEMMA



Numbers are ordinal. The most preferred outcome is 4; the least preferred outcome is 1.

essay, the two general options of accommodation and coercion will suffice as summarizations of the options open to each party. Interpretive nuances are associated with this mathematical structure—just as in the case of deterrence—which are not derived logically from the mathematical properties. The most obvious association made in the spiral case is the impact of misperception. If one or both of the parties in Figure 3 perceive their preferences as shown because they misperceive and exaggerate the interests threatened by the other, then a needless and costly escalatory spiral is apt to develop.

The Agadir conflict of 1911 exemplifies this aspect of misperception. In this affair, the French and the British faced the Germans in a clash prompted by French intervention in a Moroccan civil war. The French intervention was widely recognized in Europe as marking the end of Moroccan sovereignty. France had laid the groundwork for the Moroccan takeover with a decade of diplomatic agreements. Germany, which had been ignored in these agreements, felt that its European position would be irretrievably damaged unless it received compensation com-

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mensurate with French and other national gains resulting from the Moroccan diplomacy. As the Germans applied pressure on the French, the British came to the support of the latter in order to keep the Entente Cordiale intact and thus foreclose the possibility of facing a German-led continental league. These parties had found themselves arrayed in similar fashion on other disputes, and there was a long history of conflict among them over the Moroccan question itself.[11] Each felt that the threat posed by the success of the adversary was sufficiently important to merit a military engagement. Thus, none of the parties would capitulate. Although there was room for compromise, misperception played havoc with the initiatives.[12] The French, faced with German demands for compensation and British coolness toward unilateral French gains, finally changed their position and initiated discussions with the Germans before a crisis began in earnest. But the Germans missed the import of the French signals and responded to the French *fait accompli* in Morocco with a provocative dispatch of warships to Agadir, a southern Moroccan port. Then the British, in their anxiety over German intentions, issued a provocative threat, and soon all three nations found themselves in an escalatory spiral which they were able to bring under control only with great difficulty. The misperception of the parties to the Agadir affair and the escalation tactics associated with it expanded the conflict of interest latent in the pre-crisis situation. All three nations used provocative tactics during the episode, which contributed to attitudes of bitterness among them and led to even more disastrous conflicts in the aftermath of Agadir.

For the spiral model, use of an example stemming from the era prior to the First World War is not coincidental. Just as the interwar years have been associated with deterrence, the period preceding World War I has often been associated with Prisoner's Dilemma spirals based on actual conflicting interests and misperception.[13] Although no major conflicts had convulsed the European system for close to a century, important issues developed gradually. By early in the century, the battle lines had been drawn quite clearly among the members of the European system, and the recurrent disputes over the same issues—spheres of influence in the Balkans and the colonization of Africa—edged these conflicts closer to the central interests of the concerned

[11] Eugene N. Anderson, *The First Moroccan Crisis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1930).

[12] Lockhart, "The Efficacy of Threats in International Interaction Strategies" (Beverly Hills: Sage Professional Papers in International Studies 1973).

[13] Glenn H. Snyder, "'Prisoner's Dilemma' and 'Chicken' Models in International Politics," *International Studies Quarterly*, XV (March 1971), 66-103, and Jervis (fn. 7), 92-95.

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parties.[14] In addition to the structure of actual interests, misperception played a prominent part during this period. The costs of war tended to be underestimated, particularly by the Germans who drew on their experiences in the Franco-Prussian War. And, with the exception of Austria, the interests actually threatened by foreign adversaries tended to be exaggerated through perceptions that linked immediate issues to vague but ominous long-term shifts in strategic advantage.

The spiral model is a legitimate representation of conflicts in which crucial interests are distributed more symmetrically than is the case in Chicken. It also represents a possible misperception syndrome in which both parties presume the interests endangered by the adversary are profound enough to merit war. But the spiral formulation does not hold a monopoly on misperception: other familiar misperception problems arise under the aegis of deterrence. Conversely, the spiral formula is not associated only with misperception. Nations do challenge one another's crucial values on occasion, and Chicken preferences of capitulation over escalation do not always hold.

II. Problems in Perceiving Conflict Structure

Statesmen's discrimination of these distinct conflict structures often runs afoul of individual biases that interpret—at least initially—all episodes of conflict as instances of a single structure. Jervis comments that many foreign policy debates among both statesmen and scholars hinge not on how to respond to a given situation, but rather on the nature of the situation at hand.[15] Although disagreement is rarely limited to this issue, it is certainly a prominent area of conflict which receives far less attention than it requires. Roughly speaking, a predilection exists among statesmen for one or another of the two structures described in the previous section. Statesmen who view conflicts as Chicken (or as Prisoner's Dilemma–Chicken with the adversary as Chicken) and thus as deterrence problems, are conventionally referred to as "hard liners." Statesmen who perceive conflicts as actual or potential situations of Prisoner's Dilemma—at least from the adversary's point of view—are generally considered "soft liners." It is important to stress that neither of these predilections offers greater inherent insight with respect to correctly identifying conflict episodes than the other. The two syndromes of perception are "gut" responses to conflict, which will be accurate or false depending on the nature of the clash at hand.

[14] Luigi Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914*, trans. and ed. by I. M. Massey (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1966).

[15] Jervis (fn. 7), 96.

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1. HARD LINERS

Hard liners virtually always perceive the adversary to face Chicken preferences.[16] Their perceptions of their own nations' predicaments are harder to distinguish. Both Prisoner's Dilemma and Chicken patterns exist. Prisoner's Dilemma arises less often from the seriousness of the immediate issues at stake than from the coupling, in the eyes of the immediate and other potential adversaries, of the response to this conflict episode with a general disposition toward conflicts. That is, hard liners fear that conciliation will be taken for weakness, not only in the current episode but in general, and will therefore lead to more frequent and severe future challenges. Clear-cut instances of hard liners' perceptions of their own nations in Chicken are rarer, but they do exist. Such situations fit Schelling's portrayal of brinkmanship; in modern times, Hitler stands as the most obvious practitioner of brinkmanship.

No easy task confronts the researcher who wishes to delve into psychological correlates of "hard lineness." Several gaming studies link coercive and accommodative tendencies to a number of personal characteristics, including psychological traits. These studies face three problems from the standpoint of generalization to statesmen making important foreign policy decisions. First, there is the problem of generalization from trivial games to life-and-death decisions.[17] Second, the subjects in most experimental games are students; differences in maturity, general sophistication, and experience in handling conflict situations certainly exist between most statesmen and most undergraduates. These differences may invalidate generalizations across the two groups. For instance, most statesmen would probably place in an undiscriminated group at the high end of internationalism scales applied to undergraduates. Third, the bulk of experimental results is substantively uninteresting from the standpoint of psychological correlates of hard lineness among statesmen. Categories such as sex, nationality, and age are at best only indirect indicators of personality traits. And research on relevant traits has produced only few unexpected insights to date.

One important distinction between the hard and soft liners in terms of psychological traits is in the different levels of empathy which the two groups exhibit. Hard liners are considerably more limited in their empathy for counterparts in adversary nations, although most states-

[16] For a parallel formulation of both the hard-line and soft-line positions, see Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Bargains, Systems, Decisions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1977).

[17] See Robert E. Knox and Ronald L. Douglas, "Trivial Incentives, Marginal Comprehension, and Dubious Generalizations From Prisoner's Dilemma Studies," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, xx (November 1971), 160-65.

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men—hard line or soft line—probably have higher levels of empathy than the general populace. For hard liners, counterparts in adversary nations follow practices virtually opposite to their own. In their view, adversary statesmen will back down in the face of firmness rather than resist coercion. Further, they expect adversary statesmen to perceive weakness in conciliation and to press for further concessions rather than to accept concessions as accommodative efforts made in good faith.

The hard liners' overall perspective or attitude toward international affairs differs fundamentally from the soft liners' and supports the notions derived from their limited empathy.[18] Hard liners perceive the relations among nations as being essentially conflictual: nations, particularly adversary nations, are engaged in a virtually unlimited Hobbesian pursuit of power. The perception that the adversary is pursuing virtually unlimited expansionist objectives rather than limited core values leads hard liners to underestimate the adversary's costs in backing down. Instead, hard liners exaggerate the value the adversary places on exploited cooperation in a Chicken or Prisoner's Dilemma matrix in comparison to the value of the mutually noncooperative cell. They perceive the adversary as playing Chicken, and the problem of dealing with the adversary becomes a deterrence problem.

2. SOFT LINERS

In contrast to hard liners, soft liners place greater emphasis on the adversary's costs in backing down. If not proclaiming the adversary to face Prisoner's Dilemma preferences, soft liners at least emphasize the danger of driving the adversary into such a predicament with harsh or provocative measures. Soft liners vary in their perceptions of their own nations' predicaments. They are generally willing, to a greater degree than hard liners, to decouple the consequences of the immediate conflict from potential future conflicts.

Soft liners characteristically exhibit far greater empathy for their counterparts in adversary nations than do hard liners. Accordingly, they presume that adversary statesmen follow practices similar, not opposite, to those they themselves use. Adversaries are put off by harsh, coercive methods that either engage additional values for the target (thus making compliance more difficult), or that through provocation drive the target from a deliberative approach to spasm reactions. For soft liners, coercion will be answered by coercion, but conciliatory gestures will give rise to mutual efforts to compromise. A contributing

[18] Snyder and Diesing (fn. 16).

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factor to their empathetic attitude toward the adversary is their sensitivity to divisions within adversary nations. Most adversary statesmen are reasonable fellows like the soft liner himself. But a few troublemakers exist among this reasonable majority, and harsh, irresponsible actions on the part of the adversary can be attributed to the influence of these men. For soft liners, the key is to appeal to the reasonable majority and strengthen it if possible. So, whereas hard liners often underestimate the significance of policy differences among the leaders of an adversary nation, soft liners are normally sensitive to this possibility and may even err by exaggerating such differences.

The soft liners' overall perspective toward international affairs stresses harmony rather than conflict. Just as the hard liners recognize some common interests among nations—avoiding nuclear war, for instance—soft liners acknowledge that conflict exists among nations. However, they fear, first, that this conflict is exaggerated by mutual misperception, and second, that it may be increased by needlessly imprudent acts based on this misperception. For the soft liner, the adversary is basically like himself in that he will be pursuing limited goals which have some claim to legitimacy. The characteristic error to this line of reasoning is to underestimate the latent conflict of interest and to assume that the Prisoner's Dilemma structure is an artificial creation of misperception and provocative tactics. Such a situation may exist in specific conflict episodes—such as Agadir—but soft liners assume this condition as a general rule.

3. OTHER POSITIONS

Not all statesmen can be fitted into the hard- and soft-line molds developed in the previous paragraphs. These molds are abstractions that incorporate important aspects of many statesmen occupying moderate positions on two sides of a hard-soft line continuum. Positions more extreme than those depicted above exist for both the hard- and soft-line cases. Neither of the extreme positions is generally useful for accurately identifying key characteristics of a developing conflict episode, since few conflicts entail the characteristics inherent in these images. Another position exists between the moderate hard- and soft-line positions. The term "middle line" can be used to describe this case. Middle liners may exhibit some strengths of both hard and soft liners, as President Kennedy did during the Cuban crisis of 1962. In such instances, middle liners are able to bring an impressive array of insight to the management and resolution of conflict episodes. At other times,

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middle liners may exhibit the weaknesses of both hard and soft liners—as Bülow, the German Chancellor, did in the Algeciras crisis of 1905–06. Bülow vacillated between hard- and soft-line advice. He followed no consistent policy; his negotiators introduced compromises with a lack of sincerity on some occasions, and threats in a hollow, counterproductive fashion at other times.

Some statesmen may shift their positions at least slightly, depending on adversaries and issues. Delcassé was a classic hard liner with Germany over Morocco, but he held a position closer to the middle of the hard-soft line continuum when struggling with the British over the Sudan. The molds described above would be more useful if individual statesmen, once placed in a particular niche, would remain there. In practice, individual perceptions over time often fail to conform to a single position.[19] An intranational division of opinion along the hard-soft line continuum may be anticipated for most national decision units in most conflict situations, however; national responses to conflicts are determined in broad outline by the relative strength of these two factions.

4. SHORT-TERM PERCEPTUAL SHIFTS

Although most statesmen see in developing conflicts a limited range of situations that are characteristic for them, some cling to their initial perceptions more tenaciously than others. That is, in a situation in which the adversary is actually seeking essential and limited objectives that would be readily justified to a disinterested third party, some hard liners will persist in seeing unlimited demands for unwarranted and illegitimate goals while others will acquire a more accurate conception of the problem at hand. A similar variation in the tenacity with which initial images are held exists among soft liners.

Analysts approach variations in the rigidity of initial perceptions in different ways. Ole Holsti associates rigidity with inner-directedness, activeness, and high self-esteem.[20] Flexibility in perceptions is associated with other-directedness, passivity, and low self-esteem—personal characteristics probably not held in high repute among national leaders. Indirectly, this association taints flexibility which admits deviation from

[19] Some reasons for this instability will be considered in section IV, below (Discrepancies Between Strategy Requirements and Statesmen's Action Preferences: Domestic Position).

[20] Holsti, "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy," in David J. Finlay, Ole R. Holsti, and Richard R. Fagen, *Enemies in Politics* (Chicago: Rand McNally 1967), 25-96.

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initial perceptions. Dean Acheson, for example, mounts a direct attack on what he views as Kennedy's procrastination and wishy-washiness in the Cuban crisis.[21] Ralph White places approbation on the other side, with his notion of the "recognition of ambiguity."[22] For him, the willingness to suspend judgment—thus remaining open to alternative interpretations until more adequate evidence on a conflict's development is available—avoids premature closure and is a highly desirable characteristic for statesmen. White's attitude may be unrealistic from the standpoint of political recruitment. That is, the demands of public office in many nations may require inner-directed, active persons of high self-esteem. But White's position is more congruent with the demands of international conflict. Given that conflicts take different forms and that individual statesmen are predisposed initially to perceive a single conflict structure, perceptual flexibility is desirable. Otherwise, coincidence provides the only link between the underlying structure of conflicts and perceptions that statesmen hold of these episodes.

Snyder and Diesing discuss the process of short-term perceptual shifts in detail.[23] The brief account here follows their analysis. Within the confines of a specific conflict episode, a statesman's image (including his image of the adversary), rarely changes significantly. For instance, a hard liner whose empathy has for years been limited (in comparison to that of his soft-line colleagues) will normally not broaden, in a single additional conflict episode, the level of empathy he has sustained through many years. Instead, a statesman who exhibits flexibility within a conflict episode recognizes that his usual expectations are not being fulfilled in this particular episode. For the hard liner, the adversary remains bent on virtually unlimited expansion, but his goals in this particular instance are or can easily be limited. The immediate instance becomes decoupled from the general image. However, even for a statesman who decouples the adversary's actions in the current conflict episode from his images, the biases of the images are still apt to provide limits for expectations about the current conflict. So the degree to which flexibility in perceptions of conflict structure affects a statesman is apt to be modest, and shifts in perception such as that of Rouvier, the French Premier during the Algeciras crisis, from soft line to hard line are unusual. Normally, leadership changes are required for dramatic perceptual shifts.

[21] Acheson, "Dean Acheson's Version of Robert Kennedy's Version of the Cuban Missile Crisis," *Esquire* (February 1969), 76-77, 44, 46.
[22] White, *Nobody Wanted War* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 1970), 247.
[23] Snyder and Diesing (fn. 16).

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5. LONG-TERM PERCEPTUAL SHIFTS

Some international conflicts are resolved in a single round. The Japanese-American aspect of the Second World War highlights an isolated period of active conflict between these two nations. Other conflicts—the Balkans, Morocco, Berlin, the Middle East, and South Asia—extend over many years with repeated hot points. A consideration of long-term perceptual development suggests itself. Two elements are central to the development of perceptions over the long haul in international conflicts. One of these is change in the issue or issues in conflict. The other is change in leadership, or at least in leadership perceptions, which accompanies the development of issues.[24]

Coleman notices three major issue trends within community conflicts which have some, although not identical, application to conflicts among nations. First, the issues that develop over time are often new and distinct from the issues that initiate a conflict. For instance, the Moroccan conflict between France and Germany began with commercial struggles among private citizens of the two nations, grew to involve government squabbles over interpretation of treaty rights, and expanded again to include German demands for equality in the sense of being included in French payments to others in return for a free hand in Morocco. By 1905–06, the Germans used the Moroccan question in an attempt to break the Entente Cordiale. Second, unresolved issues on specific matters lead to more general conflict. Franco-German rivalries over Alsace-Lorraine and the Moroccan question led to general confrontation, and the Russian-Austrian rivalry over influence in the Balkans created a similar broad conflict. Third, disagreement builds into antagonism. The inability to resolve a particular issue tends to create a presumption of bad faith on the other fellow's part. Once this feeling develops, conflict can be sustained in the absence of any concrete issue.

Several concomitant changes characterize the leadership of adversary nations that are caught up in a long conflict. First, the unresolved issue may give rise to interest groups which exert pressure for an uncompromising position. Early in this century the Pan-Germans, for instance, picked up the argument raised by a few industrialists that a German section of Morocco was indispensable. For several years they sustained a highly visible propaganda campaign to this end. More recently, the China lobby made an American initiative toward a more realistic ap-

[24] The analysis here draws on James S. Coleman, *Community Conflict* (New York: Free Press 1957).

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proach to China virtually impossible, particularly for a Democratic administration. Second, if a salient issue remains unresolved for long, the possibility develops for domestic discontent to appear among the top ranks of the formal leadership. The most obvious case is Hitler's rise to power on an escalator provided by the Versailles Agreement. Normally, less extreme instances of hard liners replacing soft liners may be anticipated. The fall of Caillaux and the rise of Poincaré in France in 1912 exemplifies such a shift. Third, the bureaucracies which contribute important components to foreign policy formulation may become systematically biased over time. In the United States, this happened as a result of McCarthyism within the State Department with respect to China. In Britain and France, prior to the First World War the personnel of the Foreign Office and the Quai d'Orsay were hopelessly biased against Germany.[25]

The changes in issues and in political forces feed off and reinforce each other. The multiplication of individual issues, the consolidation of these issues toward general conflict, and the growth of perceptions of the adversary's ill-will facilitate the development of chauvinistic domestic pressure groups, hard-line leaders, and biased bureaucracies. These developments in turn exacerbate the issues. Serious international problems left unresolved for long periods represent time bombs—the Balkans, Morocco, the Middle East, South Asia. Gradually, the perceptions of each side are apt to shift closer to, or more deeply into, a Prisoner's Dilemma structure. Such conflicts can still be managed and even resolved. Through repeated failure, a hard-line approach and the leaders associated with it may be discredited, and an alternative approach and leadership may replace them, as Sadat replaced Nasser. Or an initially intolerable situation may become accepted with the passage of time—at least to the degree that the situation is not apt to precipitate violent conflict. The issue of West Berlin has diminished in this fashion. But it is a gamble to rely on such developments.

III. Managing and Resolving Various Conflict Dynamics

Three different conflict situations were depicted in the first section of this essay—Chicken, Prisoner's Dilemma-Chicken, and Prisoner's Dilemma. The management and resolution requirements of these three

[25] See Zara S. Steiner, *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898–1914* (London: Cambridge University Press 1969), and Ima C. Barlow, *The Agadir Crisis* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 1940), for the Foreign Office and the Quai d'Orsay, respectively.

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structures as well as typical difficulties statesmen encounter with them will now be discussed.[26]

1. CHICKEN

In this situation neither party is willing to fight in the manner it perceives it would have to fight to win the issues at stake. Therefore, a common interest exists in holding action below the threshold of military violence. The trick, according to Schelling, is to pre-empt; that is, to commit oneself to a noncooperative strategy before the adversary does.[27] In international conflicts, statesmen often pay greater attention to the credibility and consequences of commitments than to the order in which they are stated. The United States commitment to allow no Soviet strategic weapons in Cuba, once it became credible to the Soviets, carried consequences grave enough to lead the Soviets to withdraw—although the United States faced a compellent situation that burdened it with the onus for initiating violence. And in open situations (as opposed to closed game matrices) a pre-emptive commitment may be circumvented, as the United States airlift circumvented the Berlin blockade. The tactics Schelling discusses are often brusk and harsh. Diesing finds that, after the adversary's recognition of the commitment is gained, prudent statesmen will offer him an inexpensive concession that both provides a concrete indicator of the former's limited aims and allows the adversary a face-saving line of retreat.[28]

Chicken normally begins with each party to the conflict taking a hard-line stance; such a strategy is appropriate for the underlying structure of the situation. These hard-line stances rest on coercive measures that serve several purposes. First, by directing coercive efforts toward the problem at hand, a statesman signals his commitment to particular situations or policies. The Kaiser's speech at Tangier in 1905 left no doubt that the German leaders were seriously disturbed about the Moroccan question. Second, by applying coercive actions, a statesman creates some modest costs for the adversary. These costs constitute immediate drawbacks of noncooperation for the adversary and provide an indicator of the credibility of further measures. The Berlin blockade created immediate costs for the United States and other Western allies, as well as fears that the Soviets would use harsher tactics if necessary. Third, by undertaking coercive actions, the statesman generates a risk

[26] An expanded version of the points in this section is available in Lockhart, "Bargaining in International Conflicts," unpub., 1976, chaps. 4 and 5, and in Snyder and Diesing (fn. 16).

[27] Schelling (fn. 4).

[28] Snyder and Diesing (fn. 16).

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that conflict activity will pass a threshold at which management becomes difficult if not impossible. That is, in an effort to coerce the adversary into acting acceptably, the statesman practices brinkmanship which endangers both parties. Hitler's bold challenges in the Rhineland and *Anschluss* episodes are the clearest cases of a leader's resorting to manipulation of risk from Chicken preferences.

Usually, one of the parties gradually demonstrates itself to be more serious over the contested matter than the other, and the less serious party gives way. (Sometimes, though, neither party is willing to exert enough coercive pressure to gain the withdrawal of the other—the Berlin conflict of 1958–62—and a stall occurs.) Such a demonstration of superiority may arise from greater capabilities or from the fact that more important interests are at stake for that side. These structural considerations, however, must be supported by superior *initiative* or the application of relevant resources to the problem. Usually, a more powerful or more interested nation has little trouble applying superior resources. The support given by France's allies at the Algeciras conference to aid the French in their struggle against the diplomatically isolated Germans provides an example. Sometimes nations use less conventional asymmetries effectively. The United States saddled the Soviet Union with the onus of initiating violence in the Berlin crisis of 1948–49 and maintained its position in the face of Soviet regional military superiority. But the necessity of being able to apply resources relevant to the problem at hand is forcefully demonstrated by French impotence during the Fashoda conflict, where France's army was vastly superior to Britain's. If this army could have been brought to bear directly on either Britain or the situation in the Sudan, France would have had the upper hand. But Britain's insularity and its naval supremacy prevented these applications of French resources.

In a nutshell, Chicken demands steady coercive pressure which applies superior resources to the contested issues. Under these circumstances, one party will eventually recognize the superiority of the other and begin to look for a graceful avenue of retreat. At this point, several instances of diplomatic history (Fashoda in 1898; Berlin in 1948–49; Cuba in 1962) suggest the prudence of the winning party's granting gratuitous concessions. These concessions demonstrate limitations on objectives, and thereby ease the weaker party's withdrawal from the conflict.

Two problems arise in connection with conflicts that have this structure. In the first of these, too much coercive pressure is applied. When this happens, so many additional issues may be engaged for the

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adversary that he eventually faces Prisoner's Dilemma rather than Chicken preferences, or is sufficiently angered to strike out blindly in a spasm response. A United States attack on Soviet installations in Cuba in 1962 might have triggered either of these reactions. Hard liners are particularly insensitive to this danger, although thoroughly incensed soft liners occasionally create similar problems. The tendency to apply excessive pressure arises partially from underestimating the value of cooperative payoffs. Hard liners depreciate the value of compromises reached with the adversary since they view compromises as rewarding the adversary's expansionist aims. In an effort to avoid such an outcome, they may press the adversary with a counterproductively coercive strategy.

The second problem common to Chicken is a characteristically soft-line blunder—the failure to press the adversary to concede issues he cannot or will not support. The most prominent example that springs to mind is the Anglo-French failure to force Hitler to back down on the militarization of the Rhineland. Had Britain and France been willing to sustain a military show of force—probably without the necessity for passing the threshold of violence—they would have won an easy victory and both they and others would have been saved a great deal of trouble later. One factor contributing to the soft-line tendency of not pressing the adversary for all the concessions he will make is a common overestimation of cooperative payoffs. The soft liner, in contrast to his hard-line counterpart, finds virtue in an agreement with the adversary. For the soft liner, the adversary nation—although it may harbor a few Neanderthal leaders—is basically led by reasonable men with legitimate goals. Therefore, if these goals are met at least in part, the level of conflict will be reduced and successful compromise may increase the chances for resolving other issues amicably in the future.

2. PRISONER'S DILEMMA–CHICKEN

Prisoner's Dilemma–Chicken has to be considered in two ways—first with the statesman whose point of view is being considered in Prisoner's Dilemma, and then with this statesman's view in Chicken. For the first of these positions the strategy suggested for Chicken holds. Although technically the Prisoner's Dilemma party can be less careful in its treatment of the adversary (since military violence is preferable to conceding central points), the Prisoner's Dilemma party still prefers mutual compromise to war. For practical purposes, the prudent strategy for this situation is similar to that for Chicken. The major problem with Prisoner's Dilemma–Chicken from the perspective of the Prisoner's

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Dilemma player is that the predicament represents a common hard-line misperception. The adversary—who is perceived as searching for points of weakness on the periphery of his aspirations—can back down, but the statesman's own nation, which is only protecting core values, cannot give in. And, since the long-term consequences of compromise are viewed as encouraging the adversary to raise more severe issues with increasing frequency in the future, a compromise that is sufficiently favorable to the hard liner to make it clearly preferable to immediate military hostilities may be hard to effect.

From the standpoint of Chicken, Prisoner's Dilemma–Chicken is essentially a game to permit an exit as gracefully as possible. Normally, statesmen will not enter this situation knowingly and willingly. They may initially perceive another structure—perhaps symmetrical Chicken; as the conflict develops, they learn of their mistake. Once the mistake is recognized, the coercive stance which suited earlier perceptions needs to be dropped. An abrupt shift in strategy at this point, however, raises the danger of whetting the adversary's appetite, and statesmen exhibit a reluctance to shift to accommodation without some sign that the adversary will not interpret it as a signal of general weakness and simply increase his demands. The French at Fashoda in 1898, the Germans at Algeciras in 1906, and the Russians during the Balkan wars of 1912–13 all retreated slowly and grudgingly.

3. PRISONER'S DILEMMA

Prisoner's Dilemma is the trickiest of the situations discussed in this essay. Neither party in Prisoner's Dilemma will back down on what it perceives as the crux of the problem, even if the alternative is further escalation. On the other hand, modest compromises are preferred by both parties to a breakdown leading to violent conflict, so some room for maneuver exists. But the strategies in Prisoner's Dilemma have to be less irrevocable and more sensitive to the adversary's activity than is the case in Chicken.

Two fundamental demands are placed on Prisoner's Dilemma strategies. First, these strategies must demonstrate commitment, but do so in a low-key fashion which limits—but not necessarily avoids—provocative acts. Since the adversary is committed to certain objectives, a strategy of limited coercion cannot be expected to pressure him into backing down. Instead, the first purpose of the statesman's strategy here is to signal the adversary that he is also committed and that overlapping commitments create a contested region. An incrementally

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escalating series of signals similar to those used by Kennedy in the Cuban crisis of 1962 can be useful here; although, as United States involvement in the war in Southeast Asia shows, that path is not free from pitfalls.[29] The adversary must be provided with a clear signal of commitment—and, as in the Cuban case, this signal may have to be repeated over several attempts which grow increasingly provocative in order to impress the adversary adequately. The next task is to determine which aspects of the adversary's initial commitment are actually essential and which may be dropped or compromised. This determination is accomplished by probing or challenging tiny portions of the adversary's position. Probing accomplishes two tasks. First, it reveals concrete limits on the adversary's position. The appearance of limitations itself is important. Limitations indicate that initiatives for compromise will not automatically whet the adversary's appetite.[30] Second, probing can reduce the overlap in the two parties' commitments and even eliminate it entirely. Ulbricht used probes masterfully to this end during the conflict over Berlin between 1958 and 1962, when he discovered the Western allies were more concerned with military than civilian traffic to and within Berlin.[31]

The model of Prisoner's Dilemma activity presented above—signaling commitment in a low key and then working with the fringes of each commitment in order to derive a compatible pair of positions—may run into several difficulties. There is a danger that either the initial commitment signals or the subsequent probing activity will transcend the adversary's tolerances and lead him to escalate the situation further. This blunder is more characteristic of hard-line statesmen than of soft liners. For example, the brusk and severe actions of Austrian hard liners (the ultimatum and subsequent declaration of war) toward the Serbians set in motion an interlocking chain of events that culminated in the First World War.

A second problem consists of confusing a correction of misperception with a change in tolerances. In the Cuban affair of 1962, for instance, once Khrushchev understood that Kennedy was serious about the removal of strategic weapons from Cuba, he conceded this point—at

[29] Lockhart, "The Varying Fortunes of Incremental Commitment," *International Studies Quarterly*, XIX (March 1975), 46-66.

[30] Bringing these limits to light ties in with the distinction, discussed above, between initial images and subsequent expectations which develop as a conflict unfolds. The discovery of limits on objectives creates the basis for developing expectations about the immediate conflict which differ from the image.

[31] Snyder and Diesing (fn. 16), chap. 5.

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at least as long as Kennedy offered a reasonable compromise. After Khrushchev perceived the position of the United States correctly, he shifted his preferences. The Vietnamese, on the other hand, were willing to fight the United States for the southern portion of their nation; Johnson's gradually escalating signals were not effective in making them change preferences. They may have been surprised by the tenacity revealed by Johnson's signals, but they were not dissuaded from their objectives. Prisoner's Dilemma involves a deeper conflict of interest than Chicken; although compromise is possible, a compromise that both sides prefer to military hostilities is not always discovered. If, after correcting misperception by signaling a commitment and probing, seriously overlapping commitments are still left, policy shifts more dramatic than those of incrementally escalating signals and probes are necessary. Essentially, a statesman has to accept some previously unacceptable conditions—at least for the immediate future—or he has to be able and willing to escalate his own measures severely.

In a structure of Prisoner's Dilemma, stalling sometimes constitutes a third problem. Stalls are not particularly troublesome in Chicken structures. In Chicken, action rarely breaches the threshold of violence, and sometimes stalling amounts simply to ignoring a problem for a while. In the conflicts over Berlin, stalling was a productive activity for both the United States and the Soviet Union at different points in time. The problem with stalls in conflicts with a Prisoner's Dilemma structure is that they may occur at a higher level of escalation, beyond the threshold of violence. At that level of escalation, stalling can be expensive. That was the predicament in which U.S. leaders found themselves during the late 1960's. The strategy of the United States was not capable of resolving the situation in Southeast Asia, and the level of escalation which had been reached made stalling extremely costly.

Fourth, Prisoner's Dilemma may be poorly handled because the probing activity is too timid and fails to reveal points that the adversary will concede. This is a problem characteristic of soft liners. For instance, during the Cuban conflict in 1962, Adlai Stevenson was fearful of pressing the Soviets and suggested a mutual disengagement from Cuba. The possibility had both commendable and dangerous aspects. The point here is that, while the Soviets might have reacted violently to a United States attack on Soviet installations, they could be pushed further than Stevenson thought. And this pushing was necessary in order to create a solution acceptable to the majority of the United States decision unit.

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IV. Discrepancies between the Requirements of Strategy and Statesmen's Preferences for Action

In the preceding section, strategy guidelines for and problems associated with three different conflict structures were examined. The guidelines arise from the analysis of successful statecraft; the discussion of problems stems from studying cases in which statesmen ran into difficulty. Statesmen often exhibit clear preferences for particular strategies. These preferences arise from two general and distinct sources: a statesman's collection of personal biases and his domestic political position. These sources do not always lead the statesman to act consistently with the strategy requirements of the various conflict structures discussed above.

1. PERSONAL BIASES

The ways in which statesmen perceive conflict structure account for some action preferences. Hard liners generally argue for coercive strategies. The hard liner's preference for coercion stems in part from his perceptions—based on limited empathy—of the adversary's preferences. For the hard liner, firmness results in concessions by the adversary, whereas conciliation results in pressure. For instance, the Kaiser, upset with a disappointing British reply to a German inquiry on limiting naval armaments, once remarked: "A new proof of my old thesis that only stout defence of one's own interests impresses the Englishman and finally impels him to a rapprochement, never a so-called concession which he always interprets as a sign of weakness."[32] The hard liner's view of adversary nations struggling at the fringes of their aspirations supports this preference by distinguishing the adversary's current objectives from his core values. The general strategy preference that a soft liner draws from his images is one of accommodation. Soft liners are generally more open to procedural if not substantive conciliation than are hard liners. The soft liner's images of the adversary as similar to the self lead him to believe that coercion will draw coercion from the adversary, while accommodative actions will lead to mutual compromise. His perception of the adversary struggling at least in part for important, legitimate goals supports this preference for accommodation.

Statesmen also vary on several personal beliefs or prejudices which are independent of their perceptions of conflict structure.[33] Their attitudinal

[32] George P. Gooch, *Before the War*, II (London: Longmans 1938), 266.
[33] Kenneth Fuchs, "Foreign Policy Decision-Maker Lines," Ph.D. diss. (SUNY/

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orientation toward others in general and toward adversary statesmen in particular is one important characteristic. Orientations may vary from competitive through neutral to problem solving. A competitive orientation toward adversary statesmen is apt to entail coercive action preferences; a problem-solving orientation will generally lead to accommodative action. An example of disparate strategy choices arising from similar perceptions of a situation is provided by contrasting the strategy preferences of two prominent figures in the Berlin crisis of 1948–49. President Truman and General Clay held roughly similar views of both the Soviet leaders and the Berlin situation. Yet they favored diametrically opposed strategies. Clay viewed the situation in a highly competitive fashion. He was particularly disturbed by the prospect of a Communist victory.[34] Truman, on the other hand, was less competitive in his orientation. His initial attempts to resolve the Berlin issue involved problem solving through reciprocal concessions—modifying the currency reform in order to obtain a relaxation of the blockade. Clay wanted to win; Truman wanted to resolve the conflict.

Trust is another characteristic that varies in individuals and leads to differences in strategy preference. Statesmen who generally trust others, including adversary statesmen, are better able to initiate compromise proposals than are their colleagues who carry an abiding distrust for others. Khrushchev, for example, overcame his dilemma about trusting the United States in the Cuban conflict of 1962 in a fashion Acheson could not duplicate with respect to the Soviet Union in the same episode. Khrushchev faced the problem that, once the Soviets had removed their strategic weapons from Cuba, the surrounding United States forces might attack Cuba.[35] If Khrushchev had been unwilling to trust the Kennedy Administration in this matter, the Cuban conflict would have been much more difficult to resolve. The key to Acheson's position, on the other hand, was that the Soviets could not be trusted to act in a responsible fashion. The missiles had to be removed because, in his view, missiles similar to those which were defensive when operated by the United States in Italy or Turkey became offensive in Soviet hands. The blockade was less desirable than the "surgical" air strike Acheson supported since he felt that the Soviets could not be trusted to act responsibly with the strategic weapons already in Cuba.

Buffalo 1974), has isolated several bases for these personal predilections, and the argument here draws on his outline.

[34] See Clark Murdock, "The Berlin Blockade," Case Study, Crisis Bargaining Project (SUNY/Buffalo Center for International Conflict Studies 1971), 31-39.

[35] Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, trans. and ed. by S. Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown 1970), 499; Acheson (fn. 21).

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Still another relevant characteristic is a statesman's confidence in the use of coercion. Two statesmen who displayed dramatically different attitudes on this factor are Alfred Kiderlen-Waechter, one of several German foreign ministers in the years prior to the First World War and the author of German policy in the Agadir crisis of 1911, and Adlai Stevenson of the United States in the Cuban crisis. Kiderlen's actions in the Agadir conflict demonstrated a remarkable lack of regard for negative and unintended consequences of coercion. He strengthened France's and Britain's resistance to German objectives through callous, coercive action. Kiderlen defended his actions with the statement that: "He who announces in advance that he will not fight can achieve nothing in politics."[36] Barlow's characterization of Kiderlen supports the notion that Kiderlen was apt to overestimate the efficacy of coercion: "brusque, cynical, tactless, often truculent, with a certain strain of brutality and coarseness in his humor."[37] Stevenson, on the other hand, was aware that coercion might engage additional values for the adversary or anger him; in either case, it would make the adversary less amenable to accommodation. Stevenson was also sensitive to the possibility that coercion might poison long-term relations among nations. As a result, Stevenson was prejudiced against the use of coercion and military force just as much as Kiderlen desired to rely on them.

2. DOMESTIC POSITION

The varying domestic needs facing different national decision makers through their disparate bureaucratic, party, electoral, and other domestic positions also create parochial strategy preferences. For instance, during the latter portion of the 1950's the United States Army played a decreasing role in national security affairs. Reliance increased on strategies and weapons systems which lay within the province of other services. The Army had practically no role in the expansion of strategic bombers and missiles, for example. And the weapons the Army possessed as well as the tactics it followed were increasingly viewed as inappropriate for the types of challenges that were apt to confront the United States ground forces. In essence, the Army prepared for conventional, front warfare in Europe; attacks on United States interests (as generally perceived at the time) stemmed from irregular, Third-World forces which the Army was neither trained nor equipped to fight. Under these circumstances it is not at all surprising that General Maxwell Taylor and a few other influential officers began a campaign to carve out a new role for the Army and to bend the existing organi-

[36] Gooch (fn. 32), 220.

[37] Barlow (fn. 25), 209.

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zation to fit that role. The surprising aspect may be that Taylor and others faced so much resistance or indifference from within the Army to what, from the standpoint of bureaucratic survival, could have been perceived as a prudent effort.

For persons who view the interests of the nation as a whole from the parochial perspective of an individual organization's interest—and this confusion is not uncommon among bureaucrats with long-term institutional associations—what is good for the organization is desirable for the nation. Or, as Steinbruner suggests, the bureaucrat may simply not recognize the impact of his choices on social units beyond his own organization.[38] By this reasoning, if the development of tactics, units, and weapons designed for irregular conflicts and the testing of these components through engagement in "brushfire" wars was desirable, even necessary, for the Army—and Taylor thought so—then engagements of this sort were desirable for the nation. Such arguments may be expected to arise from parochial interests in pluralist systems; centralist systems often exhibit similar pressures. Lindblom argues that through mutual adjustment among such pressures a solution can be achieved for the collective as a whole that is superior to any that may be derived through a central arbiter.[39] It is therefore not surprising that Taylor and others argued as they did; by some criteria it is desirable that they should have done so. What *is* mildly surprising is that the arguments were not recognized for what they were—statements of organizational interests, and perhaps misperceived interests at that—or that other organizational interests did not arise to oppose those voiced by the Army.

In any case, Taylor's interpretation of the Army's organizational interests led to a preference for military intervention across the range of cases for which this contingency might be considered. Other officers clung to more traditional notions of the Army's proper sphere of activity or to a vague guideline that United States ground forces should not be committed on the Asian mainland. But Taylor's argument found a receptive ear in a new administration which desired a more flexible military posture than the force structure of the Eisenhower Administration had afforded, and Taylor carried the day.

Another example of distinct action preferences called for by bureaucratic interests comes from the United States reaction to the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973. The Department of State was concerned with

[38] See John D. Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1974), 55, 86, 125-28.

[39] Charles E. Lindblom, *The Intelligence of Democracy* (New York: Free Press 1965).

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the balance of forces in the Middle East. If the heavy Israeli losses of the first few days were not replaced by the United States, the Arab nations might gain regional military superiority. This imbalance might generate a situation in which first the United States and then the Soviet Union would become directly involved in the conflict. The State Department was anxious to avoid such a contingency. The Department of Defense was concerned about United States efforts to resupply Israel from another angle. United States forces around the world, but particularly in Western Europe, as well as the forces of major United States allies, were dependent on oil exported in large measure from Arab nations. If the United States became too closely associated with Israel through military resupply efforts, the Arab oil producers might retaliate with an immobilizing oil embargo. The Defense Department was therefore cautious with respect to replacing Israeli losses. The President had still other considerations that turned the tide in favor of a large-scale resupply effort: beleaguered as he was with the Watergate affair, Nixon was unwilling to become the focal point for another domestic protest. The threat of an Israeli announcement that the United States was withholding resupply[40] was apt to create such a protest in important media centers like New York and Los Angeles.

These illustrations support the notion that, although statesmen may agree about important characteristics of an international conflict, they may by reason of personal maxim or domestic political position opt for different or even opposite strategies. Strategic choices stemming from these sources may be inappropriate for the conflict structure the statesman faces—military intervention in Southeast Asia, for instance. Some of the movement of individuals across the hard-soft line spectrum over time can be attributed to domestic political position. The impact of domestic position is probably more acute for diffuse conflict situations than for severe crises. In the former, policy decisions regularly involve a large number of persons most of whom are acting in bureaucratic roles. Severe crisis conditions narrow down the number of people involved in decisions, and national leaders often act outside of their normal bureaucratic positions during such episodes.

V. Implications

The purpose of this essay has been to separate, and examine as distinct problems, issues that are often dealt with as part of an undifferentiated

[40] Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, *Kissinger* (Boston: Little, Brown 1974), 475.

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whole. Specifically, four elements related to the management and resolution of international conflicts have been isolated. First, several distinct conflict structures have been examined. The structures considered here are not exhaustive of those that underlie episodes of conflict among nations. These structures are common and important, however. The variety presented is sufficient to develop the point that different structures entail different dynamics. Second, the condition of multiple conflict dynamics with which statesmen grapple is exacerbated by the tendency of statesmen to perceive—at least initially—one conflict structure as underlying all conflicts that confront them. This tendency can be overdrawn, but it is important not to ignore the fact that statesmen have characteristic patterns of interpretation for impending conflicts. Third, different conflict structures require different strategies for successful management and resolution. The guidelines of this essay do not assure success with a particular Prisoner's Dilemma structure; compromise on an essential issue may be impossible. Nevertheless, it is clear that difficulties will arise from following a strategy designed for Chicken in a Prisoner's Dilemma situation. Further, this essay indicates when initiatives for coercion and compromise are apt to be useful rather than counterproductive within the context of individual conflicts. Fourth, just as the existence of multiple structures is exacerbated by tendencies among statesmen to see a particular structure, the necessity for a repertoire of different strategies to deal effectively with different structures or different requirements of one episode at different times is hampered by statesmen's preferences for particular styles of action. These preferences are relatively stable over time and thus do not exhibit the flexibility required for meeting various conflict needs across time.

The first of these issues is straightforward and requires no further elaboration. The second argument—that statesmen tend initially to perceive conflict episodes in terms of a single structure—is more intricate and controversial. The central implication here is, not that one predilection or another is better, but that the sources of and weaknesses in these initial images of conflict situations should be recognized and compensated for. Among other things, precipitous, irrevocable dramas (such as lightning invasions of contested areas) should be avoided. The certainty which statesmen exhibit with respect to the nature of incipient conflict episodes is often an indicator of their prejudices rather than of their keen insight. Some statesmen do change their expectations as a conflict unfolds; another implication arising from statesmen's perceptual biases is that a national decision unit which has a mix of perceptual predilections, and thus conflicting interpretations,

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is more apt to recognize and come to grips with the inadequacies of initial perceptions than is a homogeneous decision unit. Individual statesmen are less likely to recognize an inadequacy in their initial images if these images are unchallenged within the decision unit. The presence of both hard- and soft-line perceptions will help to alert statesmen who exhibit flexibility of expectations within conflict episodes to any discrepancies between initial images and the developing structure. Also, the presence of multiple, conflicting images serves to reinforce middle liners who are sometimes more sensitive to the limits of hard- and soft-line perceptions.

The different strategies required by the disparate dynamics of various conflict structures probably create the most delicate practical problems of the four issues considered.[41] Fortunately, the point of similarity in the strategies suitable for all the structures discussed in this essay is the initial stance of moderate firmness. This common stance provides an opportunity to assess the situation more carefully before branching off into the definitive and often irreversible paths appropriate for different structures. The first of two crucial junctures occurs when a statesman satisfies himself that the conflict arises from conscious manipulation on the adversary's part rather than from an inadvertent trans-

[41] Some of the conflict episodes discussed in this essay can, on the basis of the preferences of the dominant decision makers of the nations involved, be categorized as to structure. Berlin, 1948–49, is Chicken; Fashoda is Prisoner's Dilemma (Great Britain)–Chicken (France), as are the Austrian (Prisoner's Dilemma)–Russian (Chicken) Balkan conflicts of 1908–09 (the Bosnian crisis) and 1912–13 (the Balkan wars); Sarajevo is Prisoner's Dilemma. Other conflicts are more difficult to categorize for one or more of several reasons. For example, important leaders in one or both nations may differ in their preferences. Agadir was Prisoner's Dilemma for the French, but on the German side it was Prisoner's Dilemma for Kiderlen and Chicken for the Kaiser. Each of these men dominated German policy at different times during the conflict. Also, conflict structure may change as capabilities vary. Algeciras was Chicken for the Germans; but for the French, structure hinged on British support. Without British support, the French were in Chicken, but with it, they were in Prisoner's Dilemma. In other instances, statesmen's preferences may change as conflicts build across time, threatening new interests or raising new costs. Hitler's conflicts with the British and the French in the 1930's started out as Chicken (Rhineland and *Anschluss*), then became Prisoner's Dilemma (Germany)–Chicken (Great Britain and France) in the case of Munich, and finally reached Prisoner's Dilemma with the invasion of Poland. The United States-Vietnamese aspect of the recent conflict in Southeast Asia started out as Prisoner's Dilemma on both sides and gradually shifted to Prisoner's Dilemma (Vietnam)–Chicken (United States). Finally, interests and thus conflict structure may change with escalation. The 1958–62 Berlin conflict had a Chicken structure which might well have changed to Prisoner's Dilemma if the violence threshold had been breached. The Cuban conflict of 1962 was Prisoner's Dilemma (United States)–Chicken (Soviet Union) as it occurred. However, a United States attack on Soviet positions in Cuba or an invasion of Cuba might have produced a Prisoner's Dilemma structure. And the 1973 Yom Kippur War was Chicken from the standpoint of the United States and the Soviet Union. But acts of escalation such as the introduction of the forces of either great power could have changed this structure to Prisoner's Dilemma.

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gression of the statesman's tolerances. If the adversary appears to be in Chicken, the rule is to continue the *general* coercive pressure behind the original commitment. This entails coercive actions which create both immediate costs for the adversary and also fears of greater risks to come. Escalating the general coercive pressure can involve escalating coercive activity, as was the case for United States diplomacy in the Cuban conflict of 1962. Or it may simply entail maintaining a strategic position that becomes increasingly costly for the adversary over time, as the Soviets hoped the Berlin blockade would. If both sides are in Prisoner's Dilemma, the key is to probe *selectively* in the hope of finding a way to fit their commitments together. The trick here is to find specific points of compromise—such as Ulbricht's discovery of a distinction between military and civilian traffic to and within Berlin—which will reduce and possibly eliminate overlap of national tolerances. If a statesman senses that his adversary is in Prisoner's Dilemma while he is in Chicken, the sensible action is to coast on previous firmness and to begin looking for the easiest cover for an eventual retreat.

The second crucial point comes after general coercive actions or selected probes have clarified the other's position for each party. This juncture marks the point at which accommodation becomes useful.[42] With the adversary in Chicken and the statesman in Prisoner's Dilemma or winning Chicken, the statesman's task is to maintain his firmness while indicating limits on his objectives by providing the adversary with a face-saving avenue of retreat. Offers of conferences by the United States in the Berlin crisis of 1948–49 and by Britain in the Fashoda crisis of 1898 are examples of this technique. In cases of mutual Chicken, prolonged stalls may result if such an offer does not appear. If the structure has turned out to be mutual Prisoner's Dilemma, and probing has been successful in discovering and forcing small compromises that leave compatible commitments, a tacit solution may already exist or modest, mutual, and explicit compromises may easily create a solution. If a solution has not been discovered, a hard decision will be necessary whether to escalate dramatically—and carry out a prolonged struggle that will surely expand the conflict—or to lower aspirations, at least temporarily. A choice between these two options is not always open. If probing activity has reached a level where bureaucratic interests are threatened by a policy reversal (limited war, for instance), a decision to drop coercion may be op-

[42] This corresponds with what Zartman terms the mutual acceptance of a solution formula. I. William Zartman, "Reality, Image, and Detail," in Zartman, ed., *The 50% Solution* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 1976).

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posed by elements of the domestic coalition whose support is essential. President Johnson faced this problem with respect to United States involvement in Southeast Asia. If the game is Chicken from the losing side against either Chicken or Prisoner's Dilemma, the task is to elicit from the adversary the strongest sign of limited objectives possible and to take whatever gratuitous concessions are offered.

The strategy outlined above for Prisoner's Dilemma is more conservative than that for Chicken. In international affairs, Prisoner's Dilemma is a structure in which no one scores a clear victory. The essential for Prisoner's Dilemma is *to avoid disaster* (to fit the two national commitments together through a mutual compromise), rather than to win. Chicken, on the other hand, is often a struggle for victory. Nations usually come out of Chicken situations as clear winners or losers.[43] The distinction between the two structures raises the question as to what problems may stem from consistently following a strategy appropriate for one structure in all conflicts, including those of the other structure. Following a Chicken strategy in Prisoner's Dilemma leads to international disaster. Here the statesman strives to win in a situation that offers no opportunity for victory—the other side will simply not allow it. On the other hand, a statesman following Prisoner's Dilemma strategy from the dominant position in a Chicken situation suffers the costs of lost opportunities. He does not achieve all that he could. These costs, in contrast to the international disaster mentioned above, are usually domestic. Chauvinistic publics have been known to deal harshly with leaders who are reluctant to push adversaries to the wall.

Since different strategies are required to meet different dynamics and to handle a single dynamic at different times, a question arises as to how statesmen with stable predilections make these shifts across or within cases. As Diesing suggests, the ideal would be to have decision units dominated by moderate hard liners at the outset, with a shift of control to moderate soft liners at the second juncture.[44] This shift may occur in some instances, but it does not appear to be a frequent condition. One mechanism that does bridge these disparate requirements is flexibility in the expectations of some hard liners who can recognize and accept possibilities for modest mutual compromise as the conflict unfolds. A second possibility is that hard liners who are less flexible

[43] Some Chicken structures result in prolonged stalling. The Berlin conflicts from 1948 to 1962 contain examples of this activity. It is conceivable that Chicken conflicts might, through miscalculation, result in violent struggle. No clear-cut cases of this scenario come to mind, although the actions of German civilian leaders in 1914 *after* they realized Britain would support France could be interpreted that way.

[44] Snyder and Diesing (fn. 16).

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in their expectations will balk at escalation and stall. In this fashion, they grudgingly and tacitly accept a compromise as a temporary agreement, avoiding immediate escalation. A middle-line swing faction composed of a group or even one prominent figure can also prompt the necessary shifts.

Finally, there is the problem that personal maxims and domestic political position may create biases in favor of certain strategy preferences regardless of the underlying conflict structure. Statesmen may opt for inappropriate strategies even if they correctly identify the structure of the conflicts they confront. Their biases should provide an incentive for multiple advocacy.[45] Multiple advocacy itself is beset with problems; a common set of ideological lenses can blind an entire decision unit to certain images and action preferences, and no guarantee exists that the central executive will consult with advisors holding different viewpoints. Still, a multiplicity of opinions—even over a relatively narrow range—is apt to arise from a situation in which several individuals representing different personal preferences and organizational interests debate the merits of alternatives before a neutral, or at least noncommittal, central figure. Alternative viewpoints drawn in such a setting provide safeguards against some of the dangers exhibited by royal court and groupthink procedures.[46] For example, with the exception of Adlai Stevenson, no one advising President Kennedy during the Cuban crisis of 1962 was a soft liner. After initial thoughts had been expressed, attention focused on the question as to what point on an escalation continuum should mark initial coercion by the United States. Although this range of views was narrow, and serious consideration was not given to accommodative approaches, the discussion of the relative advantages and disadvantages of the blockade and the air strike-invasion—which arose from this informal type of multiple advocacy—was useful from the standpoint of managing and resolving the crisis.

VI. Conclusion

Statesmen often enter conflict episodes with preconceived ideas about the nature of the current conflict and the actions necessary to meet its

[45] See Alexander L. George, "The Case For Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 66 (September 1972), 751-95, for a discussion of multiple advocacy. Irving L. Janis, *Victims of Groupthink* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1972) offers a more informal version of the concept.

[46] Wilfrid L. Kohl, "The Nixon-Kissinger Foreign Policy System and U.S.-European Relations," *World Politics*, XXVII (October 1975), 1-43, develops and contrasts these various models of policy formulation.

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challenge. Since several different conflict structures exist and these structures require different approaches—both across structures and within each structure over time—a statesman's preconceived biases may not always meet the requirements of the unfolding conflict. An increased recognition on the part of statesmen of the possibility for erroneous perceptions of conflict structure, and sensitivity to the inappropriateness of actions based on false estimates of the situation, or to other biases, is desirable. Greater recognition of and sensitivity to these problems might diminish the severity of many international conflicts.

The outlook for progress in these directions is discouraging. In part the barriers are of an intellectual nature; that is the collection of problems at which this essay has been directed. The four issues discussed merit greater recognition as independent problems. But intellectual recognition is only a prerequisite to recognition in the political process; the latter may carry grave risks for a statesman's position in domestic politics. Churchill's views of the harsh necessities of international conditions did not make him influential in a Britain determined to have peace in the 1930's. Nor did Caillaux's desires for moderation of the conflict spiral between France and Germany sway irredentist France prior to the First World War. Political courage and power are as important as intellectual recognition. As Paul Swingle points out, there are few resources statesmen can rely on to help them bring their intellectual understanding of political issues to bear on domestic political pressures.[47] But difficult as it may be to overcome these barriers, the international dangers posed by erroneous perceptions of and inappropriate strategies for international conflicts—particularly conflicts among the great powers—are severe and provide concrete incentives to strive for clearer perceptions and more appropriate actions.

[47] Swingle, "Incantation of the Operational Definition," Paper, Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, (Toronto, February 1976).

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DETERRENCE IN 1939*

By ALAN ALEXANDROFF and RICHARD ROSECRANCE**

> In the first World war defense had been immensely more powerful than attack: the attacker needed a superiority of three, if not five to one. . . . If therefore [in 1936] Great Britain and France merely hoped to defend themselves, quite a small increase in their land armaments would enable them to do so; and this increase was more than provided between 1936 and 1939. On the other hand, if they wished to defeat Germany and to recover the position of triumphant dominance which they had enjoyed in 1919, they would have to multiply their armaments not by two, but by six or even by ten—an impossible proposition. . . . There is therefore no simple answer to the question: "Were British and French armaments adequate before 1939?" They were adequate to defend the two countries, if properly used; they were inadequate to prevent the extension of German power in eastern Europe.
>
> —*A. J. P. Taylor*[1]

I. The Problem of Deterrence in 1939

EVERY major war is reinterpreted after the event. The American Civil War has been endlessy fascinating to historians and has provoked continuing exegesis. World Wars I and II similarly have been the source of historical reconsideration but, in contrast, their interpretation seems to have gone through definite cycles. In reaction to the Versailles emphasis upon Germany's guilt in World War I, a revisionist consideration began in the 1920's which conditioned attitudes until 1939.[2] It was not until after World War II that German war aims in 1914 were subjected to scrutiny and criticism.[3] The analysis of the

* Simon Newman's *March 1939: The British Guarantee to Poland* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1976) came into our hands when the article was already in press. Based on many of the same primary sources, the author concludes that "the guarantee to Poland was never really thought of in terms of deterrence; it was regarded as a deliberate challenge. That it would be provocative to Germany and cause Polish intransigence on the questions at issue between the two countries, thereby increasing the probability of war, was expected" (p. 219). Newman is, however, less sympathetic to the preference of the Chiefs of Staff for an agreement with Russia than are the present authors.

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[1] A. J. P. Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War* (2d ed.; Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications 1961), 114.

[2] The basic book here is Sidney B. Fay, *The Origins of the World War*, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan 1928 and 1930).

[3] See particularly Fritz Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War* (London: W. W. Norton 1967). For a review of the various positions, see Wolfgang J. Mommsen,

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Second World War reversed this sequence. In the 40's and 50's the traditional explanation, laying the blame on Hitler and Germany, held sway.[4] A. J. P. Taylor's *Origins of the Second World War*, however, offered a revisionist account that distributed blame much more evenly.[5] British and French mistakes, as well as German ones, were held responsible for the war. Wars were likened to "road accidents," with no profound causes. If the brakes or steering had been in better repair, the war might have been avoided. Taylor noted laconically that Italy's proposal for a conference failed for lack of time; thus, "it seems from the record that [Hitler] became involved in war through launching on 29 August a diplomatic manoeuvre which he ought to have launched on 28 August."[6]

The traditional view, of course, was that if Britain and France had taken a strong stand against Germany in 1936 or even somewhat later, Hitler would have had to back down. If war had occurred then, it would have been decided quickly on Western terms. In 1939, however, it was no longer possible to prevent a conflict; events had begun to unroll inexorably like scenes in a classic tragedy. By then, Hitler was either militarily so overconfident that Western attempts to deter him could only be ineffective, or he was misled by Anglo-French appeasement into thinking he could get his way without a major war.

Both these positions are too simple. Each makes the origins of the Second World War seem easier to understand than in fact they are, though the revisionist account is closer to the truth. Consider Taylor's own arguments in the epigraph to this paper. According to his view, Britain and France should not have thought that they could prevent Hitler's drive to the East; to do so, they would have had to be willing to launch an offensive war on the Western Front, for which they were unprepared.[7] Even more significant, however, is Taylor's implicit con-

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"The Debate on German War Aims," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 1 (No. 3, 1966), 47-72; Mommsen, "Domestic Factors in German Foreign Policy before 1914," *Central European History*, VI (March 1973), 3-43; and H. W. Koch, ed., *The Origins of the First World War: Great Power Rivalry and German War Aims* (London: Macmillan 1972).

[4] See, among others, Winston Churchill, *The Gathering Storm* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1948), and L. B. Namier, *Diplomatic Prelude, 1938–39* (London: Macmillan 1948).

[5] In addition to Taylor's first and second editions (fn. 1), see W. Roger Louis, ed., *The Origins of the Second World War: A. J. P. Taylor and his Critics* (New York: John Wiley & Sons 1972), and E. M. Robertson, ed., *The Origins of the Second World War: Historical Interpretations* (London: Macmillan 1971).

[6] Taylor (fn. 1), 267.

[7] This question of allied versus German preparedness in the West is considered in more detail below.

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tention that Hitler was equally unready for war. In this view, Germany should have been deterred from embarking on a war of conquest directed against the West as well as against Eastern Europe. She did not have the military superiority to succeed in such a venture. Thus, why war? Germany should have held back when she realized (as she almost certainly did by August 26) that Britain and France would stand firm and declare war over Poland in case of an attack. The revisionists err when they maintain that Hitler's actions from August 27 to September 1 are easy to understand.

Some might seek to explain the failure of deterrence in 1939 by denying the need for great superiority in offensive operations. By 1939, it might be asserted, the *Blitzkrieg* had made such calculations obsolete. Germany, after all, succeeded in defeating France in 1940 with an army no larger than the French Army, and with a slight numerical disadvantage in tanks. This view is challenged, however, by B. H. Liddell Hart, the British military historian, who concludes that the fall of France need not have occurred if the Western Allies had used their forces effectively.[8] Victory was made possible in part by German General Guderian's defiance of the orders of the High Command. His brilliant success could not have been anticipated. Taylor's belief that superiority is required for offensive operations is buttressed by the experience of the closing phases of the war, in which Britain, Russia, and the United States needed a five-to-one superiority to defeat Germany. Since Hitler had no such superiority over the French and British Armies, it becomes difficult to explain why he precipitated war with the West by attacking Poland.

If it is difficult to understand why Hitler attacked in September 1939, it is less difficult to explain the military bases of the British and French policy of appeasement from 1936 to 1939. If Britain and France could not realistically oppose the extension of German power in Eastern Europe, what could they do but appease? On the basis of an overwhelming local superiority, Germany was able to defeat Austrian, Czech, and, later, Polish antagonists. France and Britain could not save them; they could only hope to cope with a German attack on the West. From this standpoint, what is interesting is not the appeasement policy but its abandonment in March 1939.

There appear to be two decisions that should have been ruled out by strict military calculation. The first was the British guarantee of Poland on March 31, 1939. Once this had occurred, the second precipi-

[8] In Liddell Hart, *History of the Second World War* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons 1971), 70, 73.

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tate act was the German decision to go to war against Poland on September 1. The first appears irrational because neither the British nor the French Army was ready to attack Germany—and that, realistically, was the only way they could aid Poland. The second appears questionable once the guarantee had been given, because Hitler had no plan for defeating either France or Britain; still he struck. Both sides made decisions that depended upon powerful and superior offensive capabilities when, in fact, they had simply attained equality in military forces.

The traditional view of the origins of World War II as briefly outlined above is not only wrong, but gets the analysis backwards: Appeasement in 1939 is perfectly understandable; what is difficult to comprehend is that it could have been reversed. Further, once it had been reversed, deterrence should have worked and Hitler should have been humbled. We have tended to think that World War II was not a failure of deterrence (except perhaps in its Far Eastern and Japanese aspect); rather, that it was a case where deterrence was not tried. If we now concede that 1939 represents a failure in deterrence, we are bound to ask why this could be. Beyond that, we are led to consider what implications such a failure might have for contemporary efforts at deterrence. The rest of this essay is devoted to these two questions.

II. The March Guarantee

When the United States failed to ratify the Versailles Treaty in 1919, the victorious coalition of France, Britain, and the United States collapsed. From then on, the French strove to create a bastion against Germany on their own. This involved a short-lived occupation of the Rhineland, pacts with Eastern European states, an alliance with the dubious U.S.S.R., and temporary arrangements with Italy over Austria. None of these initially seemed capable of restraining Germany, and thus Paris was thrust back upon London. After 1936, Britain became the key to the maintenance of European peace and prevention of German *revanche*.

Among British leaders, Neville Chamberlain, first as Chancellor of the Exchequer and then as Prime Minister, came to exercise a practical dominance. His direction of foreign policy was more single-minded and detailed than that of most British statesmen. Initially, he favored a refocusing upon Europe as opposed to the Far East, and he worried about a German air offensive against Britain if war came. To counter a German air offensive, he pressed for a powerful metropolitan fighter

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force and accelerated air production schedules. In the long run, he wanted a strong bomber force. His objective was to deter Germany while making only a minimum commitment to Europe. In February 1936, he wrote: "If we can keep out of war for a few years, we shall have an air force of such striking power that no one will care to run risks with it. I cannot believe that the next war, if it ever comes, will be like the last one, and I believe our resources will be more profitably employed in the air, and on the sea, than in building up great armies."[9]

There were, however, two problems with this approach. If a bomber offensive was to deter German aggression, the British had to make themselves immune to German retaliation. This required a major buildup of fighter aircraft. But to accelerate fighter production was to slow the output of bombers; the British could not do both at once. Thus the threat of an air offensive could not be used to stay Hitler's hand. Even if bombers had been available in quantity, Britain would have hesitated to initiate an air war on civilian populations, believing that ultimately she might suffer more. Thus, an answer to German aggressiveness had to be found elsewhere.

The Chiefs of Staff looked at matters differently from the Prime Minister. They did not rely on an air strategy, but placed their hopes on a war of strategic attrition that would cut off Germany's sources of supply and would ultimately bring her to her knees. In July 1938, their assessment stated bluntly: "It is obvious that although the political initiative in respect of the moment of our intervention [in war] will be with us, the military will then rest with Germany. Great Britain will therefore have to adopt a strategical defensive until such time as the German initial offensive has been mastered."[10] In February 1939, this calculation was made even more precise: "We must be prepared to face a major offensive directed against either ourselves or France. To defeat such an offensive we should have to concentrate all our initial efforts, and during this time our major strategy would be defensive. Our subsequent policy should be directed to weakening Germany and Italy by the exercise of economic pressure and by extensive propaganda, while at the same time building up our military strength until we can adopt an offensive major strategy."[11]

After Germany marched into Prague on March 15, all of Hitler's promises were shown to be hollow. Germany had violated the principle

[9] Quoted in Keith Feiling, *The Life of Neville Chamberlain* (London: Macmillan 1946), 314.
[10] CAB 53/40, Chiefs of Staff [hereafter COS] 747, 25 July 1938.
[11] CAB 53/45, COS 843, 20 February 1939.

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of national self-determination and, even more important in Lord Halifax's view, had made clear that she preferred "naked force to methods of consultation and discussion."[12] The military situation, however, did not favor an early check of the German dictator. (In February it had been made clear that Britain could send no more than two divisions to aid France. The first troop embarkations would take place within three weeks of the onset of war, but the second contingent would wait for two months. In the early stages, the French would be left to face German troops virtually on their own.)

The situation worsened when it appeared that Hitler might give an economic ultimatum to Bucharest. A German absorption of Romania went to the heart of British long-term strategy. Since the goal was to defeat Germany in a war of attrition, Britain had to be able to cut off sources of supply. But the Chiefs of Staff pointed out on March 18: "If Germany obtains access to the economic resources of Romania she will have gone a long way towards rendering herself immune from the effects of economic warfare."[13] It appeared, therefore, that such a move must be blocked. Germany might be stopped if Great Britain could form an alliance with Russia, Poland, and France.

There was still the question, however, how far Britain should go on her own. The Chiefs were asked to advise the Prime Minister whether Britain should commit herself to go to war over a German attack on Romania. In reply, they distinguished three possible situations: (1) Poland and the U.S.S.R. remaining neutral; (2) Poland allied with Great Britain, Russia neutral; (3) Russia allied with Great Britain, Poland neutral. The first was dismissed out of hand; Britain could take no action in this case. Though the Chiefs of Staff expected a brave effort on the part of Poland, they did not look optimistically on the second condition. If there were a combination of Britain and Russia, however, the allies would be in "a better position to prosecute a successful campaign."[14] Still, the military continued to oppose a commitment to Romania or to other Eastern countries. No material help could in fact be given by Britain to any of them. Effectively, the military argued, Britain had to find allies first; only afterward could she make a commitment.

Political leaders neglected that advice. Unless some guarantee could be given to Eastern states, they reasoned, Germany would continue to

[12] Quoted in Sidney Aster, *1939: The Making of the Second World War* (New York: Simon and Schuster 1973), 31.
[13] CAB 53/10, COS 283 MTG, 18 March 1939.
[14] *Ibid.*

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expand. On the other hand, if a guarantee were given to Poland and Romania, and if in consequence the guaranteed powers took a very strong and uncompromising line toward Germany, the guarantee might actually bring on war. Since Britain could not prevent successful German expansion in the East, to guarantee a country (without practical means of fulfilling that guarantee) might precipitate Hitler's acquisition of Romanian and Polish resources.

Under political pressure, the military shifted their position from outright opposition to Eastern commitments to the requirement that such a commitment not impair the attrition strategy—the strategy, as it was put, of "bleeding Germany." A theoretical option was for France and Britain to threaten an offensive in the West if Hitler moved East. Britain's military weakness on land meant that such a thrust would in effect be a French effort, and it could do no more than hope to distract Hitler from his Polish preoccupation. While an offensive was suggested several times by the British, the French remained highly skeptical. As war drew near, the French stated flatly that they would not authorize an offensive. The British briefly considered an allied bombing strategy as an alternative, but the air staff did not want to initiate such warfare.

Thus, in late March 1939, the British effectively had a choice of three strategies: (1) doing nothing—appeasement as usual; (2) giving an immediate guarantee to Poland and Romania; (3) working for a political and military relationship with Russia which would have given substance and force to a later Eastern European guarantee. The first was ruled out by the pressure of British Cabinet politics as well as by international affairs. In the aftermath of Prague, something had to be done.[15] The second policy was the one chosen for reasons of speed as well as Chamberlain's suspicion of the Soviet Union. On this very point, Chamberlain was writing to his sister: "I must confess to the most profound distrust of Russia," adding that the Soviets had no offensive power[16] (a view not shared by his own military chiefs). He urged a guarantee of Poland upon the Foreign Policy Sub-Committee of the Cabinet. When others objected to the exclusion of Russia from the agreement, he argued the need for speed and cited rumors of im-

[15] The alternative of doing nothing has more to commend it in retrospect than was apparent at the time. We know that Germany in fact intended no threat to either Poland or Romania in March. If Germany had moved eastward later, she would have forced Russia willy-nilly into the arms of the West, cementing the very alliance which eluded British grasp in August 1939. From this strong position, a much more effective resistance to Hitler might have been mounted in 1940.

[16] Aster (fn. 12), 89.

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mediate German action. He and Halifax prepared a draft declaration for Parliament, giving a unilateral commitment to Poland; by the time of its announcement on March 31, however, the putative German threat had been exposed as unreal.

The advantage of the third alternative was that it maximized defensive strength in the East, where Hitler would otherwise have had an almost free passage. Polish and Russian forces, using defensive tactics, would have been far more effective against the still untried and partly untrained German Army, than was Poland alone confronting Germany *and* Russia in September 1939. The political and military link to Moscow would also have contributed greatly to deterrence. It was all too easy for Hitler to think that Britain would not honor her guarantee to Poland unless she had an agreement with Russia. For a time, he could view the unilateral guarantee as a paper proposal, a kind of British diplomatic whistling in the dark.

But the third course of action was not seriously considered despite its advocacy by the British military. Immediately after the guarantee, the Chiefs prophetically underscored its weaknesses: "We are not in a position to assess the deterrent effect of such a Pact upon Germany, but an important military implication is that if such a Pact were to encourage an intransigent attitude on the part of Poland and Romania, it would thereby tend to precipitate a European war before our forces are in any way fully prepared for it, and such a war might be started by aggression against Danzig alone.[17]

Once the guarantee had been given, all the damage was done. It was no longer possible to put the kind of pressure on Colonel Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, that the British had used against President Beneš of Czechoslovakia the previous year. This meant that Polish obduracy on Danzig could make Germany believe that no peaceful settlement was possible. At the same time, the Polish guarantee meant in practice that the U.S.S.R. could not be brought into the arrangement. The Poles, desperately suspicious of the Russians, would have agreed to joint defense proposals only if the British had been able to insist. But with the Polish guarantee already pocketed and a matter of public record, the Poles saw no reason to compromise.[18] Furthermore, the Russians had less reason to reach an agreement. They no longer had to

[17] CAB 53/47, COS 870, 28 March 1939.

[18] The French particularly misled the Poles concerning the possibility of a Western offensive against Germany if Poland were attacked. General Gamelin told Warsaw in May that in such a contingency the French would open an offensive with *"les gros de ses forces"* fifteen days after the beginning of mobilization. J. R. B. Butler, *Grand Strategy*, II, *September 1939–June 1941* (London: H. M. Stationery Office 1959), 55.

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worry about a Western rapprochement with Hitler, and thus did not have to concede in order to get a British commitment to resist the German dictator. They could play their territorial cards and strive to win a measure of recognition in the bargain. It was therefore not surprising that when—finally—London and Paris tried to arrange for military cooperation between Russia and Poland, they could not reach an agreement. Britain could not force Poland to open her frontier to Russian troops (the minimal condition for effective joint resistance against a German invasion). Equally, the British and French offered nothing that would draw Moscow. Despite their hints to Poland, they were not planning a military offensive in the West to offset German pressure in the East. The Russians would have been pulling Western chestnuts out of the fire while remaining unable actually to give effective help to Poland. The Russian Non-Aggression Pact with Germany gave them a much better deal, and it also provided time.

At the end of March 1939, the British thought they were under pressure to do something quickly to resist Hitler. They gave the ill-considered guarantee to Poland and Romania when Germany offered a short-term threat to neither. They had no means of actually implementing the guarantee: neither they nor the French were prepared militarily to launch a major, not just a diversionary, attack upon the Western redoubts of Germany.[19] The British and French could jointly resist an attack upon their own forces, and they should have been able to prevent the fall of France in May 1940. But they could not meet Hitler's march into Poland with an offensive across the Siegfried Line, or through Belgium and Luxembourg. Hitler's own generals had satisfied him that such an attack could not succeed. With the guarantee to Poland, therefore, Britain was merely saying that a German attack on Warsaw would put them and the French into a technical state of war with Hitler. But what did this mean? It did not mean offensive Western action. The allies were still waiting for Germany to attack *them*. There was no sanction that the British could levy in the short run to bring Hitler down; all the British plans turned, rather, on the long run. Germany might win a startling series of victories, but ultimately the war of attrition, successful resistance in France, and an

[19] Even a diversionary attack was not planned. The Chiefs of Staff wrote on 3 June: "So far, therefore, our contacts with the French have not produced the answer to the problem as to how we and they can co-operate effectively in reducing the pressure on Poland if she is attacked. . . . Unless, therefore, the French are prepared to undertake some effective diversion along the lines indicated in Paragraph 10 [of *Report on Anglo-French Action in Support of Poland*] at a very early stage of the war, we cannot hope to relieve pressure on land against Poland." CAB 53/49, COS 905, 3 June 1939.

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economic blockade would wear her down. She would lose in the long run. The British tried long-run deterrence when the only effective measure against Hitler would have been short-run deterrence. They invited him to think how he would end the war when all he thought about was how he would win the first battles. The British knew they would lose the first battles; nevertheless they brought them on with the guarantee.

The position of long-term deterrence would have had far more short-term effectiveness if Britain had first sought an agreement with the Soviet Union. But by rushing heedlessly into the arms of Poland, the British lost the chance for a real agreement with Russia; they undermined their short-term deterrence position without any strengthening of their long-term position. In the post-outbreak giddiness of 1940, the British even sought to put themselves at war with the Soviet Union as well as Germany in an ill-considered attempt to assist Finland. They avoided what would have been the most fateful blunder in British military history only because the Finns surrendered on March 6, before the Anglo-French expeditionary force could set sail.[20]

The lesson of the British guarantee of March 31, 1939, is that changes of policy may sometimes be too radical when a nation's operating presuppositions are discredited. The German march into Prague undercut the foundations of the appeasement policy, and there was no clear alternative. A guarantee was the least adequate substitute for the old policy. It did not deter Hitler; it did not offer a real check on his Eastern policy. Still more important, it had unresolved logical contradictions. What if Hitler occupied Poland, but failed to attack France? How could Britain act to bring on a war if the firm presumption of all British thinking was that Germany would take the offensive? What would the British have done if Germany had simply ignored them?

III. The September Decision

The German decision to invade Poland in September raised problems even more acute than those of the British guarantee. Between 1936 and 1939, Adolf Hitler scored a series of dazzling successes in foreign policy, the result of which was to transform European and also world international politics. In 1936, Germany was still the pariah nation, the victim of Versailles, the unrepentant and still shackled loser of the Great War. By 1939, she had liberated herself from all restraints. Ger-

[20] See Liddell Hart (fn. 8), 46.

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many had become the dominant nation in Europe. Her diplomacy was the central reference point of world politics. Nations sought to placate her and do her bidding. Until the breakdown of the Munich accords in March, it appeared that German demands over Poland would be given the same favorable treatment as her claims on Czechoslovakia. And even after the occupation of Prague, it was not certain that there could be no further expansion eastward. There was little that the French or British could do to prevent it.[21]

Thus, the British guarantee of March 31 did not deter Hitler; it was the precipitating cause for the development of *Fall Weiss* (Case White), the plan for the invasion of Poland. The Führer's order came on April 3, and the initial target date was set for September 1, 1939. If the plan was to be successful, Poland had to be isolated from effective help by means of two conditions: (1) the French and British would not launch an offensive against Germany in the West while the latter was preoccupied with the Polish war in the East; (2) Russia would not intervene militarily in support of Poland. The Germans thought the second quite unlikely. The Poles and Russians were traditional enemies and ideological foes. In Hitler's view, the former would not want to be "bolshevized." In any event, as Hitler told his generals on May 29, "It is not impossible that Russia will show herself to be disinterested in the destruction of Poland."[22]

After March 31, the Germans had several advantages in their negotiations with the U.S.S.R. First, they could hold out territorial gains to the Soviet leaders which the British could not or were not prepared to give. They could even offer a major part of Poland. Second, Hitler could give the Russians a respite, a temporary peace. The British, on the other hand, could only place on them the burden of fighting to defend Poland against Germany, with a good chance of war in September. Finally, the British guarantee had made it almost impossible for the Russians to press the Poles for military cooperation against Hitler. The latter did not fully realize how desperate their plight was, believing to the end in their own strength and the prospect of an offensive in the West.

The slow-moving British and French military talks with the Russians in August stalled on the inability of Western nations to promise that

[21] The British Chiefs faced this issue in dealing with the Poles. Since neither they nor the French knew what to do "if Germany attacked Poland in the East and stood on the defensive in the West," they were not in a position to give assurances to Warsaw. CAB 53/11, COS MTG 294, 10 May 1939.

[22] "Minutes of a Conference on May 23, 1939," No. 433, *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945* (London: H. M. Stationery Office 1956), 576.

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Poland would open its borders to permit Russian troops to engage German invaders. When this became clear, the Russians moved quickly to an agreement with Nazi Germany. Thus, Hitler's second requirement for action against Poland was met: the Russians would do more than stand aside, they would participate in the dismemberment of Poland.

The possibility of an offensive by the West was thoroughly considered by General Halder and other members of the German High Command. The success of any French offensive (the British being unable to get their forces to France until after the third week in September) depended critically upon timing. The operation in Poland was planned not to take more than two weeks, after which great numbers of battle-hardened troops might be released to do service against France. Thus, the question was only whether France might strike so quickly that Germany could not respond in time. The answer has been much mooted.[23] The French began preliminary mobilization measures on August 21. By September 9, they had 72 divisions, 8,000 guns, and 2,500 aircraft in position opposite Germany. On the other side, the *Wehrmacht* had 8 first-line and 25 other divisions, making a total of 33. These divisions did not yet have tanks, and their supplies would have been adequate for no more than three days of fighting. The Siegfried Line was not complete. Turrets were missing. No adequate shelter was provided for troops. There was no system of defense in depth.[24] Still, the Germans did not worry greatly about a French attack. While General Halder believed the French to be in a position to launch an offensive two weeks after mobilization, he expected to have 22 to 26 divisions to meet an invasion at the decisive point. The Germans had only 300 artillery pieces to meet the expected 1,600 on the French side, but they were planning to transfer medium artillery from the East. They could also shift their defense to the Meuse and adopt other measures to delay a French offensive. Although they were wrong in believing that the French would not mobilize before the eve of war, the time during which the latter could break through German lines and exploit that advantage was very short. Perhaps the French did possess sufficient superiority between September 9 and 15 to consider an offensive in the West. To make use of this brief period, they would have had to go through Belgium or else attack over the Siegfried Line.

[23] See, among others, Siegfried Westphal, *Heer in Fesseln* (Bonn: Athenäum-Verlag 1950), 109-17; Telford Taylor, *Sword and Swastika* (New York: Simon and Schuster 1952), 305-09; and Jon Kimche, *The Unfought Battle* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1968), 89-95.

[24] *Ibid.*, 89-94.

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Movement through Belgium was slow. The French would not be at the German border for several days. They might have speeded this timetable by going against the German *Westwall*, but they did not realize how inadequately prepared it was. The French *Deuxieme Bureau* reported on September 9 that Germany had 43 divisions behind the Siegfried Line, and identified and placed 26 of them. The French were not ready to attack such forces.[25] The British Chief of the Imperial General Staff met with General Gamelin on September 4. He reported to London: "Ultimately General Gamelin intended to throw out three reconnaissances in force and to test the strength of the Siegfried Line. He had no intention of rushing the operation and risking the flower of the French Army by precipitate action."[26] British and French attitudes are exemplified in Telford Taylor's summary of German military confidence:

> There is every reason to conclude that Halder's cool and unworried gauge of the western front was shared by the officers' corps as a whole. He was not only Chief of the General Staff; he was a conservative and competent tactician whose views can be regarded as both representative and authoritative. A year earlier, he had not shrunk from planning Hitler's overthrow in order to avert what was then regarded as certain disaster. In 1939, however, he viewed the immediate prospects in the west with equanimity, and we may safely assume that the same was true of his other generals.[27]

Thus, by August 22, Hitler's two main requirements for isolating Poland seemed to have been met. Russia would not help Poland, but rather would be in on the kill. There seemed no realistic prospect that either the British or French would be able to take military advantage of Germany's brief period of distraction in the Polish campaign. Hitler met his generals at the *Obersalzburg* in a mood of triumph. He noted that everything at the moment was uniquely favorable to Germany and to German action, but that this might not be true after two or three years. He and Mussolini were decisive; they were men of action. But the Duce might fall, and Hitler could be struck down. The German Chancellor observed: "Essentially all depends on me, on my existence,

[25] The Anglo-French staff conversations had already made this amply clear. French General Lelong told his British counterparts as early as May 1939, "if Germany decided to remain strictly on the defensive, and if Italy remained neutral, a very thorny problem would be presented to the French and British. The Maginot Line and Siegfried Line faced each other, and France could not seriously attack Germany on land without long preparation. . . . There could be no question of a hurried attack on the Siegfried Line." CAB 53/48, COS 900, J. P., May 1939; 13th meeting of British and French staffs.

[26] CAB 65/3 W. M. 4 Conclusions; Minute 1, September 4, 1939.

[27] Taylor (fn. 23), 308.

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because of my political talents. Furthermore, the fact is that probably no one will ever again have the confidence of the whole German people as I have. There will probably never again in the future be a man with more authority than I have. My existence is therefore a factor of great value. But I can be eliminated at any time by a criminal or a lunatic." Economic forces and the need for *Lebensraum* also pressed for an early decision: "It is easy for us to make decisions. We have nothing to lose; we have everything to gain. Because of our restrictions [*Einschränkungen*] our economic situation is such that we can only hold out for a few more years. Göring can confirm this. We have no other choice, we must act. Our opponents will be risking a great deal and can gain only a little."[28] He added that the chances were that the war would be short and confined to Poland. The probability was great that the West would not intervene. The British could gain nothing from a long war and were not prepared for it. In the Far East, in the Mohammedan world, and in the Mediterranean, their power was on the wane: "England and France have undertaken obligations which neither is in a position to fulfill." The British had not even assisted in Polish rearmament, showing how little they wanted to support Poland. The West had only two strategies to use to oppose Germany. The first was a blockade. Hitler dismissed this by saying, "It will not be effective because of our autarky and because we have sources of supply in Eastern Europe." As for an armed attack from the Maginot Line, he maintained, "I consider this impossible."[29]

Germany's previous gains had been "achieved by bluff on the part of the political leaders." At some point it would be necessary to test the military machine. This test should not be "in a general reckoning" but "by the accomplishment of individual tasks." The danger that Russia would become Germany's enemy after the conquest of Poland had been neutralized. "Thus in actual fact England cannot help Poland. . . . Military intervention is out of the question." Hitler looked forward to the impact on Poland and the West of the Non-Aggression Pact with Russia. It would be a bombshell. "The effect on Poland will be tremendous."[30]

Until August 25, Hitler was able to cling to the belief that his strategy had won. Neither France nor Britain would now intervene. Even Liddell Hart stresses the logic of this position. Summarizing Hitler's attitude toward the British, he notes:

[28] Speech by the Führer to the Commanders in Chief, August 22, 1939. *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945*, Series D, VII, *The Last Days of Peace, August 9–September 3, 1939* (Department of State, Washington, D.C. 1956), 201.
[29] *Ibid.*, 203. [30] *Ibid.*, 202, 204.

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> Regarding them as cool-headed and rational, with their emotions controlled by their heads, he felt that they would not dream of entering a war on behalf of Poland unless they could obtain Russia's support. So, swallowing his hatred and fear of "Bolshevism," he bent his efforts and energies towards conciliating Russia and securing her abstention. . . . But the Soviet-German pact, coming so late, did not have the effect on the British that Hitler had reckoned. On the contrary, it aroused the "bulldog" spirit—of blind determination, regardless of the consequences. In that state of feeling, Chamberlain could not stand aside without both loss of face and breach of promise.[31]

Hitler's first inkling that the British would stand firm came on August 23, when both Henderson, the British Ambassador, and Chamberlain (in a private letter) made it clear that England would fulfill her obligations to Poland despite the Non-Aggression Pact. On August 25, the British formalized their obligation to Poland in a treaty signed in London. On the same day, Mussolini told Hitler that he could not enter the war unless supplied with many vital raw materials; his abstention was now clear. Hitler then cancelled the order to begin operation *Fall Weiss* on August 26, hoping for a British reconsideration. But it never came. When the Germans offered a propagandistic recital of their claims and demands on the 29th, it was meant to justify war, not to prevent it. Indeed, by August 27, Hitler had decided to attack Poland regardless of what Britain or France might do.

After the 26th, Hitler's behavior failed to accord with criteria of deterrence. He was prepared to act even though the British and French would go to war with Germany. To be sure, in the short run that would not mean much; for Hitler dismissed their threat to attack in the West, and they could not assist Poland. On the other hand, he had no military plan for eliminating them. He might have presented them with the worst of all worlds by simply ignoring their declaration of war, but it was a foregone psychological conclusion in Hitler's thinking that he would have to attack them. In regard to Poland, Hitler had informed his generals: "A permanent state of tension is intolerable. The power of the initiative cannot be allowed to pass to others. The present moment is more favorable than in two or three years' time. An attempt on my life or Mussolini's could change the situation to our disadvantage. One cannot forever face one another with rifles cocked. . . . We are faced with the harsh alternatives of striking or of certain annihilation sooner or later."[32] This line of reasoning meant that a British-French challenge could not go unmet, or Hitler would lose the initiative in world politics.

[31] Liddell Hart (fn. 8), 12-14.
[32] *Documents on German Foreign Policy* (fn. 28), 202.

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When the Czechs had stiffened their resistance in the spring of 1938, Hitler had decided to face them down—politically if possible, militarily if necessary. Similarly, after the British and French entry into the war, it was inevitable that Hitler would attack them.

In this way, of course, Hitler validated the original British assumptions of March 31, and made it unnecessary for the allies to plan offensive operations. That he could do so, however, was testimony to the degree to which the maintenance of sheer political momentum had come to determine his strategy, to the neglect of military prudence. After the conquest of Poland, Hitler made ritual peace overtures to the British and French, conditional on their acceptance of the new situation; but even before they could reply, he laid down plans for an offensive in the West. Operations should be directed, after the manner of the old Schlieffen Plan, through Belgium to the Channel coast, and A-day was set initially as early as November 12th. In his justification for such plans, Hitler stressed the danger that a long war would pose to Germany. A drawn-out conflict, given Germany's "limited food and raw material basis," would threaten the national food supply and "the means for carrying on the war." He feared that "the morale at least of the people will be adversely affected."[33]

Hitler's generals, however, were by no means convinced of the early need to attack the West; some believed that the West need not be struck at all. Leeb, the German commander opposite the Maginot Line, claimed that "It is quite certain that a total destruction of the Anglo-French armies, which is the desired ultimate objective cannot be achieved. . . . An attack costing the attacker more casualities than the defender . . . would be a disadvantage for us. . . . World War I was sufficient proof that long drawn-out trench warfare means tremendous disadvantage for us." General Rundstedt took a similar view. He was against allowing "the attacking power of the army to be consumed by an indecisive and partial objective."[34] With England and France in the war, a long struggle seemed inevitable. "An army capable of attacking" would be the decisive weapon in such a war, but a German attack on the West could only weaken this vital instrument. Some commanders even argued that a German attack on the West would favor Franco-British strategy.

Since the Western allies could neither prevent an attack on Poland nor take the offensive against Germany, a great gap opened in the

[33] Quoted in Telford Taylor, *The March of Conquest* (New York: Simon and Schuster 1958), 45.
[34] *Ibid.*, 47, 52.

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Anglo-French short-term deterrence position in September 1939. After the invasion of Poland, moreover, the way was clear for German expansion to the south. The resources of Eastern Europe, with Russia's tacit consent, would now be available to Hitler. Thus, an important part of Britain's long-term deterrence strategy had also been undercut. At the same time, the attack on Poland did not reverse the scales of power. The defeat of Poland by no means signalled the defeat of France. The Germans would still have to take the offensive in the West to succeed. Even with their enormous army, they never attained a decisive superiority over the opposing forces in the West. No German general could have guaranteed a German success against the French and British, and some predicted stalemate or defeat.[35] Hitler did not see the way clear to victory over the West when he decided to attack Poland. He simply leaped into the dark.

If Hitler's and his generals' conclusions had been brought into harmony, a more sensible strategy might have evolved. Germany might then have decided to hold back in September; or, after the collapse of Warsaw, to let the British and French wear themselves out in an attack against German forces on the Rhine. The necessary integration of thought never occurred. Hitler could attack Poland because of difficulties in the British short-term deterrence position. But he was not deterred from planning, as a logical consequence, an attack on the West that should have been ruled out by British and French long-term deterrence.

IV. Conclusions and Implications

The outbreak of war in 1939 can thus be seen as a sequence of failures of deterrence. In March, the British risked an already weak short-term position to prevent a further decline in their long-term position. The guarantee to Poland and then to Romania was an ineffective way of stopping the German dictator. Since no British capabilities were available to enforce it, the guarantee only increased Hitler's determination to settle matters with Poland. Once he had obtained Russia's cooperation, he assumed that Britain and France would back down. When they did not, he was confronted by a new dilemma: should he attack Poland when this would put Germany at war with

[35] Taylor's "Second Thoughts" add substance to these contentions. According to Taylor, Hitler "had no idea that he would knock France out of the war when he invaded Belgium and Holland on 10 May 1940. This was a defensive move: to secure the Ruhr from Allied invasion. The conquest of France was an unforeseen bonus" (fn. 1), 277-93; quotation from p. 287.

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Britain and France? At the time, he had no plans for a successful offensive against France, to say nothing of Britain. He certainly did not inquire into such possibilities between August 27 and 31; yet German troops attacked on September 1. He discounted the long-term dangers because his short-term position was so favorable.

The time scale of perception and decision is a critical and largely neglected area of deterrence theory. If opponents are to attain "mutual deterrence," they must operate on roughly the same time horizon. Long-term maximizers will not always deter short-term maximizers, and vice versa. Britain was not deterred from giving the guarantee by her short-term weakness in Eastern Europe. She hoped to prevail in a long war in which Germany would take the offensive. Germany was not deterred from attacking Poland by long-term uncertainties; rather, she focused on short-term strength.

It is important to inquire whether the United States and the Soviet Union have operated upon simliar time perspectives in the post-World War II era. The revolutionary fact of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons initially made both superpowers consider not just whether devastation might fall upon them, but how soon. In Secretary Dulles's formulation, it was not only "massive retaliation" that was possible, but also "instant retaliation." The very advantages that the Soviet Union might have in the short run in conventional forces could be cancelled by "a great capacity to retaliate instantly by means and at places of our own choosing."[36] But with time and the establishment of mutual deterrence, the certainty that nuclear weapons would be used in response to conventional attacks has inevitably declined. The pause before their introduction has lengthened. Indeed, most of American strategic policy since 1957 has been concerned with trying to find other than instant and massive ways of responding to conventional aggression. If conventional forces were considered inadequate, tactical nuclear weapons too indiscriminate, and strategic options unpromising, the United States might also be willing to delay use of strategic countercity weapons in response to a major conventional attack. But indefinite postponements undercut deterrence as surely as a decline in credibility. Strategists have speculated about the "dilemmas of the victor's inheritance" which the conqueror would face even if nuclear weapons were not used at all. How could an aggressor expect to govern the rebellious populations of the conquered territory? What would be the reaction of other powers to his success? We have been told that, if nuclear weapons were employed

[36] John Foster Dulles, "The Evolution of Foreign Policy," *Department of State Bulletin*, xxx, No. 761, January 25, 1954.

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by an attacker, a defender might gain advantage by adopting a "withholding strategy" in order to maximize the ratio of surviving missile stocks. Increasingly, one looks not to the immediate situation after a *casus belli*, but to leverage in negotiations that might take place days or weeks afterward. On the part of the West at least, there has been a tendency to try to find medium- and long-term advantages to compensate for presumed short-term disadvantages should a conflict begin. And the Soviet Union, equally, has been willing to plan in terms of extended time perspectives. Neither American nor Soviet leaders appear to have "mortality complexes" of the kind that influenced the Nazis' decisions.

Still, at some stage an aggressor may well come to believe that the point at which he would suffer severe sanctions is so far removed and so uncertain that it does not serve as a realistic deterrent. Short-term strengths would then determine the outcome. Here another possible lesson of 1939 may become relevant. Since the *Blitzkrieg*, strategists have perhaps been too ready to overlook the traditional advantages of the defense, too disposed to assume that the offense would overwhelm even the best-prepared conventional defense. In part this has been for historical reasons. After World War II, the United States and Europe did not initially believe they could mount a defense, adequate in conventional terms, to stem an attack by the then presumed 175 Soviet divisions. They sought, for political and technological reasons, to offset such primacy by tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. As a result, they did not design defensive redoubts that would have taken full advantage of terrain and fortifications to stop an attack. Rather, they steeled themselves to be ready for the inevitable transition to a nuclear battlefield, losing many traditional defensive strengths in the process. Today, on the other hand, the development and further perfection of precision-guided munitions may give advantages to a well-prepared defense analogous to those of classical strategy. As Liddell Hart has noted, the required ratio of force to space has been continually declining in the modern era.[37] If so, the number of troops required to hold a given frontier should also have decreased, strengthening the defensive position. If traditional techniques are conjoined with new weapons, one might eventually restore the military *status quo ante* of 1939 and produce a situation in which a very substantial offensive superiority would be necessary to achieve a breakthrough. Then time perspectives would regain symmetry: short-term offensive advantages would be offset by short-term defensive strengths.

[37] Liddell Hart, *Deterrent or Defense?* (New York: Praeger 1960), 97.

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The significance of differences in time perceptions is not the only lesson for deterrence to be learned from a study of 1939. Of equal importance is that of political alliance and realignment. The final event tipping the balance toward war in 1939 was the Russo-German Pact of August 23. This squared the diplomatic circle: Communism and Nazism joined forces, at least temporarily. Neither Britain nor France had believed that such an event was possible. They had thought that they well-nigh automatically had Russia on their side; all they had to do was court Poland. In fact, the reverse was nearer the truth. Poland had no options, but Russia did. When the U.S.S.R. shifted her weight from one side of the scales to the other, the weakness of the Western countries was exposed. Poland was vulnerable to attack, and Hitler acted to seize his short-term advantage.

Today, political alignments are just as vital a factor. The Sino-Soviet split has enhanced deterrence. The enmity of the two great Communist states has forced the Soviet Union to station substantial forces on her border with the People's Republic of China. The greater flexibility of Soviet policy since the late 1960's can be seen in part as a response to the threat posed by her southern neighbor. Strategists have speculated that a major Russian move in Europe might bring a response from China. Thus the West's position is considered improved because of Russia's supposed inability to cope with war on two fronts. But this improved deterrence position is premised on a continuing rift between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. The uncertainty of China's political scene is very evident, however. Close supporters of Chairman Mao have followed an anti-Soviet line, but the resurgence of more bureaucratic elements may lead to control by a faction much more amenable to a rapprochement with the U.S.S.R.

It may be well to consider the galvanic effect on international relations of a sudden alliance between these seemingly implacable foes. The example of 1939 shows the destabilizing effect of major alliance reversals. Although the analogy between 1939 and 1977 is rudimentary at best, present deterrence calculations would be seriously affected by such a momentous shift of alignment. The mere possibility of such a reversal suggests that the political foundations of contemporary deterrence need attention. On the whole, the West has been dilatory in its attempts to reach a more complete understanding with China. In the interwar years, the Western countries dallied in their negotiations for closer alignment with the Soviet Union; in the negotiations of 1939, they continued to procrastinate. Diplomats then believed that an alliance between Russia and her primary adversary, Nazi Germany, was

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impossible. Today, too many assume that a Sino-Soviet agreement is unthinkable, and thus relegate China's concerns to the distant future.

Although at the present time a move to more cordial relations between the United States and the Soviet Union is important and overdue, it should not obscure the fact that the vital underpinning of détente is a much closer American connection with China. We should recognize that the political balance needs buttressing as much or more than the military balance, and we should seek above all to prevent a destabilizing *renversement des alliances*.

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Research Note

THE PROMISE OF THE WORLD ORDER MODELLING MOVEMENT

By HAROLD D. LASSWELL

THE World Order Models Project (WOMP) is worthy of appraisal at several levels. The numerous publications are candidates for conventional review in terms of scholarship and style.[1] From another perspective, WOMP is a pioneering phase in the evolution of a world-wide movement whose ideology, intellectual method, and operating strategies can be profitably examined. The present discussion is focussed on the movement. I make frequent references to WOMP products, but the purpose is not that of the usual review.

The significance of WOMP is what needs to be considered—and that is the modelling process itself. It is reliance on modelling that carries significance for science, scholarship, and policy. World order modelling indicates that something new is taking shape in the use of the mind as an instrument of collective purpose. Not that modelling exemplifies perpetual motion; rather, it is a mode of perpetual, focussed participation that strives to draw upon and further improve collective ways of thinking, feeling, and acting.

The movement is dedicated to the reorientation of global values and institutions. It relies on the continuing feedback of experiences that allow for predictions and programs to be reformulated. The emphasis is on self-involvement as distinct from purely a spectator stance. Those who participate are challenged to ask questions such as these: What is my preferred world order? What changes in the system are necessary if present dangers are to be substantially reduced? By what strategies can a network of public and private persons and organizations bring these innovations into being?

In one sense the questions are the method. Or, to phrase it differently, the method is a means of guiding the focus of attention to what

[1] The summary report is Saul H. Mendlovitz, ed., *On the Creation of a Just World Order: Preferred Worlds for the 1990's* (New York: Free Press 1975). Other volumes include: Rajni Kothari, *Footsteps into the Future: Diagnosis of the Present and a Design for an Alternative* (New York: Free Press 1974); Ali A. Mazrui, *A World Federation of Cultures: An African Perspective* (New York: Free Press 1976); Richard A. Falk, *A Study of Future Worlds* (New York: Free Press 1975). Subsequent activities will be guided by The Institute for World Order, New York.

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needs to be considered if collective objectives and strategies are to be updated year after year. *Attention control* is manageable if questions are systematically used and past answers are systematically reviewed. Attention control is a means of policy control; and policy control is political control.

I propose to examine the modelling method in some detail, considering both its explicit and latent principles of *content* and *procedure*. "Content" refers to the topics that are continually dealt with. "Procedure" refers to the agenda for considering the topics. The method can be characterized as contextual and problem-oriented, the problems being the clarification of goals; the characterization of trends; the analysis of conditions; the projection of future developments; and the invention, evaluation, and selection of policy alternatives. The initial project only partially generalizes its principles. I propose to carry the process further. The distinctive requirement is for the planned interpretation of subject matter (content) and procedures.

The process is a prototype for the creative and disciplined use of the mind in human affairs. It is not, however, implied in the prototype that every intellectual should spend all of his time as a modeller. The recommendation is only that *some* intellectuals at *some* phases of their lives concentrate heavily on the direct consideration of the common interest. Nor does the World Order Models Project set itself up as a network of monopolists of esoteric knowledge. The process can (and must) eventually be participated in by officials and citizens at all possible levels.

All this is essential if the fundamental goal values of the WOMP pioneers are to be approximated, and if pending disasters are to be deferred and overcome. The implications of the modelling process should become more explicit in the following pages which briefly state and comment upon the principles of content and procedure involved. The analysis is inferred from explicit statements and collective behavior.

CONTEXTUALITY

The method of world order modelling is contextual in several senses. Every participant is encouraged to focus on the globe as a whole. Focussing on the whole world does not imply that one floats into ambiguity. Rather, it confers significance on detail by examining significant linkages with the whole.

A global perspective calls for recruitment from all parts of the globe. The pioneering project was executed by seven territorial groups

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(West Germany, Latin America, Japan, India, North America, Africa, the Soviet Union) and a non-territorial group. World order modelling implies that the original network must be supplemented by dense clusters of centers that cover the territorial and functional components of the world community.

Modelling requires continuing and intense interaction among expanding networks of dedicated members. During its first seven years of collaboration and parallel inquiry, the early WOMP network set the precedent of meeting in different parts of the world.

The contextual requirement applies to other dimensions than space. The modelling method aims at continued orientation of the individual and the group in time as well as in space. If participants in the world community are to be oriented in relation to past and future, the common focus of attention must be reached by world reports at periodic and special intervals. The movement has not yet established a basic rhythm for the revision of the first WOMP reports. I suspect that the agenda for coming basic revisions will be on a ten-year cycle, and the intervals will be adapted to the occurrence of major changes. Presumably the basic world reports will inspire frequent territorial and functional supplements which in turn will influence subsequent inclusive revisions.

CLARIFICATION OF GOAL VALUES

The modelling method is problem-oriented as well as contextual. The problem-oriented tasks are not performed in isolation from one another. On the contrary, the five identifiable operations form an agenda for attention control that guides the continuing reconsideration of preferred outcomes and strategies. The tasks focus on goals, trends, conditions, projections, and alternatives.

Of these five operations, the first is particularly important: *the clarification of common goals*. Implied is a demand to share maps of preferred futures. The original task force found that members could agree on a list of key categories that enabled them to communicate with minimal ambiguity about preferred futures. The key categories are *peace*, *social justice*, *ecological stability*, and *positive identity*.

It is generally understood that substantial unity of demand is indispensable to cooperative action toward a common end. In today's world there is general, though far from unanimous, commitment to the functional purposes mentioned above. It is recognized that many factors stand in the way of discovering such unity as exists. Differences of culture mean that the "same" words often have different meanings,

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and that different words often have the same meanings. Direct and patient efforts at communication are necessary if equivalencies are to be brought into the open and interpreted for wider publics.

The original participants in the movement demonstrated how essential it is to give one another ample opportunities to modify the phrasing of fundamental purposes, provided that meanings remain compatible with a relatively unified concept of *human dignity*. Paul T. K. Lin, for instance, states the superordinate goal of Chinese development as "Social justice, based on freedom from exploitation, with human relations of egalitarianism, cooperation, and respect for work; Economic welfare . . .; Maximum cultural and aesthetic fulfillment . . .; An esthetically and ecologically sound environment."[2] Gustavo Lagos analyzes the preferred world goal as "the revolution of being" and specifies eleven characteristics that give expression to the principal values.[3] If the overriding goal is phrased in terms of human dignity, the preferred outcomes refer to widespread rather than narrow shaping and sharing of valued events.[4]

As modelling procedures become more disciplined, the consideration of preferred goals will call for more detailed specifications to be proposed for the world community as a whole, together with the provisional assignment of priorities. This will refer to the priorities of time and other assets on the part of the policy groups themselves, and the priorities of recommended asset allocation in the decision processes of world public order.

DESCRIPTION OF TRENDS

The method of world order modelling calls for the mobilizing of significant knowledge of trends, especially as a means of achieving awareness of the degree to which value goals are attaining or failing to attain realization in the context of world order. Concisely summarized by Richard A. Falk, the WOMP study notes:

[2] Lin, "Development Guided by Values: Comments on China's Road and Its Implications," in Mendlovitz (fn. 1), 259-96; quotation from p. 272.

[3] Lagos, "The Revolution of Being," in Mendlovitz (fn. 1), 71-110; quotation from pp. 81-82.

[4] The emphasis on goals, problem-solving, and contextuality indicates the significance of the modelling method, which is affiliated with the "international" rather than the "causal" tradition. A lucid paper on these fundamental points is Ronald D. Brunner, "An Intentional Alternative in Public Opinion Design," initially presented at the 69th Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Montreal, Canada, August 1974. One starting point is G. H. von Wright, *Explanation and Understanding* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1971). See also Hayward R. Alker and Cheryl Christensen, "From Causal Modelling to Artificial Intelligence: The Evolution of a UN Peace-Making Simulation," in J. A. Laponce and Paul Smoker, eds., *Experimentation and Simulation in Political Science* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1972).

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The planet is too crowded and is getting more so.

The war system is too destructive, risky, and costly and is getting more so.

An increasingly large number of people live at or below the level of subsistence.

Pressure on the basic ecosystem of the planet is serious and growing, as is the more tangible pollution of air, water, and land.

Governing groups in many societies are oppressing their own people in an intolerable manner.

Human and material resources of the planet are wasted and depleted in a shortsighted way, and at increasing rates.

Technologies are not adequately managed to assure planetary and human benefit.[5]

As the discipline of modelling groups improves, they will develop more detailed estimates of the priorities to be assigned to projects for obtaining more adequate data on trends. At least three procedures are available for improving historical knowledge: (1) encouraging specialists on the past to fill in needed data pertinent to past trends; (2) stationing historians and other data recorders at strategic observational positions as events unfold; (3) including some historians in the principal networks of those who are most actively engaged in modelling.[6]

CONDITIONING FACTORS

The modelling method requires the participants to go beyond the scrutiny of past trends and to investigate the conditioning factors that help to account for the direction and intensity of world trends. That is the scientific component of problem-solving. The WOMP studies set a precedent for the management of scientific knowledge in the modelling context.

The world report is presented in a style that is intended to reach a well-educated lay audience without offending the scientific community. The reports are in prose which is only occasionally interspersed with tables, graphs, charts, or equations.

Neither the gathering of new data nor the publication of new and improved explanatory theories is a primary aim of modelling.[7] The

[5] Falk, "Toward a New World Order: Modest Methods and Drastic Visions," in Mendlovitz (fn. 1), 211-58; quotation from pp. 221-22.

[6] On the uses of history, whether in prose or in quantitative form, see John D. Montgomery, *Technology and Civic Life* (Cambridge: MIT Press 1974); Cyril E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History* (New York: Harper Torchbooks 1967).

[7] In fact, the concentration on the scientific or on any one intellectual task is likely to interfere with the fundamental self-orienting aims. See Albert O. Hirschman, "The

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aim is to draw on the available stock of scientific knowledge for interpretations of world order. Consequently, the movement must evolve a network of centers that draws upon the most ample stocks of scientific knowledge. The original WOMP scientists were heads of knowledge-gathering and -processing institutes. The list includes the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (New Delhi, India), Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung der Lebensbedingungen der wissenschaftlich-technischen Welt (Starnberg, Germany), Inter-University Centre of Post-Graduate Studies (Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia), Center of International Studies (Princeton University, U.S.A.), Centre for East Asian Studies (McGill University, Montreal, Canada).

It is important to recognize that the contextual approach to the use of scientific knowledge has implications for the future improvement of scientific theory and findings. Continuing reconsideration of scientific models and data stimulates formulation of neglected problems of importance and initiation of research designed to overcome these gaps.[8]

WOMP publications provide many examples of this process. Yoshikazu Sakamoto, for instance, explores the theory of identity. He distinguishes between positive and negative identity, the former term referring to "the chances of man's being and *becoming* himself, both as an individual and a member of society . . . . his chances of meaningfully relating himself to others through such acts as participation, identification and cooperation and of meaningfully relating himself to himself through autonomy, self-determination, self-fulfilment, and the like."[9] He seeks to operationalize the concept of identity in terms of statistical probability (chances). The principal focus is on the role of aggression (discrimination, violent action), especially on "discrimination by the privileged" against the underprivileged in denying them opportunities

Search for Paradigms as a Hindrance to Understanding," *World Politics*, XXII (April 1970), 329-43.

[8] Contemporary literature on the interplay between the pursuit of science and the multiple objectives of policy is improving in theoretical subtlety and empirical content. For example, Donald T. Campbell, "Quasi-Experimental Design," in D. L. Sills, ed., *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan and Free Press 1968, III, 133-53). Tightly controlled procedures in the global context require strategies of simultaneity among scientists and decision makers: Garry D. Brewer and Ronald D. Brunner, eds., *Political Development and Change: A Policy Approach* (New York: Free Press 1975); Alice M. Rivlin, *Systematic Thinking for Social Action* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press 1971); Amitai Etzioni, "Policy Research," *American Sociologist*, VI (June 1971). A striking combination of the systematic and the empirical is Warren F. Ilchman, "Population Knowledge and Fertility Policies," chap. 1 in Warren F. Ilchman, Harold D. Lasswell, John D. Montgomery, and Myron Weiner, eds., *Policy Sciences and Population* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books 1975).

[9] Sakamoto, "Toward Global Identity," in Mendlovitz (fn. 1), 189-210; quotation from p. 194, emphasis in original.

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for self-realization, and in "violent action normally taken by the underprivileged against the privileged." The research challenge is sharpened when he speaks of the "critical point" at which popular discontent with discrimination, inequality, and social injustice is expressed in violence. Sakamoto proposes a "political typology of discrimination" that directs attention anew to the constellation of conditions that determine the role of active and passive majorities and minorities.

Another instance of scientific theory-building is the reformulation of the process of integration by Ali A. Mazrui. This reformulation is undertaken in consequence of the postulate that a substantial measure of the preferred world depends on "a theory of *normative convergence* . . . and a theory of *dependency*." World reform is "a problem of mobilizing consensus" which in turn is "a problem of building up supporting values . . . as an outgrowth of cultural convergence." The minimum degree of integration is "bare *coexistence* between distinct social entities." A second degree is *contact*. A third is *compromise*, where dealings between groups are "sufficiently complex, diverse, and interdependent to require a climate of peaceful reconciliation among the conflicting interests." The fourth category is *coalescence*. The subprocess of cultural coalescence occurs between compromise and coalescence. We perceive the challenge to research in the proposition that, "when convergence goes beyond a certain point, the stage of coalescence is reached."[10]

With further experience, the modelling groups will agree on the priorities to be recommended in pursuit of better explanatory models and more conclusive data, in the study of factors that condition the realization of human dignity in the political and social process.

PROJECTING FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

As I have already implied, world order modelling is future-oriented and uses cognitive mapping of contingent futures, since the method postulates possible (probable) rather than "inevitable" events. It is not to be assumed that Saul H. Mendlovitz, Harry B. Hollins, or any other initiator of the world order modelling movement believe that they *know* the future. Rather, they recognize that estimating the future course of world development is a procedure of intermittent and provisional reassessment, not of dogmatic assertion. Dogmatic reiteration reduces the likelihood that subjective events and completed acts in the present will mediate between the present situation and the preferred

[10] Mazrui, "World Order and the Search for Consensus," in Mendlovitz (fn. 1), 1-38; quotations from pp. 3-4, 7-8, emphases in original.

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future. WOMP has taken the "contingent" rather than the "inevitablist" posture; by so doing, it has helped to establish a liberating intellectual precedent. The justification of future modelling, be it reaffirmed, is not primarily the act of prophesy. It is insight into possibilities; therefore, it may be a creative act of participatory change.[11]

The recognition that preferred futures are possible does not imply a refusal to consider unfavorable estimates of coming events. For many members of the world community, the admission of danger is a motivating provocation to meet the threat. A *systematic approach to the periodic reconsideration of preferred futures* implies a short list of major alternatives: (1) preferred events are possible and likely; (2) preferred events are possible though unlikely; (3) preferred events are possible though highly unlikely. It is entirely feasible for participants in the modelling movement to entertain grave reservations about its prospects of success.[12] The movement is able to draw on specialized, disciplined, and creative futurists. WOMP committees include persons who have played a responsible role in the development of futurist theory and technique. The world order modellers recognize that, as they move through the future, they need to test their projections against other sources of inference in addition to specialized scholars and scientists—notably the experience of the ordinary citizen and of officials.[13] Since the assumptions both of officials and ordinary citizens are part of the effective reality of the world community, they are significant elements in the changing composition of global perspectives.

[11] This approach to projection harmonizes with the "new classics," such as Dennis Gabor, *Inventing the Future* (New York: Knopf 1964), and Bertrand de Juvenel, *The Art of Conjecture* (New York: Basic Books 1967). On wider involvement, see George Chaplin and Glen D. Paige, eds., *Hawaii 2000: Continuing Experiment in Anticipatory Democracy* (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii 1973).

[12] See Carl-Friedrich von Weizsäcker, "A Sceptical Contribution," in Mendlovitz (fn. 1), 111-50.

[13] The groups of WOMP add face-to-face discussion to the Delphi technique of projecting futures. Bases of inferences range from rigorous mathematical-statistical to essay-scenarios. Some reminders of the literature: Olaf Helmar, *Social Technology* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, P-3063, February 1965); Norbert Wiener, *Extrapolation, Interpolation, and Smoothing Stationary Time Series* (Cambridge: MIT Press 1949); Thomas Robinson and Nazli Choucri, eds., *Forecasting in International Relations* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman 1974); Edward E. Azar and Joseph Ben-Dak, eds., *Theory and Practice of Events Analysis* (New York: Gordon and Breach 1975); H. P. Heiss, Klaus Knorr, and Oskar Morgenstern, *Long-Term Projections of Power* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger 1973); Bruce M. Russett, Hayward R. Alker, Jr., Karl W. Deutsch, and Harold D. Lasswell, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1961); Charles L. Taylor, ed., *Aggregate Data Analysis* (Paris: Mouton 1968, International Social Science Council); Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (2d ed., New Haven: Yale University Press 1972); Daniel P. Harrison, *Social Forecasting Methodology: Suggestions for Research* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation 1976).

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POLICY ALTERNATIVES

The cutting edge of world order modelling at any given moment is the invention, evaluation, and selection of policy alternatives. It is a continuing challenge to consider the current agenda of policies in terms of preferred global values and of factual contexts. Policies range from constitutive to ordinary. The constitutive policies concern the fundamental allocations of authority and control within and between public and civic order. The ordinary policies are formulated within the limits of a constitutive framework.

World order modelling requires the choice of time periods most conveniently adapted to the examination of policy alternatives. The choice of periods depends on expectations of relatively rapid and far-reaching (or of slow and superficial) change in the global context. Richard Falk speaks for the initial project when he divides the immediate future into three time zones:

1970s: The Decade of Consciousness Raising

1980s: The Decade of Mobilization

1990s: The Decade of Transformation[14]

The above is not an example of mystical reasoning, even though it is necessarily influenced by the degree to which various numbers have been sentimentalized in the past, and therefore command a residue of attention-getting strength. Consider the role of "decennials," "centennials," and "millennia" in the language of politics. The decades mentioned above are approximately equal to a "rising generation" and make a great deal of sense. The list recognizes the importance of structuring the focus of attention of the age cohort of each year.[15]

World order modelling requires continuing attention to the range of options open to policy makers. The key question is how strategic alternatives will affect the constitutive structure of the world community. The preferred future—outlined by WOMP—is realized to the extent that it achieves institutional forms that harmonize with, and sustain, the values of human dignity on a global scale.

A concern for the perpetual balancing of public and civic orders is implied. The policy task is to prevent government from swallowing the civic order, or the civic order from creating an anarchic public arena.

[14] Falk (fn. 5), 213.

[15] On considerations of timing, note Eric A. Nordlinger, "Political Development: Time Sequences and Rates of Change," *World Politics*, XX (April 1968), 494-520; Wassily Leontieff, "The Structure of Development," *Scientific American*, Vol. 209, (September 1963), 148-66.

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On the task of preventing public order from culminating in monolithic world government, Rajni Kothari summarizes the position of WOMP as follows: "The world has already learned at great cost that all such [world government] designs become insufferable leviathans in disguise."[16] The growth of monopoly, if tolerated in the civic order, also nurtures the leviathan of territorial power.

Richard Falk provides a workable set of diagrams inclusive of the entire range of options open at any given time.[17] Among the major choices of systems, the following are explicitly referred to: the existing system; the five-power world (the United States, Soviet Union, China, Japan, Western Europe); a regional system; a transnational functional system (multinational corporations); a world-government system; a world-empire system; and a WOMP/USA Central Guidance System.[18]

Chief emphasis is laid on the desirability of planning and moving toward restructuring the functional activities of the globe according to differentiated arrangements that take local and middle-range initiatives into account.[19]

Inventive thought is deliberately cultivated in the modelling process. Perhaps the most important insight into the role of inventive thinking in reference to world organization is that many proposals are not to be taken too literally. Their role is simply to detach individuals from any disposition to accept a given set of institutions as immutable.

Among the creative proposals put forward in the WOMP reports that supplement or reinforce Falk's is Kothari's *Footsteps into the Future*, where concern for more flexible power sharing is partially exemplified in a "Rough Sketch of Possible Regions of the World."[20] Twenty-two regions are outlined. Mazrui, in *A World Federation of Cultures*, affirms that the beginnings of world culture, though at hand, constitute a system of hierarchy dominated by Western culture. He proposes a world federation of cultures with regional and linguistic foundations. The structure would be partly based on five languages—English, French, Russian, Arabic, and Chinese. Johan Galtung reviews the rise of organized nonterritorial actors in the world community and

[16] Kothari, "World Politics and World Order: The Issue of Autonomy," in Mendlovitz (fn. 1), 39-69; quotation from p. 69.

[17] Falk (fn. 5).

[18] World order modelling groups are able to utilize all the technologies of visual presentation (as well as data storage and retrieval) of the contemporary world. These visual aids are only effectively employed when they have the relevant content and when the appropriate agendas are followed. On these points see, for example, my discussion of "decision seminars" and the "social planetarium" in Lasswell, *A Preview of the Policy Sciences* (New York: Elsevier 1971), chap. 8 and the literature cited there.

[19] Falk (fn. 5), 240.

[20] Kothari (fn. 1), Appendix, 159-61.

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proposes many combinations of nonterritorial and territorial entities. The aim is to weaken the prospect of "one big worldwide pyramid" and to foster a plurality of patterns that undermine and supersede the expectations of violence that have been built into the structure of the nation-state.[21]

PROSPECTS

In assessing the future prospects of world order modelling, it is noteworthy that the WOMP pioneers opted for a *federative rather than a dominative model* for their own structure as well as for the structure of a preferred world. It is possible for individuals and centers around the globe to become involved without giving up autonomy. In consequence, public officials and private persons as well as national and transnational leaders are in a position (at minimum cost and risk) to allow their identity systems to evolve and interpenetrate. The federative arrangement is adaptive enough to permit the movement to draw on changing levels and reservoirs of appropriate motivation and to permit mobilization for prompt and simultaneous expression. The strategy of simultaneity, joint and parallel, when followed through the years, can be expected to foster transition toward a world whose public and civic orders are progressively more compatible with the values of human dignity. It is not to be assumed that the initiators of the movement were, or are, over-sanguine about the prospects of success. They are fully cognizant of the scientific, political, and other barriers that stand in the way of continuing the attention controls that are implemented by participation in groups that exploit the modelling method.

The prospects of the movement will probably improve as the modelling process becomes a more universal feature of world culture. There are many indications that a contextual and problem-oriented approach is gaining acceptance among intellectuals and decision makers at various territorial and functional levels.

Perhaps the most direct indication is the rapid spread of scientific and professional concern for the study and improvement of the policy process itself. In the fields of public and private management, two trends are visible. One is toward the development of many new specialties which are outfitted with distinctive publications, training facilities, and professional societies. The accompanying and contrasting trend is contextual; it is concerned with the policy process of which the specialized skill is part. These complementary trends can be identified in

[21] Summarized in Galtung, "Nonterritorial Actors and the Problem of Peace," in Mendlovitz (fn. 1), 151-88.

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every sector of society (in the policy and management of government, business, medicine, education, and so forth).

In some ways, the strongest indicators of integrative (as well as fragmented) emphases are in the physical and biological sciences. Hyperspecialization continues as knowledge expands; concurrently, we witness sustained efforts at interdisciplinary cooperation and the cultivation of closer connections between knowledge and policy. It is in the latter case—the significance of knowledge for policy—that the various problem-solving orientations are most deliberately interrelated.

The physical and the biological arts and sciences are reaching out to the sciences and professions of culture, as well as to officials in the public and civic sectors of society. As a result, the realms of physical and biological inquiry are evolving new structures of cooperation with one another and with responsibile decision makers. At the same time, they are enlarging their view of the role and the method of science.[22]

Similar tendencies are manifest among scientific and scholarly specialists on culture. Contemporary philosophy and religion are astir with activities intended to encourage an ecumenical outlook. Historical scholarship is perpetually building bridges to take advantage of new perspectives. Scientists are liberating themselves to an increasing extent from the disregard of normative issues, historical knowledge, future projections, and deliberate policy relevance. The recent upsurge of futurism is a striking instance of emphasis laid on one of the problem-solving tasks that, when it began to suffer from intellectual thinness, moved in a decentralized fashion to encourage a comprehensive approach. Policy analysis, in turn, more often and more openly, approximates the modelling movement.

The world order modelling movement will probably be strengthened by people's growing awareness of the many phases of the national policy processes that are open to influence by scientists who work in concert with other scientists or with other participants in the world community. The modelling method is not only an impressive example of the intelligence-planning function in policy formation; it involves

[22] Accessible examples are *Environment and Society in Transition: Scientific Developments, Social Consequences, Policy Implications* (New York: Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 184, 1971), and *Public Policy Toward Environment 1973: A Review and Appraisal* (New York: Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 261, 1975). These conferences and publications were sponsored by the American Division of the World Academy of Arts and Sciences, the American Geographical Society, The New York Academy of Sciences, and others. See the contributions in volume 261, for example, by Francis Perrin, Boris Pragel, Willard F. Libby, Jack M. Hollander, Rene Dumont, George Bergstrom, John McHale, Martin Shubik, Jan Tinbergen, Myres S. McDougal, and Lord Ritchie-Calder.

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the appraisal of past and current decisions.[23] And eventually, the modelling movement may play a significant role in the promotional activities that affect prescribing, invoking, applying, and terminating decisions as well.

The basic strategy of simultaneity seeks to achieve the joint and parallel attention control of significant actors by means of policy seminar networks that coordinate the initiation and execution of policy, the effective adaptation and use of organization, the mobilization of science, and the mastery of technology.

The fundamental conclusion is that a more preferred public order in an interdependent world requires voluntary attention control among the participants in globe-encircling networks. The prospects of a preferred world are improved by stepping into the future with subjectivities in harmony with the value goals of human dignity. Subjectivities are exposed to the continuing discipline of a modelling process that is at once contextual and problem-oriented, and occasions a cooperative experience of thinking, feeling, and acting.

[23] Richard C. Snyder, Charles F. Herman, and Harold D. Lasswell, "A Global Monitoring System: Appraising the Effects of Government on Human Dignity," *International Studies Quarterly* (Autumn 1976); Marcia Guttentag and Elmer Struening, eds., *Handbook of Evaluation Research* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications 1975, 2 vols.); Todd R. LaPorte, ed., *Organized Social Complexity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1975); William Ascher, *Prophecy and Policy: The Performance and Use of Forecasting* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1977). It is important to recognize the other connections among relatively "extensive" and "intensive" standpoints of scientific observations. See especially Steven R. Brown, "Intensive Analysis in Political Research," *Political Methodology* (1974), 1-25.

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Review Articles

RAWLS' THEORY OF JUSTICE: Domestic and International Perspectives

By ROBERT AMDUR

Brian Barry, *The Liberal Theory of Justice: A Critical Examination of the Principal Doctrines in A Theory of Justice by John Rawls.* Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1973, 168 pp., $10.50.

Norman Daniels, ed., *Reading Rawls: Critical Studies on Rawls' A Theory of Justice.* New York, Basic Books, 1975, 352 pp., $15.00.

John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice.* Cambridge, Mass., The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971, 607 pp., $15.00.

DURING the 1950's and early 1960's, many observers doubted that there was "still such a subject as Political Theory." Writing in 1961, Isaiah Berlin noted the existence of a widespread belief in England and America that substantive political philosophy "whatever it may have been in the past, is to-day dead or dying." Further, Berlin suggested: "The principal symptom which seems to support this belief is that no commanding work of political philosophy has appeared in the twentieth century."[1]

In the past several years, substantive political philosophy has undergone a revival; it is no longer fashionable to ask whether the subject still exists. There are undoubtedly many reasons for this revival; but clearly, part of the explanation lies in the appearance of one commanding work: *A Theory of Justice*, by John Rawls. Since its publication in 1971, Rawls' book has generated an enormous amount of interest, not only among philosophers, but among political scientists, economists, and lawyers as well. The Rawls literature already includes dozens of articles and two books: *The Liberal Theory of Justice* by Brian Barry, and *Reading Rawls*, a collection of fourteen essays, edited by Norman Daniels. Even those of the reviewers and commentators who have been highly critical have generally paid tribute to the power of Rawls' arguments and the significance of his work. As Robert Nozick (whose disagreements with Rawls are quite profound) has put it: "Political

[1] Berlin, "Does Political Theory Still Exist?" in Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman, eds., *Philosophy, Politics, and Society: Second Series* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1962), 1.

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philosophers now must either work within Rawls' theory or explain why not."[2]

In the first part of this essay I describe Rawls' method of argumentation and outline the main features of his theory. I then examine some of the more important implications of the theory for domestic and international politics. Finally, I discuss several criticisms.

I. Rawls' Theory

Rawls' aim is to develop principles that we can use to assess "the basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation" (p. 7). By major institutions, Rawls means the political constitution and the principal economic and social arrangements. He is concerned with these institutions because their effects "are so profound and present from the start."

> The intuitive notion here is that this structure contains various social positions and that men born into different positions have different expectations of life determined, in part, by the political system as well as by economic and social circumstances. In this way the institutions of society favor certain starting places over others. These are especially deep inequalities. Not only are they pervasive, but they affect men's initial chances in life. . . . It is these inequalities, presumably inevitable in the basic structure of any society, to which the principles of social justice must in the first instance apply (p. 7).

Rawls wants us to think of the principles that govern the basic structure as the object of an original agreement. Social contract theory assumes that it is possible to take an extremely difficult question—what are the principles of justice?—and reduce it to a simpler, more manageable question—what principles would rational, self-interested men and women agree to, in a situation of rough equality? Rawls sees himself as part of this tradition. He wants us to imagine a meeting at which "those who engage in social cooperation choose together, in one joint act, the principles which are to assign basic rights and duties and to determine the division of social benefits" (p. 11).

There is no suggestion, however, that a meeting like this one has ever happened, or could ever happen. In this version of the social contract, the people who choose are hypothetical. We imagine them making

[2] Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (New York: Basic Books 1974), 183.

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their choices not in a primitive state of nature, but in a carefully designed, purely hypothetical situation called the original position of equality. What Rawls wants to do here is to "set up a fair procedure so that any principles agreed to will be just." His purpose in designing the original position is to combine, in a particularly vivid way, certain conditions and constraints that are widely recognized as being reasonable ones to impose on the choice of moral principles (p. 21). He assumes that once the hypothetical contractees are forced to reason in accordance with the appropriate constraints, any principles they select will be the principles of justice.

Rawls' argument, then, has two parts. First, he sets out the constraints which he believes will guarantee a fair agreement or bargain. Then he attempts to demonstrate that rational men and women, reasoning in accordance with the various constraints, would inevitably agree on a certain set of principles.

The most important constraints concern the knowledge available to the hypothetical contractees. They know they are choosing principles for a society in which they must live together in conditions of moderate scarcity. They realize that, while they have somewhat similar needs and interests, each nevertheless has his own rational life plan. These plans "lead them to have different ends and purposes, and to make conflicting claims on the natural and social resources available." Further, they understand that apart from pure conflicts of interest "there exists a diversity of philosophical and religious belief, and of political and social doctrines" (pp. 126-28).

In addition to this knowledge, Rawls is willing to permit his contractees access to certain general laws and facts about human society: "they understand political affairs and the principles of economic theory; they know the basis of social organization and the laws of human psychology" (p. 137). Concerning themselves, however, the contractees know virtually nothing. Rawls requires that they choose from behind what he calls a veil of ignorance: no one is allowed any information about his natural talents and abilities, his tastes and preferences, his position in society, or the particulars of his own rational life plan. The veil of ignorance is probably the single most important feature of the original position; it is also the feature that distinguishes Rawls most sharply from the traditional contract theorists. Rawls' purpose here is to guarantee an objective and impartial choice by depriving the choosers of information that seems "morally irrelevant" or "arbitrary from a moral point of view." From behind the veil of ignorance, no one is in

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a position to tailor principles to his own advantage. Since no one knows how the various principles will affect his own case, the contractees will be obliged "to evaluate principles solely on the basis of general considerations" (pp. 12, 136-39).

But if people know nothing about their own plans and desires, what basis will they have for making any choices at all? To answer this question, Rawls introduces the notion of primary social goods. Primary goods are things that every rational person is presumed to want. "With more of these goods men can generally be assured of greater success in carrying out their intentions and in advancing their ends, whatever these ends may be" (p. 92). Rawls identifies the main primary social goods as rights, liberties, opportunities, wealth, income, and finally self-respect (or self-esteem), which he defines as "a person's sense of his own value, his secure conviction that his conception of the good, his plan of life, is worth carrying out" (p. 440). He suggests that self-respect is the most important of the primary social goods; without it, he believes, our plans will seem worthless, and the other goods will have very little value.

The contractees are not motivated by either envy or benevolence toward each other; they are, in Rawls' words, "mutually disinterested." When they meet, each one will simply try to win for himself and his immediate descendants the largest possible bundle of primary social goods. Apart from this, they have only one concern: they must try to choose principles which will provide the basis of a stable society. They want to be sure, insofar as possible, that people living in a society based on the chosen principles will find those principles "reasonable," that life in such a society will not create psychological strains serious enough to threaten the entire social order with destruction.[3]

Given these constraints, Rawls believes that the original contractees must reach unanimous agreement on the following two principles:

> First, each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of basic equal liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.
>
> Second, social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and (b)

[3] It should be emphasized that this does not imply any commitment on Rawls' part to stability in *un*just societies. The original contractees need *not* be concerned about whether persons living in actual, unjust societies will find the chosen principles reasonable, or whether the beneficiaries of unjust institutions will find themselves psychologically incapable of enduring the transition to a society based on justice.

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attached to positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity (p. 302).

The basic liberties protected by the first principle are what Rawls calls the liberties of citizenship. They include "political liberty (the right to vote and to be eligible for public office) together with freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the person along with the right to hold (personal) property, and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure." They do *not* include what have sometimes been called economic liberties: freedom to own property in the means of production, freedom of contract, the right to inherit or to leave one's possessions to persons of one's choice. A number of writers—Milton Friedman, F. A. Hayek, and more recently Robert Nozick—have held that these economic freedoms are either as important as, or inseparable from, the liberties Rawls calls basic.[4] Rawls never confronts this assertion directly; he simply assumes that the liberties of citizenship are in some sense more "fundamental" than the so-called economic freedoms.

The first principle requires that the various basic liberties be equal and, at the same time, as extensive as possible. The first part of the second principle (which Rawls calls the "difference principle") does not demand an equal distribution of wealth and authority; it does, however, demand that all inequalities improve the prospects of the least advantaged.[5] Rawls suggests that inequalities might, for example, "cover the costs of training" or provide "incentives which succeed in eliciting more productive efforts"; they might induce people with scarce natural talents to use those talents "in ways that help the less fortunate as well" (pp. 151, 311-15). For the total system of inequalities to be just, it must be arranged to maximize the expectations of those the system leaves worst off.

Rawls' attempt to demonstrate that the original contractees would choose the two principles is highly complex, and any brief summary will necessarily involve some oversimplification. The basic idea is that the design of the original position forces the contractees to choose conservatively; it forces them to select the alternative the worst possible outcome of which is superior to the worst possible outcomes of all the others (p. 153). Rawls believes that the most powerful, and the most

[4] Friedman, *Capitalism and Freedom* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1962); F. A. Hayek, *The Constitution of Liberty* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1960); Nozick (fn. 2).

[5] Prospects are measured by the index of primary goods that a person (and his immediate descendants) can expect to receive.

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widely accepted, alternatives to his theory are the various forms of utilitarianism. From the perspective of the original position, however, there is a problem with all of these: they might, given certain fairly plausible factual assumptions, require enormous sacrifices from those who are already worst off, for the sake of the greatest happiness of the greatest number or some other greater good. This suggests that life in a utilitarian society might prove intolerable for those at the bottom. Knowing nothing about their own attributes or about the probability of finding themselves in particular social positions when the veil of ignorance is lifted, the contractees will take no chances. They will not be willing to risk ending up among the worst-off in a utilitarian society.[6]

Further, the contractees reason that a utilitarian society is likely to be unstable and to undermine the self-respect of its members. When people are called upon (or when they realize that they might some day be called upon) to sacrifice their liberties or material interests for the sake of those already better off, they are likely to conclude that they are being used as means to advance the good of others (pp. 175-83). This is likely to lead to a loss of self-esteem, or resentment, or both. On the other hand, these problems are much less likely to arise in a society dedicated to maximizing the expectations of those who remain at the bottom.[7]

What happens in cases where the two principles conflict? Rawls argues that the contractees would deal with possible conflicts by assigning the first principle priority over the second whenever a certain (unspecified, but in Rawls' view fairly low) level of wealth has been attained. This means that inequalities of wealth and authority must be arranged in ways consistent with the equal liberties required by the first principle (p. 43). Once the necessary level of wealth has been achieved, men are prohibited from sacrificing some of their maximum equal liberties in return for increased social and economic benefits.

There are several reasons for assigning priority to the first principle.

[6] It has often been pointed out that this argument works only if one assumes that the contracting parties will not want to take risks. Rawls' point is not that rational men and women are necessarily unwilling to gamble, but rather that under the conditions of the original position the parties will feel constrained to behave in a risk-averse manner. Rawls recognizes that many people are willing to take risks in actual situations of uncertainty. But he believes that gambling is irrational when the results will have such a profound impact on the gambler's life prospects and on the prospects of his immediate descendants. For a criticism of this view, see Barry, 87-107.

[7] Here and throughout his argument Rawls assumes that the problem of self-respect will be most acute for those who are worst off. He never discusses the possibility that those who are better off might suffer a loss of self-esteem when forced to make those sacrifices necessary to improve the position of the worst-off.

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Rawls assumes that below a certain level of wealth it is impossible to exercise one's liberties "effectively." Once that level has been reached, however, he believes that most people come to place an increasingly high value on liberty, relative to other economic and social goods. As society's level of wealth increases, people are likely to care more about the pursuit of spiritual and cultural interests and about political participation. The priority of liberty offers the greatest possible protection to these concerns. It also helps to guarantee each person self-respect. Rawls believes that self-respect is based at least in part on "the publicly affirmed distribution of fundamental rights and liberties" (pp. 542-43).

II. The Just Society

What are the political and social implications of Rawls' theory? What kind of society would the two principles require? Although Rawls' treatment of these questions is unsystematic and highly abstract, it is possible to suggest some rough answers. The theory clearly requires a constitutional democracy offering very strong protection to political and intellectual freedoms. In addition, I would argue that the principles of justice demand a highly egalitarian society. A number of critics have denied this; Barry, for example, maintains that Rawls' principles are capable of justifying "gross and pervasive" inequalities of wealth (p. 141). I hope to show that this view is mistaken. Although Rawls is committed to some sort of market economy, his theory demands constant state intervention to ensure that inequalities in wealth remain small. Furthermore, the arguments which limit inequalities of wealth and income may have more radical implications as well. They may provide justification for a number of additional social reforms, including public ownership of industry and democratic organization of the workplace.

Rawls does not describe in detail the political institutions of a just society. He does say, however, that his first principle requires a constitution granting all citizens "an equal right to take part in, and to determine the outcome of the . . . process that establishes the laws with which they are to comply" (p. 221). The authority to determine basic social policies rests with a legislature, elected for fixed terms and thus ultimately accountable to the public. All citizens should be eligible to join political parties, run for elective office, and hold positions of authority. To the extent possible, each person's vote should have the same weight in determining the outcome of elections. Rawls believes

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that equal political liberty is the best guarantee of just and efficient legislation, and that the equal freedoms required by the theory "strengthen men's sense of their own worth, enlarge their intellectual and moral sensibilities, and lay the basis for a sense of duty and obligation upon which the stability of just institutions depends" (p. 234).[8]

In addition to guaranteeing the freedom to participate, the Rawlsian constitution gives an especially important place to liberty of conscience, thought, and discussion. The original contractees endorse the first principle, in part because they are unwilling to risk persecution if they find themselves holding unpopular beliefs once the veil of ignorance is lifted. "To gamble this way would show that one did not take one's religious or moral convictions seriously," Rawls writes (p. 207). A person who takes his beliefs seriously must remain free to examine those beliefs, and this entails the right to make and hear all available arguments on moral, religious, and philosophical questions. The interests protected by this right are too important to be sacrificed for the sake of economic efficiency or social convenience.

Still, Rawls does not want to argue that these liberties are absolute. He believes that the original contractees would be willing to recognize two sorts of limitations on the freedoms permitted in a just society. First, basic liberties can be restricted when necessary to strengthen the total system of liberty shared by all. To determine whether a particular restriction is acceptable, we must ask whether the "representative citizen" will view that restriction as a gain for his freedom on balance. Rawls suggests that rules of order and restrictions on time, place, and manner of expression meet this test. Since fruitful discussion cannot take place if everyone is permitted to speak whenever he wishes, certain limits are needed to preserve the value of freedom of speech for the entire community. Similarly, Rawls believes it is possible to justify limiting liberty of conscience "when there is a reasonable expectation that not doing so will damage the public order which the government should maintain" (p. 213). The representative citizen would endorse such a restriction because he would recognize that major disruptions of public order and security constitute "a danger to the liberty of all."

Second, liberties may be limited in societies which have not yet reached the level of wealth at which they can be effectively exercised. Until that level has been attained, the priority rule is not applicable, and liberties *may* be sacrificed in return for other goods. Rawls acknowledges that economically backward societies may restrict freedom

[8] Here Rawls follows John Stuart Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government*, especially chap. 3.

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in order to achieve economic growth. Such restrictions will be justified "when the long-run benefits are great enough to transform a less fortunate society into one where equal liberties can be fully enjoyed. This is especially true," Rawls adds, "when the circumstances are not conducive to the exercise of these rights in any case" (p. 247).

These limits are hardly insignificant. They do not, however, negate the fact that Rawls' theory creates a very strong presumption against interference with fundamental freedoms. Rawls' just constitution will permit infringements only when necessary either to protect the whole system of basic liberties, or to increase the probability of effective exercise of those liberties in the future.

The implications of the theory for the distribution of wealth and income are less obvious. Rawls favors a market economy of some sort: he assumes that markets are useful in terms of efficiency, and he believes that "in the absence of some differences in earnings as these arise in a competitive scheme, it is hard to see how . . . certain aspects of a command society inconsistent with liberty can be avoided." But it is clear that the second principle necessitates extensive state interference with the workings of the market. There is, Rawls observes, "strong objection to the competitive determination of total income, since this ignores the claims of need and an appropriate standard of life . . ." (p. 277). The parties in the original position agree to the difference principle precisely because they wish to ensure themselves against the contingencies of the market.

Thus, although the market plays a role in determining individual income, it does so against a complex set of restrictions. Justice requires the establishment of a branch of government whose job it is to supplement the market by providing transfer payments designed not merely to keep those at the bottom at subsistence (or to keep them from making trouble), but to ensure that the total income of the least advantaged —wages plus transfers—is such as to maximize their long-term expectations (p. 277). The revenues for the necessary transfer payments are to be obtained through taxation.

Still, it might be objected that even if the theory requires state interference to maximize the expectations of the worst-off, the results may not be highly egalitarian. The problem is that we cannot say in advance what kinds of inequalities will be needed to elicit more productive efforts or to induce those with scarce natural talents to use their abilities "in ways that help the less fortunate." Rawls appears to believe that large incentives will rarely be necessary to improve the prospects of

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those at the bottom, but he may simply be mistaken. Thus, several critics have agreed with Stephan Thernstrom's assertion that, given "certain assumptions about the distribution of skills and incentives [the difference principle] could be used to justify drastic economic inequality."[9]

This view, however, fails to take account of the full extent of Rawls' egalitarianism. To determine how much inequality is permissible in a particular society, it will be necessary to ask questions about the distribution of skills and incentives, but these are not the only relevant considerations. Rawls introduces two additional factors that limit the level of inequality compatible with justice. Both of these are extremely important; both have generally been overlooked by Rawls' critics.

The first of these considerations is the need to preserve the fair value of liberty. There is, Rawls observes, "a maximum gain permitted to the most favored on the assumption that, even if the difference principle would allow it, there would be unjust effects on the political system and the like excluded by the priority of liberty" (p. 81). He believes that basic political liberties

> lose much of their value whenever those who have greater means are permitted to use their advantages to control the course of public debate. For eventually these inequalities will enable those better situated to exercise a larger influence over the development of legislation. In due time they are likely to acquire a preponderant weight in settling social questions, at least in regard to those matters upon which they normally agree, which is to say in regard to those things that support their favored circumstances (p. 225).

Rawls suggests that this is precisely what has happened in many countries recognizing equal liberty, presumably including the United States. Political power has accumulated in ways that have made a mockery of formal political equality; universal suffrage has provided "an insufficient counterpoise."

Rawls endorses several proposals intended to limit the influence of the wealthy on politics and particularly on political debate. He is especially interested in public financing of electoral campaigns and provision of public funds to encourage free discussion. But he realizes that these and other similar schemes, no matter how well designed, are unlikely to prove sufficient. Therefore, he also insists that wealth and property be kept widely distributed. Inequalities that are otherwise compatible with the difference principle must be eliminated. Rawls suggests that the branch of government in charge of distribution should limit in-

[9] Thernstrom, *The Other Bostonians* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1973), 333.

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equalities which threaten the value of liberty, by means of taxation and "adjustments in the rights of property" (pp. 277-79).

Unfortunately, Rawls fails to make clear how far he believes a society must go in pursuing equality to protect liberty. There are two possible interpretations of his position. The stronger interpretation would demand that the worth of every person's liberty be equal. The weaker version would require only the elimination of inequalities that are great enough to cause major distortions in the political process. Daniels argues that, from the perspective of the original contractees, the stronger view makes more sense. But even the weaker version is likely to have highly egalitarian implications if we accept some widely held assumptions about the relationship between wealth and political power.

The second limit on inequality concerns self-respect. As noted earlier, self-respect is the most important of the primary social goods; it is the one which the original contractees will want to protect "at almost any cost" (p. 440). Throughout much of his discussion Rawls assumes that a society can maintain the self-respect of its members by providing equal liberties and distributing the other primary goods according to the difference principle. Once we have secured equal liberties, he assumes that by maximizing the wealth and income of the worst-off, we guarantee that their self-esteem will not be impaired. But he ultimately acknowledges that this view may be too simplistic. Men's sense of their own worth may depend, to a significant extent, "upon their institutional position and their income share" (p. 546).

If that turns out to be the case, inequalities which are otherwise compatible with the difference principle will, beyond a certain point, generate a loss of self-respect. In some situations the wealth and income of the worst-off will continue to increase, but they will suffer from "relative deprivation." It will be necessary for the relevant governmental agencies to take account of these feelings of relative deprivation when setting limits on permissible inequalities. In doing so, moreover, it will not be sufficient to balance losses in self-respect against gains in wealth and income. Rather, since Rawls makes clear that the other primary goods are of little value without self-respect, it will be necessary to limit inequalities as soon as the self-respect of the worst-off begins to decline.

Now clearly, this proposal raises practical problems. As Benjamin Barber points out in his essay in *Reading Rawls*, self-respect cannot "be operationalized in the fashion of income" (p. 309). But it does not seem impossible to determine in at least a rough way what inequalities

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undermine the self-respect of the worst-off. If the various problems of measurement can be overcome, self-respect will provide a significant limitation on the extent of inequality allowed in Rawlsian society. The level of inequality permissible will depend on how sensitive the people near the bottom are to the existence of large disparities. Conceivably, it might be shown that virtually *all* inequalities in wealth and income have grave consequences for the self-respect of the least-advantaged. In that case, the difference principle would require that wealth and income be distributed evenly.

It seems likely, then, that the priority of liberty and the notion of self-respect as the most important primary good will place significant limits on the inequalities permitted in a just society. But liberty and self-respect may also provide ways of dealing with problems to which Rawls himself pays little attention, and of arguing for reforms in which he shows little interest. Consider the following examples:

(1) Rawls wants to avoid committing himself to any particular economic system. He believes the choice between a private-property economy and socialism is "left open"; both ought to be compatible with the two principles (p. 258). But his argument would require a socialist economy if there were no other way to preserve liberty. That is, of course, just what radicals have traditionally argued: they have maintained that private ownership of the means of production, even when combined with formal political liberty, *must* lead to political domination by the owning class.[10] If this assertion is taken to be true, then Rawls' theory will require socialism. Even if it were clearly more efficient, private ownership would have to be sacrificed to maintain the fair value of liberty.

(2) Brian Barry criticizes Rawls for not showing sufficient concern about the content of jobs and the need for meaningful work. Rawls does say that in a just society the worst aspects of the division of labor "can be surmounted: no one need be . . . made to choose between monotonous and routine occupations which are deadening to human thought and sensibility" (p. 529). Presumably this is so because the existence of a guaranteed minimum gives workers leverage that will force employers to eliminate the very worst jobs. Barry, however, suggests that this response is inadequate and endorses two measures that are more radical. First, he believes that the most oppressive jobs should be spread around, perhaps by requiring everyone to spend a certain number of

[10] For a recent example, see C. B. Macpherson, *Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1973), chaps. 1-4.

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days per year doing menial, uninteresting work. Second, an agency should be established "with power to tighten up incrementally the working conditions, material and psychological, that must be provided by any job and close down employers who fail to comply by certain deadlines" (pp. 164-65). Although Rawls may not be interested in such measures, his theory does provide a way of arguing for them. If it can be shown that certain sorts of jobs are damaging to self-esteem, then the difference principle will require implementation of Barry's proposals or of others like them.

(3) A similar argument can be made concerning the organization of production. Democratic socialists and advocates of workers' control have frequently asserted that hierarchical organization of industry necessarily undermines the self-esteem of the working class. It is assumed that most men will be unable to maintain their sense of their own worth while being forced to take orders day after day, for their entire adult lives.[11] If we accept these arguments, then radical equality in the organization of the workplace will be required to fulfill the difference principle. Again, given the importance of self-respect, this would be necessary even at considerable cost in terms of efficiency.

Undoubtedly, it will be possible to suggest additional arguments of this sort. In his essay in *Reading Rawls*, Frank Michelman provides several examples involving what he calls "insurance rights." The point to be emphasized is that Rawls' argument commits him to support *all* the conditions that are necessary to preserve the fair value of liberty and maintain the self-esteem of the worst-off, whatever those conditions turn out to be.

III. Non-Ideal Theory

In the previous section I have discussed some of the more important features of a Rawlsian society. But the question of the political implications of Rawls' theory has an additional dimension. Once we have an idea what a just society would look like, we still need to know how we are to deal with injustice "either in social arrangements or in the conduct of individuals." Rawls believes it is necessary to develop principles to meet the requirements of what he calls "non-ideal" circumstances. Non-ideal theory includes such topics as punishment, compensatory justice, and the justification of various kinds of opposition to unjust regimes. These issues are particularly important if we

[11] For the classic statement of this view, see R. H. Tawney, *Equality* (London: Unwin Books 1964).

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conclude, as I believe we must, that very few existing societies are, by Rawlsian standards, just.

In addition to the two principles and the priority rule, Rawls believes the hypothetical contractees would agree to establish a "natural duty of justice," which demands that every person support just institutions where they exist and work to establish them where they do not exist, at least whenever he can do so without great cost to himself. We are to judge existing institutions in the light of our conception of a perfectly just society (p. 246). Everyone is obligated to work to eliminate injustices, "beginning with the most grievous as identified by the extent of deviation from perfect justice." The serial ordering of the two principles should influence our decision as to which injustices are more "grievous"; violations of the principle of equal liberty must be considered more serious than deviations from the second principle.

Rawls presents a detailed discussion of one activity designed to bring about reform: civil disobedience in a nearly just, but nevertheless imperfect, society. Like most liberal theorists, he sees civil disobedience as analogous to public speech. It is not intended to convey a threat or to exert pressure on the authorities, but rather to appeal to the majority's sense of justice. By engaging in such disobedience, one "declares that in one's opinion the principles of social cooperation among free and equal men are not being respected." "We are appealing to others to reconsider, to put themselves in our position, and to recognize that they cannot expect us to acquiesce indefinitely in the terms they impose upon us" (pp. 364, 383).

Because civil disobedience is a form of address, it must be public and nonviolent. Those who engage in it accept legal penalties, not because they believe that punishment is in some sense "deserved," but because they want to make it clear that they accept the basic structure of society as nearly just and that theirs is disobedience "within the limits of fidelity to law." Rawls is concerned about the possibility that excessive disobedience might threaten the stability of a flawed, but still basically just, society; therefore, he erects a strong presumption in favor of obedience, carefully limiting the circumstances in which one may justly disobey (pp. 350-55, 371-77). Some of these limits may be unnecessarily restrictive,[12] but the general argument is highly compelling.

Because Rawls discusses civil disobedience in great detail, and because it is the *only* kind of protest activity he treats in such detail, some critics have concluded that he does not recognize the legitimacy of

[12] On this point, see Peter Singer, *Democracy and Disobedience* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1973), 86-92.

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other, more serious forms of opposition. That is not correct. Rawls realizes that civil disobedience is rational only in nearly just societies whose citizens share a sense of justice to which the protestors can appeal. In radically unjust societies, where the majority lacks a reasonably "effective" sense of justice, he acknowledges that this kind of disobedience would be a waste of time and resources, more likely to provoke repression than to produce the desired changes. But Rawls does not expect people living in such societies to remain politically quiescent; they are bound by the natural duty of justice to work for change by whatever other methods are available. "When a society is regulated by principles favoring narrow class interests, one may have no recourse but to oppose the prevailing conception and the institutions it justifies in such ways as promise some success" (p. 353).

Unfortunately, Rawls does not discuss the more serious forms of disobedience and the rules and restrictions that should govern their use. But he does realize that efforts to reform radically unjust societies will entail the use of various forms of pressure, including violence. That is to say, he concedes that it will sometimes be necessary to violate or suspend precisely those basic liberties which a just constitution ought to protect. He is uneasy about this conclusion, and he hopes that political actors will hesitate before interfering with the liberties of others. But he understands that such interference will sometimes be necessary to establish a society based on justice.

IV. International Relations

Rawls has little to say about relations *between* societies. At one point he suggests that it is possible to "extend the interpretation of the original position and think of the parties as representatives of different nations who must choose together the fundamental principles to adjudicate conflicting claims among states" (p. 378). But he does not go on to make a detailed argument in favor of any principles. Instead, he simply presents a number of examples of principles he believes would be chosen.

These examples are concerned primarily with just-war theory. They include, by Rawls' own admission, "no surprises." He supports self-determination, the right to self-defense, and a principle requiring that treaties be kept, except in cases where they commit states to cooperate in unjustified attacks. After endorsing the traditional distinction between *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*, he suggests that some forms of violence are strictly inadmissible even in a just war: "The aim of war

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is a just peace, and therefore the means that may be employed must not destroy the possibility of peace or encourage a contempt for human life that puts the safety of ourselves and of mankind in jeopardy."[13] Further, he argues, "where a country's right to war is questionable and uncertain, the constraints on the means it can use are all the more severe" (p. 379).

Concerning the distribution of wealth among nations, *A Theory of Justice* says nothing at all. Given the current debate about international redistribution, many readers are likely to view this as a serious omission. But it is not difficult to understand why Rawls focuses his attention on distribution within particular societies. Western political philosophers at least since Plato have assumed that the state is the appropriate unit for discussions of distributive justice. Because virtually no one has challenged this assumption, no one has felt the need to defend it. The weight of precedent has made it appear perfectly natural to ignore global questions.

Nevertheless, although Rawls follows this tradition, he implicitly concedes that concentration on individual societies may leave us with an incomplete theory. At the beginning of the book, he says that the problem of distributive justice arises whenever individuals are engaged in a cooperative venture for mutual advantage (p. 4). Later, he acknowledges that it makes sense to ignore international questions only if we assume that the state is "a closed system isolated from other societies" (p. 8), "a self-contained national community" (p. 457). These remarks clearly suggest the need for additional principles to govern international distribution. For it is obvious that most states are not now (if they ever were) closed systems, isolated from other societies. Although it is not absolutely clear what Rawls means by a cooperative venture for mutual advantage, it would seem that by any sensible definition this term must encompass relations between the inhabitants of different states engaged in ongoing commerce. Sometimes Rawls himself seems to realize this. At one point, he implies that it will be necessary to extend the theory to deal with more difficult international questions, once the narrower, more manageable problems have been solved (p. 8).

Several commentators have suggested ways in which this might be done.[14] Essentially, these proposals involve expanding the original posi-

[13] It is reasonable to assume that Rawls also intends these strictures to apply to revolutionaries fighting to overthrow an unjust regime.

[14] Barry (pp. 128-33) and T. M. Scanlon (Daniels, 202) discuss this question briefly. A more thorough discussion appears in Charles R. Beitz, "Justice and International

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tion to one in which persons from different societies (but not knowing, due to the veil of ignorance, which societies) seek to develop principles to regulate international distribution. The writers who have taken this approach disagree on details but concur on the major issue. They believe that the parties in an international original position would agree to apply the difference principle, or some principle very much like it, globally.[15] "Surely," writes Barry, "the arguments which are said to lead the participants in the original position to insist on maximizing the wealth of the worst-off within any given community would even more strongly lead to an insistence that what this minimum is should not depend capriciously upon the good luck of being born into a rich country or the ill luck of being born into a poor one" (p. 129). If it is rational for Rawls' contractees to protect themselves against the worst possible outcome in case they find themselves among the least advantaged in a particular society, then it will also make sense for them to protect themselves against ending up in a society with "an *average* income of £14 per head, fifteen or twenty doctors per million population, and perhaps less than one in a thousand of the population in post-primary education." The contractees could protect themselves best by agreeing to apply the difference principle as if the world comprised a single society. They would agree to permit inequalities only when necessary to maximize the expectations of those worst off in the entire world.

The precise implications of a global difference principle are, of course, open to debate. Here as elsewhere, Rawls' theory does not specify what a just distribution would look like. The theory can only identify the criteria for judging economic institutions; it can tell us what sorts of questions have to be answered before we can determine whether a particular distribution is just. Various writers have claimed that large

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Relations," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, IV (Summer 1975), 360-89. Concerning the ethics of international redistribution, see also John P. Lewis, "Oil, Other Scarcities, and the Poor Countries," *World Politics*, XXVII (October 1974), 63-86; Peter Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, I (Spring 1972), 229-43, and Singer, "Reconsidering the Famine Relief Argument," in Peter Brown and Henry Shue, eds., *Food Policy: U.S. Responsibility in the Life and Death Choices* (New York: Free Press, forthcoming); Robert W. Tucker, "A New International Order?" *Commentary*, LIX (February 1975), 38-50, and Tucker, "Egalitarianism and International Politics," *Commentary*, LX (September 1975), 27-40.

[15] As a possible alternative, Beitz (fn. 14), 366-73, suggests a resource redistribution principle, based on the assumption that the natural distribution of resources, like the distribution of natural talents and abilities, is "arbitrary from a moral point of view." This principle "would function in international society as the difference principle functions in domestic society." Beitz believes that such a principle would be morally compelling even if states were in fact self-sufficient.

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inequalities work to the benefit of the worst-off within a single society, and surely arguments of a similar sort can be made regarding international inequalities.[16] But it is, I think, fairly clear that such arguments are more difficult to sustain in the international sphere, if only because the inequalities involved are so much greater. Global application of the difference principle is thus likely to push Rawls' theory in a more radical direction. It is almost certain to require a far more egalitarian distribution of wealth than that which presently prevails. Under this principle, an affluent state that is perfectly just internally (whose inequalities all work to the benefit of the worst-off group) may still be unjust vis-à-vis other nations. Justice is likely to require monetary and trade reforms, debt cancellation, and, more important, massive development aid; in short, a substantial redistribution of wealth from the rich nations to the poor.

It is important to emphasize that this conclusion does not depend on any assumptions about how existing inequalities have arisen and how they are sustained. To conclude that the difference principle requires massive international redistribution, one need not assume that the rich countries have exploited the poor countries by appropriating their raw materials without adequate compensation or by intentionally undermining their position in the world market. Nor is it necessary to believe that relations between rich and poor countries have distorted the economic development of the latter, or that the poor countries would be better off today if they had been allowed to develop "normally."[17] These claims underlie many arguments for international redistribution; but, from a Rawlsian perspective, they are irrelevant.[18] To demonstrate that redistribution is required under the difference principle, one *only* need show that it would improve the long-term expectations of the poor.

If it makes sense to interpret the difference principle globally, it will also be reasonable to extend the principles of non-ideal theory to the international arena. This will have important consequences for the

[16] Rough arguments of this sort can be found in P. T. Bauer, *Dissent on Development: Studies and Debates in Development Economics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1972); Hayek (fn. 4), 46-48.

[17] These assertions are found in Paul Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth* (New York: Monthly Review Press 1957); Gabriel Kolko, *The Roots of American Foreign Policy* (Boston: Beacon Press 1969); André Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (New York: Monthly Review Press 1967), among many others.

[18] If true, however, the radical claims might necessitate redistributive measures *beyond* those required to fulfill the difference principle.

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rights and obligations of both rich and poor. If the existing international order fails to satisfy the principles of justice, then the inhabitants of the poor countries will be justified in working to effect an international redistribution. It will, of course, be preferable for those engaged in such efforts to use nonviolent means, including appeals to the sense of justice of the affluent. But if such appeals fail, it will be permissible, as it is in the domestic arena, to oppose the prevailing system "in such ways as promise some success." Though some means—terrorism or nuclear blackmail for instance—might be precluded on the grounds that they "encourage a contempt for human life that puts the safety . . . of mankind in jeopardy," a war for the redistribution of wealth would not necessarily be unjust.[19]

The rights held by the poor imply duties on the part of the rich. Inhabitants of wealthy nations will be obligated to do what they can to create a more nearly egalitarian international order. This might involve voting for candidates committed to an expansion of foreign assistance, contributing to private organizations which aid the underdeveloped world,[20] and giving all possible support and encouragement to those working to effect a more just distribution. As Beitz makes clear, this final requirement might in turn necessitate civil disobedience or refusal to participate, in the event of "a war of self-defense fought by an affluent nation against a poorer nation pressing legitimate claims under the global principles."[21]

If we accept the preceding arguments about the implications of Rawls' theory, there is still one major issue that requires consideration. Writers committed to global egalitarianism often treat international redistribution as if it were simply internal redistribution carried out on a larger scale. But there is one crucial difference. In a world of sovereign, independent states, transfers from the rich to the poor must be mediated by the governments of the poorer countries. Those governments, however, may choose not to use the aid they receive in ways that benefit their worst-off citizens. It is not clear how Rawls' theory can deal with this possibility. At first glance, it would seem that only a world government could guarantee that local authorities use aid as required by a global difference principle. But apart from the question of whether such a solution is even remotely feasible, Rawls' first principle, with its commitment to individual participation, would appear to

[19] Beitz (fn. 14), 386-88.
[20] See Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality" (fn. 14), esp. 239-40.
[21] Beitz (fn. 14), 388.

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militate against larger units of political organization. Rawls seems to assume that a system of independent states is desirable as well as inevitable.

Nevertheless, if a global difference principle is to have any meaning at all, the governments of recipient states cannot retain the right to dispose of transfer payments as they please. Affluent states must be justified in insisting that poor countries use aid in ways that maximize the long-run expectations of their poorest inhabitants. Furthermore, as Singer suggests, those in a position to dispense aid may also tie their offers to demands that recipient governments take steps to reduce population growth, as a condition of further assistance.[22] Recent history suggests that leaders of underdeveloped countries are likely to view these demands as unfair infringements on their nations' sovereignty. But since the principles of justice are concerned with the well-being of individuals rather than states, it is difficult to see how such interference might be avoided. It is even possible that the parties in an international original position would *demand* intervention against any government that refused to use transferred wealth to improve the prospects of the worst-off.[23]

No matter how the issue of sovereign states is finally resolved, adoption of an international perspective seems likely to have radical consequences for Rawls' theory. There is, however, an obvious objection to this entire line of argument. Most people do not believe that their responsibilities to members of other societies are as strong as their responsibilities to their own countrymen. As Tucker points out, "the great majority persists in drawing a sharp distinction between the welfare of those who share their particular collective and the welfare of humanity."[24] Now the prevalence of these beliefs does not, of course, establish their moral weight; Tucker's "great majority" may simply misunderstand their moral obligations. But it is possible to maintain that such beliefs are rational, that we do after all have overriding duties to those closest to us. To support this position, one could argue that obligations (or, at least, our strongest obligations) are generated through day-to-day interaction, local political activity, tacit and explicit

[22] Singer, "Reconsidering the Famine Relief Argument" (fn. 14).

[23] Tucker, "Egalitarianism and International Politics" (fn. 14), contains a sensitive discussion of the difficulties which a system of sovereign states creates for any theory committed to global egalitarianism.

[24] Tucker, "Egalitarianism and International Politics" (fn. 14), 36. For a similar observation from a source more sympathetic to egalitarian claims, see Lester B. Pearson and others, *Partners in Development: Report of the Commission on International Development* (New York: Praeger 1969), 8.

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agreements made over time—what Michael Walzer, following Rousseau, has called "sharing a common life."[25] I do not wish to suggest that this view of obligations is necessarily correct. It is, however, a widely accepted view; and, if taken seriously, it would provide grounds for denying that the difference principle ought to apply to the world as a whole.

If, however, the parties in the original position did *not* decide to apply the difference principle globally (either because they accepted the argument sketched above, or for some other reason), they still might be expected to endorse principles with redistributive implications. Rawls includes among the various natural duties a "duty of mutual aid" which requires us to "help another when he is in jeopardy, provided that one can do so without excessive risk or loss to oneself" (p. 114). If the contractees rejected an international difference principle as too strong, they still might agree that the duty of mutual aid should apply transnationally. Unfortunately, Rawls avoids some of the most difficult questions by refusing to explain what constitutes "need," "jeopardy," and "excessive loss." But one would think that on any plausible interpretation of these terms, the duty of mutual aid would require substantial assistance in cases of drought, famine, or other natural and man-made disasters—more aid than now given either by governments or private citizens of wealthy nations.

V. Criticisms

Rawls' original position is a "choice situation," an analogue of the state of nature in traditional social contract theory. Rawls believes that it is the "one interpretation of the initial situation which best expresses the conditions that are widely thought reasonable to impose on the choice of principles" (p. 121). In addition, he contends that once the various conditions have been brought together, the choice situation will yield a determinate result: the two principles of justice, ordered by the priority rule.

It should be clear that an argument of this sort can be criticized in a variety of ways, on a number of different levels. It is possible, first of all, to deny that the parties in the original position would inevitably choose Rawls' two principles. This criticism has been made most forcefully by economist John Harsanyi.[26] Using Bayesian decision

[25] Walzer, *Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War, and Citizenship* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1970); see esp. viii-xi, 90-97.

[26] Harsanyi, "Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls's Theory," *American Political Science Review*, LXIX (June 1975), 594-606.

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theory, Harsanyi argues that it is not rational for the original contractees to ignore the probabilities of ending up in various social positions once the veil of ignorance has been lifted. But, he continues, if the contractees attempt to take these probabilities into account, they will almost certainly choose to maximize average utility, rather than opting for principles that are so concerned with the fate of the worst-off. Thus, according to Harsanyi, the original position yields utilitarian principles, at least when combined with some widely held assumptions about rational behavior under conditions of uncertainty.

Most critics, however, concede that the original position does lead to the selection of the two principles, or at least that it can be made to do so by further adjusting the various conditions. But these critics argue that Rawls can achieve this result only at the cost of violating his initial commitments. Again, we will see Rawls' principles as the principles of justice only if we agree that the original position brings together all those constraints which are necessary to guarantee a fair and impartial choice. Clearly, a great deal depends on the precise nature of the conditions under which the hypothetical contractees make their selections. If we have serious objections to any of the main features of the initial choice situation, then—no matter how elegant Rawls' deductive argument may appear—there will be no reason for us to treat the emergent principles as morally significant. Barry and the critics represented in *Reading Rawls* have disputed the legitimacy of almost every aspect of the original position: they have denied that all the knowledge excluded by the veil of ignorance is really "arbitrary from a moral point of view"; they have challenged the list of alternatives presented to the parties; they have questioned Rawls' assumptions concerning the motivations of the contractees (why "mutual disinterest" rather than, say, "altruism"?).

They have also raised questions about Rawls' reliance on various laws and facts drawn from the social sciences. It will be recalled that Rawls is willing to permit his contractees access to certain widely accepted laws and facts about politics, economics, and psychology. According to Barry, however, Rawls ends up relying on a number of general laws that are neither widely accepted nor correct. These include, for example, the assertion that most people display an increasing preference for liberty relative to other primary social goods—an assertion that Barry finds dubious. While Barry concentrates on the general laws admitted in the original position, several of the critics in *Reading Rawls* approach the problem from the opposite direction. They have pointed to a number of widely held generalizations about society which would have

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changed the outcome of the deliberations in the original position if they had been included. These critics ask how Rawls can justify admitting some general laws and facts while excluding others that seem equally plausible.

Some of the sharpest and most powerful criticisms have focused on the extremely important notion of primary goods. These objections raise the question of whether Rawls' argument could be accepted by persons from a culture significantly different from our own. They threaten to undermine Rawls' claim to have found an "Archimedean point" from which existing social institutions can be appraised (p. 263). The issue here is whether wealth, income, liberties, and opportunities are really useful in every rational life plan, or whether these are goods only in certain societies. Michael Teitelman suggests that "after an initial coincidence, people's needs and preferences diverge fairly quickly and widely . . . so that the common core of requirements is fairly small." That becomes especially clear, he believes, when we look at the problem from a "transhistorical perspective." Teitelman mentions wealth as an example of a good which is "essential for the attainment of a person's ends in some kinds of societies but not in others."[27] Thomas Nagel, in his essay in *Reading Rawls*, reaches a similar conclusion. He argues that Rawls' list contains goods that are most useful in life plans which are individualistically rather than communally oriented. Hence, he believes, the use of primary goods as a measure of well-being biases the entire theory in an individualistic direction (pp. 8-10). William McBride adds that if Rawls' list of primary goods "is likely to seem intuitively plausible and commonsensical to the majority of his readers, . . . that may simply be a function of the cultural milieu in which he is writing."[28]

Barry and the writers in Daniels' volume develop the criticisms outlined above, as well as many others. Although both books are extremely useful, *Reading Rawls* seems to me the better of the two. Barry's book shows evidence of having been put together very hastily, and the results are uneven: it contains many subtle criticisms, but also some sloppy arguments and several serious misinterpretations of Rawls' theory.

Reading Rawls does not suffer from these faults. One can, however, take issue with Daniels' selection of articles. Daniels believes that the

[27] Teitelman, "The Limits of Individualism," *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 69 (October 5, 1972), 545-56; see also Adina Schwartz, "Moral Neutrality and Primary Goods," *Ethics*, Vol. 83 (July 1973), 294-307.

[28] McBride, "Social Theory *Sub Specie Aeternitatis*: A New Perspective," *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 81 (April 1972), 996.

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most interesting and significant contrasts are between Rawls and Marxism. "The need for a systematic Marxist response is especially great, since Rawls' work, when viewed as a defense of liberal moral and political theory, has such ideological importance" (p. xxxii). Although the articles in the book are by no means identical in outlook, this view obviously has influenced decisions about what to include. There are certainly differences between Rawls and his Marxist critics, but I do not think that they are as great as Daniels suggests. To the extent that the Marxists represented in this volume have a vision of a just society, it is not so different from Rawls' own view. One of them, Richard Miller, recognized this in an earlier version of his essay. "Of course," Miller wrote, "Marxists do suppose that a permanently stable society would have to be one which, at least roughly speaking, realizes the difference principle."[29]

The deeper and more interesting disagreements seem to me to be between Rawls and conservatives or libertarians—theorists who believe, for example, that freedom of contract is just as "basic" as political liberty; that people have a right to whatever they produce; that the most talented members of society deserve greater rewards (or greater power) by virtue of their talents; that hierarchy and ideological uniformity serve important psychological needs. Such beliefs present a direct and serious challenge to Rawls' vision of a good society. *Reading Rawls* would have been a better book if some writers holding these views had been represented.

[29] Miller, "Rawls and Marxism," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, III (Winter 1974), 187.

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THE STUDY OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

By PETER H. MERKL

Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Studies in Political Development No. 8. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1975, 638 pp., $22.50.

Albert O. Hirschmann, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1970, $2.50 (paper).

Charles Tilly, Louise Tilly, Richard Tilly, *The Rebellious Century, 1830–1930*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1975, 322 pp., $15.00.

Alan Milward and S. B. Saul, *The Economic Development of Continental Europe, 1780–1870*. London, Allen & Unwin, and Totowa, N.J., Rowman & Littlefield, 1973, 535 pp., $18.75.

Gabriel A. Almond, Scott C. Flanagan, and Robert J. Mundt, eds., *Crisis, Choice, and Change: Historical Studies of Political Development*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1973, 695 pp., $12.95.

THE study of European political development has stood at the cradle and—since the "return to Europe"—by the sickbed of the current reappraisal of the development studies of the Third World, which for two decades deeply influenced the discipline of comparative politics. It is a subject of intrinsic interest not only because of its bearing on the analysis of the less developed countries and because of the inferences drawn about the American national experience; it also deepens the understanding of how the contemporary European states themselves came to be. In a sense, of course, information about aspects of European political development is ubiquitous and can be found in hundreds of fine historical studies about the different countries and their evolution to this day. Yet, there is a gulf separating these historical studies from any widely agreed-upon theory of development, and especially from the quasi-ideology of political developmentalism. The latter used to inform development studies in a retrospective fashion—that is, by working back from the *telos* of democratic development rather than by starting out from the open choices of the historical situation of each country at a particular stage. We need to ask our questions, new and old, in the right sequence and without reference to any *telos*. That way, we can correct "the old maps of state, society, and economy . . . which had only a very rough and perhaps spurious fit," as the new Joint Committee on Western Europe of SSRC/ACLS has put it

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in its programmatic statement. While taking maximal advantage of available historical—especially European—scholarship, we must attempt to bridge the gulf between historiography and theories of development. The authors whose books are reviewed in this essay have made this attempt, each in his or her own way, following what appeared to be promising avenues of research. Viewed side by side, their varied endeavors will sort themselves out and should add up to an improved perspective on political development itself.

STATE BUILDING

One of the most rewarding approaches to the understanding of the processes at work concentrates on the state-building process *per se*. In the last volume of the Studies in Political Development, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, Charles Tilly and eight contributors admirably come to grips with most of the issues involved. The product of a conference in 1970 and some follow-up meetings of the now defunct Committee on Comparative Politics of the SSRC, this book is at first glance a forbidding and ungainly jumble of partly overlapping, long essays. But its wealth of information and stimulating insights, not to mention the multilingual bibliography, make the effort most rewarding.

The thrust of the book goes far beyond the much-quoted "return to Europe." It is in fact a return to the dismal sciences of *Staatswissenschaft*, of public finance and administration in a historical context, of the political economy and genetical sociology of the state with a capital S, all subjects that American political and social scientists have for decades preferred to ignore in favor of spiritually more uplifting aspects of government. For precisely this reason, the outstanding European scholars among the contributors, with their own sources and approaches, are able to open up perspectives that break through the usual limitations of "developmentalism" as seen from an American angle.

The stress on the extractive and repressive activities of state formation in Europe is, of course, deliberate. Still, it can hardly be said that the book succeeds in pulling together the many separate strands of the impact of military organization, taxation, technical personnel, police organization, control of the food supply, manufacturing, and public morality, into anything like a coherent model. To be sure, contributors such as Samuel E. Finer have their own modular theories, but the book as such fails to provide a common denominator. The editor admits that such conceptualization and other important aspects—the omission of the role of courts and judicial organizations and the impact of the

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religious struggles on state formation—will have to await more systematic studies in the future. The overall design of the book inevitably suffers from a severe case of symposiumitis, the parts having taken precedence over the whole. The contributors are not all writing about comparable time spans. There is also no rationale presented for the use of historical time in the book which, after promising to concentrate on the "early formative periods," instead deals mostly with the 17th and 18th centuries and, regarding police organization, with the 19th and 20th centuries. The editor's explanatory comment also is weak in its use of chronology to tie together, for example, the Roman Empire with the year 1400 (pp. 77-78).

Charles Tilly's introduction skillfully highlights certain perspectives of the process of development in Europe: The reader can sense the growth of this strange new coercive organization, the State, from 1500 (though several of the contributors seek much earlier antecedents) against enormous resistance from pre-existing deliberative assemblies, the rival nobility or trading bourgeoisie, the ubiquitous peasant societies, the church, and from other would-be states. Many would-be states, such as Burgundy, failed to make the grade in the long run, as did such alternative forms of organization as feudalism, multinational empires, or theocratic federations. Analogous to a theory of economic concentration, Professor Tilly suggests that, to survive as a state among some 1,500 aspiring political units, it took such factors as a supply of outstanding political entrepreneurs, availability of extractable resources and skills of extraction (taxation), success in war, a protected position (such as at the rim of Western Europe), a homogeneous population, and a strong coalition between the Crown and the nobility. Preparation for war was the quintessential state-building activity. It depended on a state's ability to extract sufficient resources for it, and in turn helped to maintain its coercive authority over its subjects. The outcome of wars and the state system also shaped or destroyed the individual state.

It seems logical, therefore, for the book to explore what Samuel E. Finer calls the various "military formats" and to relate them to technology, social stratification, beliefs, the "extraction-coercion cycle," and to state building itself. Finer's study of the great efforts of state building under widely differing conditions in England, France, and Prussia from the earliest period into the 20th century is brilliantly counterpointed with Gabriel Ardant's and Rudolf Braun's essays on the evolution of taxation amid the economic limitations of largely precapitalistic peasant societies, and by the essay on the public service by Wolfram Fischer and Peter Lundgreen of Berlin. There emerges a vivid picture

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of the dependence of state building on economic development and the growth of a money economy. Taxable economic activity, as in the early trading centers, resisted the evolution of the state; once the taxing state had been established, the practitioners of such activity demanded to be represented in the process of taxation. In this fashion, the final push for representative government in the 19th century mirrored the triumph of market economics in most of Western and Central Europe. Professor Ardant also describes the bitter opposition of the subjects to the continual tightening of the tax screw, their recurring tax rebellions, and the coalitions that were required between the Crown and other social classes in order to put down the resistance to this most essential state-building activity. In the same fashion, many continental monarchies first called the early *cortes*, estates, or parliaments to help them extract revenues by consent—only to suppress them later (with the rise of absolutism) because they were not cooperative enough with the Crown's power-oriented interests. Braun relates in particular the intimate links between the evolving British and Prussian states and their systems of military and fiscal extraction; the differences between the Whig system of separating government and business and the Prussian linkage of fiscal with police, military, and economic policies; and the differences between the British squirearchy and the Junkers' *Kompaniewirtschaft*—the feudal-military authority of the East-Elbian agrarians over their peons. Political development in Europe was highly differentiated, depending on local situations and the compromises effected between the Crown and the social classes.

Charles Tilly emphatically contends that the European situation was unique and has little relevance for the developing countries of today. The various current theories of political development from A.F.K. Organski to Samuel P. Huntington come in for some penetrating criticisms as "unhistorical," unsequential, retrospective, prescriptive, and rarely aware enough of European history prior to the 19th century. And yet, Tilly does not seem to offer a cogent new theory in their place.

EXIT AND OTHER SPATIAL PATTERNS

One determined theoretical thrust is made in Tilly's book by Stein Rokkan: "It is a great paradox that so little has been done to develop unifying paradigms for the advanced regions of the world and that so much of what we have in the way of theories of development bears exclusively on the systems with the shortest histories and the poorest documentary records" (*The Formation* . . . , 562). Rokkan proceeds

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to fill the gap with a magnificent model of the crucial dimensions of variations and time sequences in Western Europe. As in his earlier essays,[1] the model leans on Parsonian categories, but Rokkan gives them a dynamic dimension by adding questions that can reveal the generation of internal structural profiles of the evolving center-periphery relations of various systems. He gives what seems at first sight excessive credit to Albert O. Hirschman's *Exit, Voice and Loyalty*, the subject of a 1973 interdisciplinary seminar of the International Social Science Council.[2] Hirschman's book has also inspired many of the recent scholarly efforts toward a systematic explanation of the linkages between economic history and political and cultural sociology. Its special merit lies in having coined a shorthand language of behavioral options in organized society which can be applied as cogently to economics as to politics, and which takes individual choice as well as communications and organizational contexts into account. In a developmental perspective, Hirschman argues, the options are at first rather limited and crude. With advancing economic and organizational (political) development, in particular with the growth of markets, transport, and communication, *exit* becomes easy; the arts of *voice* and representation flourish precisely because it is now much easier to exit.

The options of exit, voice, and loyalty also have an obvious bearing on party systems and other internal structures of conflict. Given the territorial nature of the state, Hirschman's options dramatize the genesis of the particular boundaries and units of the European nation-states. What combinations of control of exit or institutionalization of voice created these particular states rather than totally different spatial configurations? How did manipulations of exit, voice, and loyalty create the internal structures of center-periphery relations as well as relations and boundaries among groups, corporations, and governmental authorities? How did particular institutionalizations of voice and the option of exit affect the crises of participation and of distribution? It is no detracting comment to point out the many ways in which Hirschman's terms call for further differentiation, as in "voice articulation," "voice mobilization," and "voice aggregation," to guide empirical political research. Likewise, control of exit can be related more specifically to the early military-administrative penetration and consolidation of the

[1] Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (New York: Free Press 1967), 6-14: in Rokkan, "Models and Methods in the Comparative Study of Nation-Building," *Acta Sociologica*, XII (No. 2, 1969), 53-73, where the six crises of development suggested by Gabriel Almond, Lucian Pye, Joseph LaPalombara, Leonard Binder, and others are related to the Parsonian model.

[2] Rokkan, *Social Science Information*, XIII (No. 1, 1974), 27-53.

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older nation-states, and to natural boundaries such as the English Channel or the Pyrenees. Alternatively, it can be related to the economic and cultural flows across boundaries. Although a common church hierarchy, for example, may have retarded the state-building process in Europe, it may also have helped it in many ways—for instance, by supplying administrative personnel and training as well as by offering models of law and organization. Recent events have shown that it is quite possible to exit from a sociopolitical system without physically leaving it. For developing countries as well as for advanced economies, Hirschman's options clearly invite analysis more in terms of the interaction of all three—exit, voice, and loyalty—rather than the simpleminded dichotomies of monopoly-competition in economy and politics.[3]

Rokkan's grand synthesis of earlier models and his adaptation of Hirschman's categories not only take into account the role of cities, land-holding structures, churches, and language communities in the evolution of center-periphery relations over time, with appropriate asides about the new, developing nations. For Western Europe before and during the state-building era, he also suggests a geopolitical grid in which the north-south distance from Rome, the fountainhead of the imperial heritage and center of the Catholic Church, and the east-west distance from the central belt of trading cities between the Hanseatic League and Northern Italy, along with ethnic factors and land-holding patterns, determine the conditions conducive to state formation. It is on the seaward and later the landward fringes of the old Empire that states begin to form. The trading cities themselves resisted any effort at military-bureaucratic domination for centuries; instead, they maintained prosperous leagues and consociational confederacies, as in Switzerland and the Netherlands. Evolving states around the edge of the prosperous trading areas soon began to engage in fierce competition and empire building at each other's expense, reaching out overseas and toward dominion over backward agricultural populations in the East. The distance from Rome added the dimensions of religion, church-state relations, and vernacular language, which affected the timing of the formation of national centers and the growth of legal-administrative structures. There were also the crusading empires of southwestern and southeastern Europe (Spain-Portugal and Austria) which had been built up in wars against Moslem empires.[4] Rokkan has not fully worked out

[3] Much of the book's intellectual attraction stems from its relevance to the American experience of emigration from Europe and the internal migrations of individuals and groups who tended to "vote with their feet" rather than to struggle for voice.

[4] There are some minor differences between Rokkan's great west-east chart (Tilly,

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the southern fringes in a corresponding fashion, and may have to give further consideration to the historical role of some areas such as Bohemia. In any case, there emerges a unified geohistorical vision of the formation of territorial states, which generally sets the pattern for contemporary nation-states. The city-state belt was in time undermined by the rise of the European state system around it, by the religious struggles and wars, and by its relative economic decline as compared to the rising Western states. Finally, Napoleon's conquests made the area ripe for state building by such relative fringe states as Prussia and Savoy-Sardinia.

After describing the establishment of the territorial states (phase I), Rokkan's scheme proceeds to account for the identity- or nation-building (phase II), leaning more on Barrington Moore than on Hirschman,[5] and then the phases of participation (III), and of distribution or the welfare state (IV). The rapidity of succession of these phases matters, of course, as well as whether linguistic unity precedes phase III or not. To the well-known concept of crisis loads, furthermore, Rokkan adds the "geopolitical loads" of a protected or unprotected location. The term "exit" enters into the distinction between endoglossic and exoglossic nation-states, the dichotomy of "received," or imported Roman law versus endogenous legal systems, and into the question whether states of various locations were open to the trading city network. Absolutist-mercantilistic states, by restricting both exit and voice, succeeded in state building, but only at the expense of successful further development. The upshot is that a smooth transition to mass politics (phases III and IV) was likely to occur only "when the territory is sufficiently remote from the exit promptings of the trade belt to have allowed the early growth of distinctive legal, religious, and linguistic standards (the English, Swedish, Norwegian, and Icelandic cases) or, within the central belt, whenever the cities have been able to establish strong enough consociational ties to thwart the development of a centralizing state apparatus (the Dutch and the Swiss cases)" (Tilly, 591).

By the same token, particularly violent transitions were likely to occur when a state-building center at the edge of the trade belt had to struggle to limit the exit options offered by the latter (Denmark, Prussia, Austria, France, and Spain), or when there was a rapid suc-

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Fig. 8-7) and its equivalent in *Social Science Information* (fn. 2), 46; the latter is limited to the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries.

[5] Cf. Rokkan's essay (fn. 2), 47-48, where cultural and economic boundary building is more explicitly related to exit and barriers to exit. Rokkan parts company with Barrington Moore regarding the differences between French and British development.

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cession of phases I to III (Italy, Ireland, Finland, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary). Absolutist no-exit policies also invariably implied the suppression of the power and prosperity of the cities of the country itself, while detracting from the trading opportunities of the city belt. In this essay, Rokkan foregoes the opportunity to spell out the channelling of "voice" through the four thresholds of oppositional representation as he did in *Citizens, Elections, Parties* and in other writings with regard to the expansion of mass suffrage.[6] Instead, he concludes with an application of his "master variables" to the developing areas of today in order to demonstrate the uniqueness of the European state-building era between 1485 and 1789. It is difficult to see, however, how such a comparison can be meaningful without accounting for the contextual variables of colonial conquest, empires, and the postcolonial situations of each new nation.

POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND DEVELOPMENT

Another approach to political development grows from the high level of current interest in political violence. For the developing countries, the thesis has often been advanced that the level of violence rises steeply once the great transition gets underway and decreases only when a society has reached full modernity as measured by mass consumption or other indices. But in Western Europe, this period of "transition" took up many centuries—if its onset can indeed be determined at all. Did it begin with the Reformation, the British civil wars, or the industrial revolution? And what kind of collective violence was it that can be empirically demonstrated to distinguish different phases of European development? The extraordinary husband, wife, and brother team of Charles, Louise, and Richard Tilly, supported by yet three more Tillys among the research assistants, has bravely ventured into this conceptual thicket with regard to France, Italy, and Germany for the period 1830 to 1930, thereby omitting the violence of the French Revolution as well as of the 1930's and the following decades. In *The Rebellious Century, 1830–1930*, the authors explain that the period "wrought fundamental changes in the whole pattern of violent protest in Europe. It was also Europe's great period of transformation from agrarian to industrial society" (p. 3).

The authors ask how violent protest relates to the urban-industrial transformation and to other changes in society; each of them answers the question in a slightly different way. Louise and Richard Tilly seem

[6] Rokkan, *Citizens, Elections, Parties* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, and New York: McKay 1970), chaps. 3 and 4. See also *Social Science Information* (fn. 2), 49-51.

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inclined to grant that the industrial-urban transformation may indeed have produced collective violence, though mediated by political conditions such as the repressive apparatus of the state, the restriction of freedom of association and speech, or the established channels of articulation and representation. Charles Tilly, on the other hand, rather than giving the urban-industrial changes their due, is preoccupied with refuting the "social breakdown" or anomie thesis *à la* Durkheim, which links industrialization and urbanization with presumably "irrational" violence. He evidently expected spurts of urban or industrial growth to produce instant social breakdown, or even suicide, criminality, or vagrancy; he does not allow for a time lag of five, ten, or twenty years, or into the next generation, as children grow up from broken homes or disoriented childhoods. Such a thesis, however, would seem to call for careful local research rather than the manipulation of national statistics. The Berlin-born rioters of 1848 mentioned by Richard Tilly (p. 216), for example, may well have been the sons of rural-urban migrants, as were the American race rioters of the 1960's. Migration and emigration, according to the accounts of Italy and Germany, often seem to have been substitutes or equivalents for violent rebellion.

Charles Tilly is at such pains to demonstrate the purposive, "rational" character of collective violence that he tends to obscure the difference between collective action, which often is the stuff of history, and political violence, which is an occasional epiphenomenon of collective action and, by some interpretations, can also be used to describe organized violence by armies or the police at home or against other states.

The confusion is all the more regrettable since Charles Tilly is among the foremost historical sociologists of violence. His admirable studies of the Vendée and of strikes in France demonstrate the depth of his understanding of the historical forms of violence.[7] In his essay on food supply and public order he offers "a victual theory of state-making" (*The Formation . . .*, 393). He analyzes the political character of historic food riots and blockages and shows that they were not so much the result of hunger and discontent as of organized, communal attempts to substitute collective action for the failure of governmental authorities to protect the local food supply at reasonable prices against the impact of emerging national markets. He explains that the national market or the needs of armies and big cities for locally produced food were part of the state- and nation-building process. Local collective action, whether violent or not, was therefore a *reactive* or defensive

[7] Tilly, *The Vendée* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1964); Tilly and Edward Shorter, *Strikes in France, 1830–1968* (New York: Cambridge University Press 1974).

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movement against the power of the emerging nation-state to extract food and other resources from peasant societies at the subsistence level and, later, from the vast numbers of landless or land-poor peasants drawn into agricultural capitalism or rural industry in the 18th century. Tilly also gives the reader revealing glimpses of the important differences in political development between the victorious East European nobility (Hungary, Poland), which won out over the princes and the cities and enslaved its peasants, and the market economy and monetized agriculture of the West, which permitted the growth of industrial capitalism and the modern bureaucratic-capitalistic state.

In *The Rebellious Century*, the Tillys distinguish three stages of collective violence: *Competitive* violence between old rival groups or communities; *reactive* violence, by which local communities or social groups defend their interests against state action or the claims of the emerging national market; and *proactive* violence, by which associations (for instance, trade unions) or parties claim new rights or seek a redistribution of power. Although they maintain that movements frequently base their collective actions on ideological principles, the authors seem to be uncomfortable with the accepted theories of ideological "collective behavior." Neither do they attempt to penetrate the mystery why or how these well-disciplined, bureaucratically organized movements engage in street violence. Conceivably, the answers to these questions might threaten the purely "rational" image of collective action.[8] Is it possible after all that some forms of collective action are meant to be intrinsically violent, and that certain mass organizations tend to recruit pathologically violent men?

The three-stage distinction of competitive, reactive, and proactive violence helps to periodize French and German modern history. It subsumes both the state-building process and the shift, with the help of the urban-industrial transformation, from a local and communal to a national-associational structure of mass politics. Although these three stages have often been concurrent, especially in Italy, the distinction also fits the varied descriptions of French, German, and Italian waves of political mobilization and associational organizations. Even in the number and duration of incidents of collective violence, duly quantified (if with varying measures) by the three Tillys, there are notable differences: Strikes and demonstrations in the 20th century tend to be far more massive, but shorter and less bloody than their equivalents in the mid-19th century. The foregoing may meaningfully categorize various

[8] Cf. Merkl, *Political Violence Under the Swastika: 581 Early Nazis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1975), Parts V and VI.

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forms of collective action, but what does it really say about political violence? The authors only count incidents involving 50 or more persons (Richard Tilly: 20 or more), and damage to property or seizure of persons or property against resistance (as far as such information is likely to be reliable). Thus there is no accounting for other terrorist actions, assassinations, successful coups, palace revolts, nonviolent revolutions, and, of course, military or police violence whether authorized or not. The Paris Commune of 1870, for example, is a minor period of violence on the French tables as compared to, say, the first decade of the 20th century. The raids of the Fascist *squadristi* in 1921–22 somehow disappear in the centuries of Italian violence. Fortunately, no attempt is made to measure the German street violence of 1931–33, or the repression that followed. Government repression and major realignments are referred to, but not really included in the measurement.

What the Tillys have really measured are certain kinds of street action by oppositional groups, and only while these groups held no authority. The "spontaneous pogroms" of the Nazis and other fascist dictatorships, or the semi-official actions of the *squadristi*, not to mention "spontaneous demonstrations" in Communist countries and many other forms of violence, would hardly fit the scheme. Richard Tilly gives a detailed account of the growth of the Prussian police forces after 1848, and also of the eventual transfer of the internal repressive function from the army to the police. Charles Tilly mentions the police state of Napoleon III; Louise Tilly cites the fact that Italian state authorities prior to Mussolini were rarely able to control outbreaks of collective violence.[9] In the conclusion, the role of governmental repression in engendering political violence out of collective action is diagrammed,[10] though it is not truly integrated into the national narratives. *The Rebellious Century* is a fascinating book, full of insights and worthwhile information, but it also leaves more than its share of unresolved questions and loose conceptual ends.

In light of the current revival of the study of political economy, the Tillys' account of the economic and social history of France, Italy, and Germany provides some striking contrasts with *The Economic Development of Continental Europe, 1780–1870*. Milward and Saul, two seasoned economic historians, are already well known for their work

[9] See also the essay on the history of European police organization by David Bayley in Tilly's *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*.

[10] There is no mention, however, of the familiar phenomenon that it is often the letting up of repression and especially of repressive violence that acts as a spur to collective action and to street violence.

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about the 20th century.[11] At first glance it is difficult to tell just what is so different about the perspective of Milward and Saul, who hope to follow up this volume with a second one on economic development since 1870. The authors freely admit that they have paid little attention to the history of labor and of consumption. Neither do they share the Tillys' interest in organizational growth and political mobilization, which is crucial to a history of collective action. On the other hand, they offer a sweeping view of the economic possibilities of the whole continent at various stages, separating their perspective from the distortions of comparisons with British economic development which have bedevilled so much of the literature of "continental backwardness."

The reader readily grasps the impact of Napoleon's continental system on the various countries and on technological transfer across the English Channel after the relatively prosperous 18th century. He also receives a highly differentiated picture of the extraordinary and long-standing variations in the economic development and fixed capital of, say, France, as compared to endemically underdeveloped Poland or Rumania. Milward and Saul emphasize such aspects of social history as the widely varying roles of the nobility, of land management systems and serfdom, and of the guilds and corporations and their often successful resistance to central governments and capitalistic development. The many failures in industrialization and their reasons are as instructive as the fortuitous mixture of circumstances for industrial success. Even the vast build-up of rural industries, which the Tillys describe so tellingly, takes on a more compelling economic and historical rationale. Migrations and population growth and change dramatically illustrate the changing economic fortunes of various parts of the continent; the authors explore all their ramifications.

Next to their eye for the international economic picture, Milward's and Saul's greatest merit may well lie in their careful analysis of the impact of wars, revolutions, institutions, population trends, and of course technology, on economic and social development. Among the best parts of the book are the sections on the economic causes and consequences of the French Revolution, a classical topic much in need of de-mystification. The authors meet the challenge in signal fashion, putting French and continental economic development in the 19th century into the proper politico-economic perspective. The second volume of

[11] Milward is the author of *The German Economy at War* (London: Athlone Press 1965), *The New Order and the French Economy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1970), and *The Fascist Economy in Norway* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1972); Saul is the author of *The Myth of the Great Depression in England* (London: Macmillan 1969).

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this economic history of the continent may turn out even better than the first.

SYNTHETIC HISTORY?

If we picture the contributions to an understanding of European political development somewhere along a line between historical analysis and "empirical" theory of political science, the closest to the latter pole must be *Crisis, Choice, and Change*, by Gabriel A. Almond, Scott C. Flanagan, and Robert J. Mundt. The book includes analytical studies of major political transformations in Great Britain (1832 and 1931), France (1870–75), and Germany (1918–19), as well as essays on historic crises in Mexico, Japan, and India. According to the preface, this project was five years in the making and reflects much of Almond's own intellectual development and his quest for an all-inclusive theory of social and political development. As he presents the organizing theory in his introductory chapter, it elucidates the extraordinarily fruitful synthesis of successive waves of Parsonian functionalism, social mobilization, rational choice, and leadership theories that have made up his current thinking. The theory falls short of an explanatory model, however, even though the authors have thought of including many aspects, conditions, and choices relating to political change. The combination of the various approaches has not completely eliminated their respective flaws, nor has it entirely closed the gaps in understanding that historical cases inevitably present. The "historical episodes" have not really been transformed into "analytical episodes," nor has the theory succeeded in synthesizing the course of history.

In a sense, Almond appears to have reached for the ultimate theory of development too soon, with important elements still missing—for example, in the relationships between the necessities of the domestic and external environment and the choices of the leadership, or in the "polimetrics" of performance which he has postulated elsewhere.[12] The book leaves one wondering, what might (or should) be the next method integrated by the great synthesizer to make this scheme complete.

The authors pay surprisingly little attention to the different governmental structures that channel decisions—rational or not—and provide for succession in "voice" and leadership. Flanagan's theory of coalition is quite different from the usual short-term models of coalition, for example; it treats the disposition over resources and the issue orientations of the contenders almost as if these countries had not each had a

[12] See Almond, *Political Development: Essays in Heuristic Theory* (Boston: Little, Brown 1970), 282 ff.

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particular structure and constitution that made for different problems, processes, and solutions. The individual case studies, of course, could not afford to ignore the historical uniqueness of each country's situation. For this reason as well as for some others, the case studies are not exactly the "analytical episodes" that synthetic reconstruction of history calls for. The historical interpretations offered in each case, moreover, are not beyond the pale of controversy among historians.

Almond and Mundt concede in their conclusions, that "this book shows all of the marks of unfinished business, of work in progress. The reader in search of hard theory, of hypotheses deduced from axioms and subjected to rigorous tests of proof, will find little comfort in this analytical framework and our collection of case studies" (p. 619). That is not to say that the comparative exercise was not worth the trouble, nor that the resulting new knowledge about the best way to approach such an ambitious undertaking was not rewarding. On the contrary, the conclusions read like an interim report of an ongoing scientific enterprise whose substantive and methodological insights should be fed right back into further case studies and into sharpening up the method itself. Almond and Mundt are pleased, by and large, with their insights into the evolution of these major European systems as compared to Barrington Moore Jr.'s and Robert A. Dahl's analyses because their method "deals more effectively with the interaction of politics and its environments and . . . illuminates the relationship between constraint and choice in political problem-solving" (p. 647). The most promising addition to the method, they argue, is to combine it with longitudinal time-series data—in other words, to "factor in" the micro-level of coalition options and leadership choices along with macro time-series data. Viewed as a significant way-station in the development of development studies, this book is an important contribution indeed.

CONCLUSION

It is hardly an accident that the chief figures in this review—Charles Tilly, Albert Hirschman, Stein Rokkan, and Gabriel Almond—all stand out for their ability to synthesize the contributions of others and of other disciplines, thus bringing their combined explanatory power to bear on difficult subjects. This emphasis on interdisciplinary synthesis rather than the old preoccupation with a misplaced desire for originality among comparativists deserves to be universally adopted. If it becomes a trend, in fact, this discipline may yet become what it is not at this time: a science of development.

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TRENDS ON TERROR:
The Analysis of Political Violence

By J. BOWYER BELL

International Terrorism (Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-third Congress, Second Session, June 1974). Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1974, 219 pp.

Edward Hyams, *Terrorists and Terrorism*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1974, 200 pp., $7.95.

Richard Clutterbuck, *Protest and the Urban Guerrilla*. London, Cassell, 1973, 277 pp., $3.75.

Paul Wilkinson, *Political Terrorism*. New York and Toronto, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1974, 160 pp., $11.95; $7.95 paper (1976).

James Kohl and John Litt, *Urban Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America*. Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1974, 425 pp., $12.50.

Mason Willrich and Theodore B. Taylor, *Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards*. Cambridge, Mass., Ballinger Publishing Company, 1974, 252 pp., $14.50 cloth; $5.95 paper.

IN recent years terror has become trendy. Obscure men in uncertain cause have seized their moment of prime time, choreographed a series of violent and dreadful deeds for the media and the millions, and established new directions in political violence. The lengthening litany —Rome, Khartoum, Munich, Athens, Vienna, Entebbe, once cities, now incidents—has engendered almost universal fascination, coupled with outraged indignation and scarcely eroded by the occasional reasoned explanation for such appalling conduct. No one, least of all the cloistered academic, knows quite what to make of a Kozo Okamoto who, with two companions, slaughtered twenty-five innocent people in the waiting room of the Lod Airport. He explained to his accusers that the Red Army revolutionaries and the victims united in death would be reincarnated as stars whose light would shed eternal peace on earth. Men who would kill for an improbable South Moluccan Republic or in the name of a fantasy Black Liberation Army must be mad and their acts certainly criminal. For many observers there is little difference in the kidnapping of diplomats for a viable political purpose and the violent acts of hysterical men mouthing garbled slogans. It often seems that the world has entered a new and frightful era, a time of terror, when the fanatical few can disrupt transnational order, hold stability to ransom, and strike down the innocent with impunity. What is worse, very little can apparently be done to prevent the new wave of horror.

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In fact, both the public and the academic response to terrorism has been ahistorical, exaggerated, and closely associated with congenial political postures. There is no consensus on the bounds of terrorism: some observers define as terror nearly every act of disruptive violence and ignore violence by established regimes; some scholars want psychopaths and criminals to be examined and others do not; and there are those who, defending a cherished cause, deny that their patriots are terrorists. There is, certainly in the United States, a general outraged indignation at what is seen as a sudden and dangerous disruption of international order. Many insist on swift and summary justice, coercive laws, increased security and safeguards, and the futility of conceding anything to the deranged or fanatical. Many others stress the rationality of terrorists, the need for dialogue, the legitimacy of grievances, and the possibility of accommodation.

Much of these conflicting analyses and prescriptions have been fashioned by those who have never seen a "terrorist" at the point of a gun, who depend for data on the *New York Times* or intuition and, in rare cases, conventional historical sources or interviews with the captured. Because terrorism, however defined, is a highly visible phenomenon, there are those in positions of authority who seek to aid and comfort their constituents. Scholars have stepped forth with typologies and categories, with sheaves of aggregate data, with proposed international conventions and institutions, and with psychological profiles.

Part of the difficulty, other than the elusive nature of the subject, has been that while terrorism was a conventional revolutionary term in the 19th century, the word is now a label used by the threatened to damage their opponents. "Terrorism" thus has become a convenient means to identify evil threats rather than to define a special kind of revolutionary violence evolving out of Russian radicalism and European anarchism. Today revolutionaries want to be guerrillas, not terrorists. And the enemies of revolution, often of change, have evaded the problems of counterterror, denied the rationality of the new revolutionaries, and sought to create for this decade an archetype enemy much like the anarchist bomber of an earlier time. Consequently, terrorism has come to have many meanings. The very word has become a touchstone for postures and beliefs about the nature of man and society, and the relation of law, order, and justice.

Clearly, some of these violent deeds are simple criminal acts, and others are the result of the compulsive fantasies of the mad. Obviously some governments have instigated a campaign of counterterror or permitted vigilantes to do so. Almost always, however, it is the use of

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spectacular violence by revolutionaries that has attracted the most attention and caused the deepest concern. There are conventional ways to deal with criminals and lunatics, long a recognized threat to society; and somehow a "licensed" assassin is less threatening than a revolutionary gunman. In the case of revolutionary violence, three major points of analytical contention exist: What kind of violence can be labeled terrorism? What kind of men act in this way? And to what extent are their actions effective? Answers to the first query run from any violent threat to existing order to a denial that "terrorism" is anything more than a pejorative label. Responses to the second query fall into two major categories: first, that such men are fanatics more properly studied by psychologists than by political scientists; second, that with a few exceptions, such men are rational and acting for a specific revolutionary purpose. Finally, assessments of such violence again produce two poles: first, that such acts are ineffectual and/or counterproductive; second, that such acts at times have affected events to revolutionary advantage. There is, however, general agreement that in recent years there has been a rise in revolutionary violence, a spate of new and spectacular tactics, and a growing threat to transnational order.

Again, there are a variety of explanations for such a trend toward terrorism. The end of imperialism has reduced the number of overt targets. The rise of interdependence has produced an increasingly homogenized Western culture that appears to threaten the future of inchoate nationalities—the Basque language will be lost and the youth move to Madrid. And the consumer society has alienated radicals who see color television as the opiate of the people. In an era of easing major power confrontations, the prospect of serious changes in the international system has thwarted the ambitions of others who want adjustments—who want to create new nations (Eritrea), to unite divided ones (Ireland), to change boundaries (Somalia), or to displace minority regimes (Rhodesia). Thus, there are a great many ambitions and aspirations held by those with little leverage, which under present circumstances cannot be achieved and yet cannot be abandoned by the faithful.

Most such revolutionaries would prefer to wage a limited war or to undertake a guerrilla campaign—now nearly a conventional form of war—but they lack the means. At best, they can bring the campaign into the cities where guerrilla tactics can more readily be seen as resort to terrorism than can a struggle in the far bush. At worst, they have to resort solely to spectacular acts of violence—not the tactics of the armed struggle, but a strategy of terror. Thus no one but the Portuguese

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labeled FRELIMO in Mozambique as terrorists. Most urban guerrillas —the Tupamaros or the I.R.A.—become "terrorists" to those other than the threatened government when the previously immune and innocent—diplomats, businessmen, or tourists—become targets, and when bombs are set without warning. Some organizations—Black September or the Red Army—must resort to such violence from the very beginning in order to maintain the organization and to achieve prominence. In its own analysis, Black September felt that its operation at the Munich Olympics was a success. The Fedayeen sought not public sympathy but to impart a simple lesson to the world: if we are unhappy, so shall you be; if there is no justice for us, there shall be no peace for you. When the question was asked in horror why men do these dreadful things, there were those ready to explain the despair and desperation of the Palestinians.

Increasingly, the globe seems filled with fanatics seeking justice with a bomb, striking out at a world they never made. Efficient authoritarian regimes appear immune, and most of the accommodating democratic societies without submerged nationality problems have had few indigenous problems; rather, they have often become the stage for a terrorist spectacular. There remain, however, plenty of tyrannical regimes and inefficient democracies. There remain, as well, unfulfilled dreams of desperate men determined to act before history's tide ebbs. Thus, at the very time the world began moving toward détente, toward interdependency, toward a new transnational order, the frustrated turned to terror.

There is no easily perceived beginning for this new era of terrorism. In 1969, John Gordon Mein, the U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala, was assassinated; the U.S. Ambassador to Brazil was kidnapped and later released after the Brazilian Government agreed to the kidnappers' demands; and a TWA Boeing 707 was hijacked to Damascus and destroyed.[1] The hijacking of airplanes became all but commonplace, especially by the Palestinian Fedayeen and, in the United States, by those with no discernible politics.[2] Black September, the Tupamaros,

[1] One of the first responses to the advent of the new terrorists on the part of the concerned—other than speculation, and there was plenty of that—was to count. The result is that, although no one is any closer to understanding the phenomenon, still the course of events can be followed in the detailed chronologies of violence provided by RAND or HERO (Historical Evaluation Research Organization), or in the appendices to various studies or Congressional committee reports. There are even those who seek to order all such incidents on computer cards, producing a concordance of the dreadful.

[2] On skyjacking alone there is a mini-library: James A. Arey, *The Sky Pirates* (New

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and the Quebec Liberation Front became media stars. By 1972, the United States Government was already deeply concerned about the problems of countering the hijacking of airplanes; the Black September attack on Israeli athletes at the Olympic games in Munich[3] persuaded Washington to react to the more general world problem. President Nixon created a Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, and the United States presented a draft convention on prevention of international terrorism to the United Nations General Assembly. The major responses of the U.S. consisted of investigations of technical and tactical means of deterrence and fashioning an international consensus.[4] Nearly two years later, when the House Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia held hearings on international terrorism, that policy had not been found especially successful. But by then, at least the general postures and positions of those concerned had become clearer, if not congruent.

As the lead witness, Ambassador Lewis Hoffacker explained that many effective steps in deterrence had been taken, and that the United States had an effective and balanced policy in a variety of ways, but that acts of terror could occur and the prospect of action by the United Nations was not good. Over the next four years, that remained the official view in Washington. Embassy security was up and hijackings down, largely as a result of a bilateral agreement with Cuba, and there was no movement in the United Nations. The other witnesses were far more concerned with the causes of the new terrorism and the possible remedies. Eugene H. Methvin, an editor of *The Reader's Digest*, insisted that terrorists were psychologically disturbed and their "grievances" not amenable to rational accommodation.[5] What was needed was effective law enforcement and the proper use of the media. This law-

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York: Scribner 1972); Peter Clyne, *An Anatomy of Skyjacking* (London: Abelard-Schuman 1973); David G. Hubbard, *The Skyjacker, His Flights of Fantasy* (New York: Collier 1973). From the victim's view, there is Uri Oren, *99 Days in Damascus: The Story of Professor Shlomo Samueloff and the Hijack of TWA Flight 848* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1970); from the hijacker's, Leila Khaled, *My People Shall Live: The Autobiography of a Revolutionary* (London: Hodder and Stoughton 1973). And there are mounds of governmental reports, psychological studies, and accounts of various aspects, especially on the Palestinian Fedayeen; for example, Peter Snow and David Phillips, *The Arab Hijack War* (New York: Ballantine Books 1971).

[3] For a massive chronicle, see Serge Groussand, *The Blood of Israel: The Massacre of Israeli Athletes—The Olympics 1972* (New York: Morrow 1975).

[4] Cf. Martha Crenshaw Hutchinson, "Transnational Terrorism as a Policy Issue," paper delivered at the 1974 meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago.

[5] Methvin, *The Riot Makers: The Technology of Social Demolition* (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House 1970); *The Rise of Radicalism: The Social Psychology of Messianic Extremism* (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House 1973).

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and-order approach was countered by Professor Richard Falk, who stressed the need for accommodation with real grievances where possible, the importance for the United States to criticize state terror as well as revolutionary terror, and the dangers, for all, in restrictions imposed by a counterterrorist strategy. The final witness, Brian Jenkins of RAND, summed up the state of the analysis: "I simply cannot give you answers. There aren't answers. . . . All we can do is provide limited protection for ourselves. That may be an unsatisfactory answer."[6]

After five years, there were still no satisfactory answers.[7] No one had a definition of terrorism. In academia, the various concerned disciplines could not even define "terror." There was no agreement as to the effectiveness of "terror," or the basic causes of the phenomenon, or the best means of approach to analyze it. The lawyers sought recourse in law,[8] the psychologists in the personality,[9] the historians in the slow unwinding of the past.[10] Some applied the frustration-agression thesis,[11]

[6] Jenkins has done some of the most balanced and effective analysis of terrorism, but his work is widely scattered, from RAND papers to Congressional testimony. Cf. his "International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict," in David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf, eds., *International Terrorism and World Security* (London: Croom Helm 1975), 13-49.

[7] Seeking new directions, the Department of State organized a large conference of the academic and analytical "specialists" on terrorism in Washington in March 1976. There were no visible new directions.

[8] There is substantial literature, by various legal scholars, on appropriate responses and strategies, and on various United Nations resolutions and international conferences. This work looks most scholarly, dotted with footnotes and cross-references, but has taken place several giant steps away from reality. However desirable a world court for terrorists, or international agreements to end sanctuary, or an effective United Nations stand, in practice very little has been done. For a thoughtful survey of the problem, see Thomas M. Franck and Bert B. Lookwood, Jr., "Preliminary Thoughts Toward an International Convention on Terrorism," *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 68 (January 1974), 69-90.

[9] Gustave Morf, a Swiss-born psychiatrist practicing in Montreal, interviewed captured members of the F.L.Q. and published the result in *Terror in Quebec* (Toronto and Vancouver: Clark, Irwin 1970). David Hubbard (fn. 2) did the same on skyjackers, arriving at a bizarre explanation for such deviant behavior, but producing a most effective screening process. One of the very few trained psychologists to interview revolutionaries outside of prison has been Walter H. Slote. See his "Case Analysis of a Revolutionary," in Frank Bonilla and José Silva Michelena, eds., *A Strategy for Research on Social Policy*, I (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1967) for a Venezuelan study. His Vietnamese interviews are not yet published.

[10] The historical literature on Revolution/Terror is such that even bibliographies have become massive. Most movements have generated a tame historian (although recently the Provisional I.R.A. decided their man had taken his brief to be objective too seriously—been too critical—and suggested he forego publishing); but the most useful material is focused on somewhat more distant events, making use of varying historical means.

[11] The most elegant recent study is Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, Princeton University Press 1970); a glance at the bibliography will reveal just how massive the relevant literature is.

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and others the tools of quantitative social science.[12] With some exceptions, most did so at a distance—except for those who interviewed the victims or the prisoners.[13] There were really no general experts in the analysis of terror, only those with special academic skills (a knowledge of the Palestinian Fedayeen, or a career focused on deviant behavior) that could be related to the problem.[14] Those threatened by the terrorists, however, needed advice, recommendations, aid, and comfort; if the suggestions worked, no matter how bizarre, so much the better.[15] Beyond the confines of policy makers and their experts, the general public wanted answers as well. And those who can supply swift, dramatic, and popular accounts always stand ready at hand.

Edward Hyams, the author of *Terrorists and Terrorism*, would seem an unlikely candidate to explain the new variant of political violence despite his earlier work on assassination, for he has written at great length on a wide variety of subjects, including the English garden, without becoming a recognized authority on any. That handicap, however, does not prove to be insurmountable. What Hyams has done is to read a fair amount of readily available history, and then produce a quite decent popular account. It would probably not delight most scholars, but Hyams is not writing for scholars. There is a historical background of those he calls the theorists of terror; and there is a series of case studies, mostly familiar, of Russian populists, Irish Fenians, revolutionary anarchists, the I.R.A., and the Stern Group, and then a conclusion: such violence is often effective and "is simply a

[12] A major difficulty is that revolutionary "events" are seldom discrete, and are always related to vague variables. It is possible to count assassinations (once the deed has been satisfactorily defined), but quite impossible to list those "assassinations" that aborted out of sight. And quite often, the aggregate-data people appear content with less than complete sources. Some wars do not even make the *New York Times Index*—which may be a good thing.

[13] A great body of interviews exists, underwritten by the Israelis concerned with the Fedayeen, and the Americans with the Viet Cong; but much of the material remains, if not classified, at least confidential.

[14] One solution has been to put together anthologies: Carlton and Schaerf (fn. 6); Carol Edler Baumann, *International Terrorism* (Milwaukee: Institute of World Affairs, University of Wisconsin 1974); Bard E. O'Neil, D. J. Alberts, and Stephen J. Rossetti, eds., *Political Violence and Insurgency* (Arvada, Colorado: Phoenix Press 1974); Yonah Alexander, ed., *Inter-National Terrorism, North and South America, The USSR, Europe, Asia, and Africa* (New York: Praeger 1976); the issue on terrorism of *The Stanford Journal of International Studies*; the proceedings of the conference on terrorism held under the auspices of Glassboro State College, Glassboro, N.J. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press 1977); and those of the City University of New York Conference, *Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives* (New York: John Jay Press 1976).

[15] Beyond the normal behavioral considerations, Hubbard (fn. 2) factored in the reaction to gravity and to the space program, but his screening program *did* work, gravity or no.

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normal condition of social life under the rule of law, is a cathartic fever incident to civilization . . . " (p. 189). Hyams makes clear, of course, that he abhors terror. (One of the unwritten requirements of writing on terrorism is that abhorrence must be stressed; on the other hand, if revolution be the subject, one can be either in favor or opposed.) Hyams's conclusion that, although unsavory, still such a means may work, has been unfavorably received by those who insist—on evidence less convincing than Hyams's—that such deeds not only are not effective but are also counterproductive.

A problem for the advocates of order has been to balance their analysis of revolutionary incompetence with the need for a substantial response to the new terrorist challenge. In any case, there has evolved what might be called a Union Jack School of Conflict Analysis. It is related to Brian Crozier's Institute for the Study of Conflict, in London, which sponsors a series of conflict studies as well as various studies and occasional conferences, usually but not always involving individuals dedicated to life as lived in the home countries. Crozier's new book, *A Theory of Conflict*, is dedicated to "the victims of revolution the world over."

A leading practitioner of the Union Jack School is Richard Clutterbuck, a former British Major-General, and at present a lecturer at the University of Exeter, who has written on Malaya and the disturbances in Singapore.[16] His *Protest and the Urban Guerrilla* is an attempt to relate the new revolutionary violence to British society, a subject that has fascinated the defenders of British order for some time. The difficulty with Clutterbuck's analysis, despite his present academic position, is that in a broad sense he cares little for exacting distinctions, accepts the most facile labels and orthodox British explanations, and finds most rebels too distasteful to be sorted out properly. In his long section on the Irish Troubles, there is no real feeling for Irish issues (long an English failing), and no criticism of the British, especially British Army policy. There is also a series of strange errors: Conor Cruise O'Brien is *not* the leader of the Irish Labour Party; the six-counties did *not* vote against joining the southern Irish in 1921; and "Fianna d'Eirann" gangs are *not* a recent, spontaneous movement; rather, the Fianna Eireann is the Irish Republican youth movement. And calling the

[16] Clutterbuck's recent *Living With Terrorism* (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House 1975), a handbook for the threatened, is dedicated to Sir Geoffrey Jackson, who was kidnapped and held for 224 days by the Tupamaros in Uruguay. Jackson, however, in his *Surviving the Long Night: An Autobiographical Account of a Political Kidnapping* (New York: Vanguard Press 1974), broke the chain by dedicating his book more conventionally "To my wife, and our son."

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official I.R.A. a Marxist-Trotskyist organization—clearly a "bad" thing —is a pure example of the problem of labeling. Some of the Conflict Studies have maps with swooping arrows marked "Chinese Communist influence" (also a bad thing). I would by no means suggest that much interesting and provocative work is not generated by the Institute or by those who write for it; still, the studies often miss those distinctions and subtle definitions necessary to analysis and, like Clutterbuck, stand beneath the Union Jack. Certainly a conflict study center is a useful institution—Dr. Gaston Bouthal directs a similar one in Paris and tentative plans exist for an American one—but one with a more diverse ideological posture and more stringent academic standards might be of greater value.

In *Political Terrorism*, Paul Wilkinson, a Lecturer in Politics at University College, Cardiff, addresses the wider implications of political terrorism in a more discriminating way. His work is divided into four parts. The first is a far-ranging essay on concepts of terrorism—those of other scholars rather than those of practitioners, including a rather interesting section on ethical considerations. Section two offers a brief typology of political terrorism; it is followed in section three by an extensive elaboration drawing on a variety of historical materials and present academic commentary. Although regime-terror figures in his typology, Wilkinson's primary concern is revolutionary terror. He is opposed to it, especially within democratic states, which is hardly surprising. There is no reason to anticipate that advocates for terrorism will be found in the universities of a democratic society. Wilkinson asserts that liberal democracies generally have no need to fear the triumph of terrorism, although they may have to pay a considerable cost in varying currencies: "liberal democracy is only seriously threatened by revolutionary terrorism when there is a general withdrawal of popular support from the government, or when government appears entirely unable to deal with the problems that face it" (p. 119).

Democracies have, of course, succumbed (Germany and Italy to violence on the right)[17] or been taken over by the military (Uruguay), or at least made a deal, as Great Britain did with the Irish Republicans in 1921. One focus of revolt in an important contemporary contest within a liberal democracy—seemingly stable or not—that Wilkinson does not stress is the presence of unrequited nationalism. Thus, Wilkinson sees the present Ulster troubles as a British rather than an Irish problem, to be met by a mix of coercion and political concession. This

[17] See V. Anthony Burton (another retired British Army officer), *Urban Terrorism, Theory, Practice, and Response* (New York: Free Press 1975).

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policy may be ineffective for the new breed of European revolutionary nationalists who in Belfast or the Basque country or Corsica continue to wage their campaigns of national liberation—perhaps unsuccessfully, but creating zones of endemic insurrection. In his final section on countermeasures, Wilkinson argues that "European democracies must take firm, effective steps; to dither would be a recipe for disaster. And the guiding principle of a European anti-terrorist policy must be never to surrender to blackmail or extortion" (p. 151).

In sum, *Political Terrorism* is an informed scholar's response to the threat of revolutionary terror. It touches all the bases from the aggregate data analysis of the Feierabends and Nesvold to Camus's *Les Justes*. The Weathermen are there, and even the *Doukhobors*. This is very much an academic book for academic purposes, a broad sweep through the subject, with cunning categories, an analysis of present analysis, and a brief prescriptive tail.

On the opposite side of the academic barricades from Clutterbuck and Wilkinson are James Kohl and John Litt. Their book, *Urban Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America*, is dedicated "To the Second War of Independence," and there is never any doubt on whose side they stand. Since they are serious as well as committed, the work does not fall into the rather massive genre of guerrilla hagiography. They have examined three urban guerrilla movements—in Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina—largely by means of quotations from the involved: proclamations, memoirs, letters, and manuals. The introductory section outlines the theory and practice of Latin American urban guerrilla tactics during the past decade, including a critique of past failures (which have been considerable). The authors contend, however, that urban guerrillas are not the "party of the revolution," but have begun a process that may some day lead to the liberation of all of the Americas. So far, as in the case of the rural guerrilla *focos*, all but the Argentine rebels (where the issue remains in doubt), have failed, often producing an even more brutal but effective regime. Although Kohl and Litt, like Wilkinson, offer various prescriptions for action in the future, a Latin American militant would have to think twice, given the course record, before selecting urban guerrillahood as a vocation. In any event, the authors have performed a most useful service; they have collected documents, some quite rare, and added commentary and chronology and a detailed bibliography—a reference work for the interested, who may well not be revolutionaries.

In a sense, all these works have been concerned with relatively minor events, a low order of political activity. What is peculiar about the new

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terrorism, especially as practiced on a transnational scale, is that a very few persons may have a disproportionate effect on the minds of the many. A few guerrillas with submachine guns slaughtering the innocent in a revolutionary spectacular are picked up and exaggerated by the television camera. Daring Robin Hood kidnappings for immense sums fill the newspaper columns of the world. People's prisons, skyjacking, hostage-bargaining, and assassination are exciting, are news, and as a result of modern technology, can appear in color on the television screen. Very few people are actually killed. Even when an urban insurgency becomes serious, as in the case of Uruguay and Northern Ireland, only the locals really suffer; transnational order is hardly rippled. Most revolutionaries can bomb their way into the headlines but not into power. Their bombs are simply not big enough.

Mason Willrich and Theodore B. Taylor, in *Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards*, a report to the Energy Policy Project of the Ford Foundation, have raised the specter of a truly big bomb that may be just around the corner for the terrorist. For at least a decade, there has been professional concern with what have been called subnational or nonstate actors acquiring nuclear capacity by theft or guile or violence. Taylor in particular has argued that the necessary technical information is available, often in nonclassified governmental publications; that all the talent required would be a university education in science; that all the ingredients, except plutonium, can be easily purchased on the open market; and that the device could be constructed at a cost well within most revolutionary budgets. The ultimate weapon of terror would then exist, not in the supposedly responsible hands of governments restrained by fear of retaliation, but in the possession of unknown and fanatical men in the grip of some desperate dream.

Willrich and Taylor have produced a detailed and highly informed analysis of the problem of nuclear theft—largely leaving aside that of sabotage—complete with equally detailed policy recommendations.[18] They clearly believe that theft is possible. Moreover, there is a dreadful lack of precision about the entire subject of nuclear terrorism. There can never be any absolute assurances or safeguards, given the proliferation of the nuclear power industry. There may be those with the will, capacity, and desire to steal plutonium, to construct a nuclear device, to scatter radioactive material in a city. "The scope of the risk of theft

[18] For those made uneasy by details, John McPhee, in *The Curve of Binding Energy: A Journey into the Awesome and Alarming World of Theodore B. Taylor* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux 1974) provides a splendid popular account originally published in *The New Yorker*.

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by terrorist groups would seem to depend largely on how widespread terrorist behavior becomes in the future. Although any assessment in this regard is highly speculative, present trends appear discouraging. . . . For if present trends continue, it seems only a question of time before some terrorist organization exploits the possibilities for coercion which are latent in nuclear fuel" (p. 115).

It is not only in Willrich's and Taylor's analysis of terrorism that assessment is highly speculative, but in most of the analyses. The opponents of nuclear power, for example, have marshalled a whole spectrum of academic experts to expose the threat. In some cases the proffered scenarios sound like wishful thinking—James Bond scripts to frighten public opinion; in others, lack of sufficient safeguards has forced the nuclear industry to respond. The point is that the academic perspective on terrorism is conditioned by the nature of individual philosophy. No matter what tools of analysis a scholar carries into the terrorist thicket, rarely is the venture begun or ended disinterestedly. Outraged indignation and profound conviction abound. The conventional means of social scientists have been wielded to mixed advantage.[19] Psychologists have been able to interview captured Fedayeen or disturbed skyjackers, but active revolutionaries have been elusive. Political scientists have compiled detailed data from conventional sources, written on the theory of terror,[20] talked with the victims, the retired, and the captured, and have fashioned theories—often out of whole cloth or at least newspaper reports. Historians at least can begin at the beginning and rely on conventional and trusted sources. In fact, most analysis of rational revolutionaries has been either by journalists or by recourse to the historical method. Although a great deal can be said about policemen or parliamentarians, much less can be said about terrorists, but that has not prevented publication by academicians or others.

It seems quite unlikely that the situation will improve dramatically. There are still those who are content to apply their cherished means—feeding the *New York Times Index* into a computer to get a terrorist

[19] A most fascinating and effective examination of what might be described as pre-state regime-terror by anthropological means is E. V. Walter, *Terror and Resistance: A Study of Political Violence* (New York: Oxford University Press 1969).

[20] Still perhaps the most impressive treatment is David C. Rapoport's brief *Assassination and Terrorism* (Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting Company 1971). Some works with intriguing titles, such as Gerald McKnight, *The Mind of the Terrorist* (London: Michael Joseph 1974), turn out to be muddled journalism; others, like Irving L. Horowitz, "Political Terrorism and Personal Deviance," a background paper prepared for the United States Department of State (XR/RNAS-5, February 15, 1973), or D. V. Segre and J. H. Adler, "The Ecology of Terrorism," *Survival* xv (July-August 1973), 178-83 (reprinted from *Encounter*, XL [February 1973]), are intriguing but highly speculative.

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profile on the printout—or simply to speculate in elegant essays on the terrorist mind. Revolutionaries on the run are unlikely to stand still for dons bearing survey research forms or psychologists concerned with aberrant behavior. The academician will therefore largely have to make do, recognize that a principle of indeterminacy is operative, and adjust to the problem. This is in any case not a completely novel academic difficulty. What complicates matters is that almost all analysis has been shaped by advocacy. The investigator in the middle of the road is swept away on one side by guardians of order and on the other by revolutionary volunteers. Few subjects for investigation engender such commitment. And all this when there are no agreed definitions, no accepted bounds to the subject, no very effective academic approach, no consensus on policy implications—for either aspiring revolutionaries or fearful bureaucrats—and, finally, no slackening of interest. Inevitably, it appears that the analysis of terror will continue to be a growth industry regularly supplied with additional spectaculars by the practitioners. The prospect of all those essays and articles dense with notes, and survey books and monographs on obscure bombers, should strike terror in the mind of the common reader.

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